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Accurate memory matters nowhere more than in criminal cases, but research shows that 
people’s memory reports can be contaminated by misinformation spread by others. An 
increasing body of evidence shows that people can also contaminate their own memories 
when they lie. However, a theory of how lying can affect memory has been slow to 
develop. The experiments within this thesis therefore aimed to further our understanding 
of how fabrication can affect later memory for the truth and test some of the hypotheses 
generated by two existing relevant theories: von Hippel and Trivers’ theory of self-
deception and the memory and deception (MAD) framework. 
Experiments 1-3 test von Hippel and Trivers’ proposal that repeating lies can promote 
forgetting of the truth via retrieval-induced forgetting. No evidence was found for this 
claim: Memory for information that participants repeatedly lied about did not differ 
from baseline. The thesis then turns to the relationship between the cognitive effort of 
fabrication and subsequent memory errors, as both theories are centered on the concept 
of cognitive load in deception. Some challenges are presented to the MAD framework’s 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between the cognitive effort of fabrication and 
subsequent memory errors. The findings of Experiments 4-5 highlight the need to 
reconsider the nature of this relationship: Different methods of increasing liars’ 
cognitive load moderated the effect of fabrication on memory. Finally, Experiment 6 
tested the possibility that fabricating in a previous interview might decrease the accuracy 
of the Concealed Information Test (CIT)—a physiological deception detection test that 
relies on strong memory for the truth. Prior fabrication did not decrease the CIT’s 
accuracy. Together, these findings help to refine models of lying and memory. 
Additionally, the findings raise concerns about contamination of revised testimonies 
after fabrication and highlight potential issues for increasing cognitive load for lie 
detection.  
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Chapter 1: Literature review 
“If you want to keep a secret, you must also hide it from yourself” 
– George Orwell (1954) 
Deception is one of the greatest obstacles in the pursuit of criminal justice. Every 
statement that contributes to a criminal case is potentially a deceptive one: Offenders lie 
to escape incarceration, informants may be incentivized to provide false testimony 
(Informing justice, n.d.) and alibis can be false (Marion & Burke, 2013). Even those 
with a vested interest in the truth, such as victims and witnesses, may give false 
statements if they are intimidated (Lykken, 1998; “Time to Tackle”, 2003). But despite 
its prevalence, deception is hard to detect. Most people perform little better than chance 
when trying to distinguish liars from truth tellers (DePaulo et al., 2003; The Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006) and the recurring phrase that there is “no Pinocchio’s 
nose” makes for a pessimistic outlook on our ability to detect deception (Luke, 2019). 
Moreover, our ability to detect deception might be further hampered if a liar can come to 
believe their own lies, so that they not only deceive another, but potentially themselves. 
As Orwell knew, a secret is best kept when it is hidden from yourself. 
One way that people may come to believe their own lies is through memory distortion. 
By feigning ignorance or fabricating false details, it is possible that the individual may 
forget truthful details or remember them incorrectly at a later date. Memory impairments 
induced by deception may be problematic in the criminal justice system for two reasons: 
First, poorer memory for the truth may indeed make it harder to detect when somebody 
is lying. Second, there may be instances where an individual wishes to retract a 
deceptive statement, such as when a witness enters protection or a suspect enters a plea 
bargain. In such cases, it is important that the individual can retrieve the truth to provide 
an accurate revised testimony. Yet there is relatively little research investigating the 
effects of lying on our ability to recall the truth, and even less research that contributes 
to our theoretical understanding of when and how memory is affected. This thesis aims 
to address this gap by testing some of the mechanisms that have been proposed in the 
existing literature. 
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1.1 Misinformation and memory 
Lies can be considered a species of misinformation in the sense that they convey false or 
inaccurate information. We already know from decades of misinformation research that 
exposing people to inaccurate information about an experienced event can lead them to 
later recall that event incorrectly, either partially or entirely (Loftus, 2005; Wade, 
Rowthorn, & Sukumar, 2017). Even without exposure to false information, memory for 
an event can be affected simply by the way in which a story is recounted. As far back as 
1932, Bartlett highlighted that memory is not merely reconstructive, but a social act: We 
typically report only relevant aspects of an event and omit other details depending on the 
audience and the goals of the exchange. This selective reporting also influences what 
details are later remembered about the original event (Tversky & Marsh, 2000).  
When people lie, they typically either mislead the receiver by fabricating false 
information or omit information that the receiver wishes to know. A deceptive 
individual therefore often creates their own post-event misinformation or selectively 
reports information about that event. How might this affect that individual’s memory? 
One study showed that both introducing false information and omitting true information 
can have powerful effects on memory (Wright, Loftus, & Hall, 2001). Participants 
watched a slide sequence depicting a restaurant scenario and then retold the sequence of 
events they had seen by using story cards provided by the experimenter. Some 
participants were given a set of cards containing an extra event that did not happen in 
the original scene, whereas other participants were given an incomplete set of cards that 
omitted an event from the original scene. Some participants therefore had the 
opportunity to include in their retelling an event that did not happen (as they would if 
they were fabricating) whereas others were forced to omit from their retelling a critical 
event that did happen (and therefore selectively reported the event).  
When participants' memories were tested one week later, 20% of participants who 
included the extra false event in their retelling recalled this incorrect detail compared to 
6% of the control group who did not retell the scenario using story cards. Additionally, 
only 44% of participants who omitted the critical event from their retellings recalled this 
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detail, compared to 67% of the control group (Wright et al., 2001). Embellishing stories 
with false information therefore increased the likelihood that participants mistook false 
information for the truth, whereas omitting critical details from their stories increased 
the likelihood that participants would forget this detail compared to if they had not 
rehearsed the story at all. 
Although classic misinformation studies like Wright et al. (2001) show that 
misinformation and selective reporting can distort memory, the findings do not 
necessarily generalize to deception. The participants in these experiments were not 
deliberately embellishing or omitting details from their story and may have been 
unaware that they were doing so. However, a related body of research suggests that 
people remain vulnerable to misinformation effects even when they knowingly generate 
that misinformation themselves. Instead of exposing participants to post-event 
misinformation, these studies force participants to generate their own misinformation by 
asking them ‘impossible’ questions about an event they witnessed; that is, questions that 
have no corresponding answer because they address details that were never shown. For 
instance, after witnessing a child fall from a chair, participants might be asked where he 
was bleeding from, despite the fact that he was shown unharmed (Ackil & Zaragoza, 
2011). Participants are therefore forced to fabricate a response to complete the task.  
These “forced fabrication” studies are designed to mimic coercive interview settings 
where an eyewitness is made to guess or speculate about a detail they cannot remember. 
The research to date consistently shows that participants often falsely remember the 
details that they were forced to fabricate in both recall and recognition tests (Ackil & 
Zaragoza, 1998; Pezdek, Sperry, & Owens, 2007; Zaragoza, Payment, Ackil, Drivdahl, 
& Beck, 2001; Zaragoza, Rich, Rindal, & DeFranco, 2017). People are therefore 
susceptible to incorporating misinformation into memory, even when they have 
generated that misinformation themselves. Perhaps most puzzling about this effect is 
that participants develop false memories of the details they were forced to fabricate 
despite often strongly resisting the task of answering the questions. Indeed, people can 
come to falsely remember not only small details, but entire fabricated events: In one 
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study, participants developed false event memories in 50% of cases over an 8-week 
period (Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2008). 
Although research on forced fabrication is informative, forced fabrication differs from 
deliberate fabrication in a number of important ways. Participants in forced fabrication 
studies are not informed that some of the questions they will be asked have no 
corresponding answer. They might therefore reasonably assume that they are being 
asked about events that did in fact occur and the belief that those events occurred might 
make participants more susceptible to memory distortion. This is consistent with the 
finding that factors that increase participants’ uncertainty in their fabricated responses 
(such as higher resistance to providing an answer or receiving a warning that they will 
be asked about false events) decrease false memory rates (Ackil & Zaragoza, 2011). In 
other words, when participants are more confident that the event in question never 
occurred, they are later less likely to falsely recall their fabricated details. In deliberate 
fabrication, participants are indeed likely to be confident that the event did not occur 
because the purpose of their task is to communicate false information and it is important 
for a liar to be aware of which information is true and which false. The intent to deceive 
also requires deliberate fabricators to appear certain in their responses so that they are 
more likely to be believed. Deliberate fabricators might therefore be less prone to 
memory distortion than forced fabricators. 
Another important difference between forced and deliberate fabrication is that the 
details participants are forced to fabricate are often consistent with the facts of the event, 
whereas deliberate fabrications may instead contradict the truth. To take the above 
example, the suggestion that the boy was bleeding is consistent with the witnessed event 
of him falling from a chair. Conversely, a deliberate fabricator might instead replace a 
truthful detail with a false one. For instance, a criminal suspect might say that they 
arrived home at 4pm on the night of the crime, rather than at 11pm. People may be more 
resistant to developing false memories from such contradictory fabrications, since other 
supporting memories of the event may be used as evidence in the memory verification 
process to reject the false information as fabricated (Wade & Garry, 2005). Consistent 
with this idea, people are more prone to developing false memories of information they 
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have been forced to fabricate when that information explains how or why the witnessed 
events occurred (Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2013). This suggests that the consistency of the 
fabricated information with the event facts could be an important factor for false 
memory development. 
It is therefore plausible that deliberate deception might have different effects on memory 
than externally sourced misinformation or misinformation that one has been forced to 
fabricate. Lying is a unique category of misinformation, defined as “a successful or 
unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which 
the communicator considers to be untrue” (Vrij, 2008, p. 15). A liar therefore knows that 
what they are saying is false and because they must have the intention to create a false 
belief, lying is likely to be a salient act for the individual. Indeed, existing evidence on 
how lying affects memory is mixed, with some studies showing that lying can impair 
memory for the truth (e.g., Pickel, 2004; Polage, 2012), while others show that lying has 
no unique effects on memory (e.g., Vieira & Lane, 2013), or can even enhance it (e.g., 
Polage, 2004). However, there is little research that synthesizes our existing knowledge 
to make sense of when memory is impaired, unaffected or enhanced by lying. Such 
inconsistent findings suggest that lying may indeed be a distinct category of 
misinformation and therefore its effects on memory warrant more detailed investigation.  
One factor that distinguishes lying from other kinds of misinformation is that liars play 
an active role in the spread of false information by intending to induce a false belief in 
another and, in some cases, generating that false information themselves. This means 
that they are more likely to experience greater cognitive load than an individual who 
passively receives misinformation from an external source (for example, the media, or 
an experimenter). The relationship between cognitive load and lying has been offered as 
a potentially important factor for understanding when, how and why lying affects 
memory for the truth, which is discussed in the forthcoming section. 
1.2 Lying and cognitive load 
The common denominator of almost all deception research is the notion that lying 
generally requires more cognitive resources than truth telling, and that this places liars 
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under greater cognitive load (Verschuere, Köbis, Bereby-Meyer, Rand, & Shalvi, 2018; 
Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008; Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, 
& Mulay, 2014). “Cognitive resources” refers to the “limited pools of attention and 
working memory available to respondents” (Walczyk et al., 2014, p.23) and “cognitive 
load” is the extent to which these resources are depleted. Put simply, lying typically 
requires more processes than truth telling. 
What makes lying typically more effortful than truth telling? Truth tellers can simply 
retrieve and relay the truth, whereas liars must organize, manipulate and elaborate on 
existing memories or scripts to generate false counterfactual information that is 
consistent with the known facts (Sporer, 2016). Not only is constructing the lie itself 
cognitively demanding, but also delivering the lie. The cognitive demand of lie delivery 
stems from two main factors: Monitoring and suppression (Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2008). 
Unlike truth tellers, liars do not assume that they will be believed and they therefore 
must monitor their behavior to ensure that they do not leak cues to dishonesty. Liars 
must also monitor the behavior of the enquirer to assess if they are believed (Schweitzer, 
Brodt, & Croson, 2002). Such monitoring requires cognitive resources. Additionally, 
because the truth is automatically activated (when accessible), liars must dedicate 
resources to the deliberate activation of a lie (Duran, Dale, & McNamara, 2010) and the 
suppression of the truthful response (Spence et al., 2001) at the time of lie delivery. 
One reason that the concept of cognitive load receives so much attention from deception 
researchers is that increased cognitive load often manifests in liars’ behavior and can be 
used to facilitate deception detection (Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2008). Indeed, people are more 
accurate at detecting deception when they are asked to look for signs that somebody is 
under increased cognitive load, as opposed to when they are asked to simply state 
whether they think that the individual is lying (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011; 
Walczyk et al., 2012).  
Strategies that reduce the cognitive cost of lying may therefore help an individual to 
elude detection. Memory distortion may be one such strategy: If an individual comes to 
believe that their lies are the truth, they are no longer cognitively taxed by suppressing 
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suspicious behaviors or the memory for the truth. In fact, a prominent theory of self-
deception proposes that self-deception evolved for precisely this purpose, positing that 
people can come to believe their own lies as a mechanism for reducing the cognitive 
demand of lying and more effectively deceiving others (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011).  
1.3 von Hippel and Trivers’ theory of self-deception 
According to von Hippel and Trivers’ theory of self-deception, maintaining an accurate 
representation of the world would not have worked to our evolutionary advantage. 
Instead, the authors propose a co-evolutionary struggle between the deceiver and 
deceived, such that deception evolved to help individuals accrue resources, but this in 
turn selected for better detection strategies to prevent us from being duped so often. The 
key claim of the theory is that self-deception is the next step in this co-evolutionary 
battle: A deceptive individual is much harder to detect if they themselves come to 
believe the lie, since they should leak fewer cues to deception than somebody who 
knowingly communicates a falsehood.  There are numerous types of self-deception 
proposed by von Hippel and Trivers’ theory, each with different underlying 
mechanisms. Of relevance to the current thesis is their proposal that self-deception can 
be achieved via memory distortion.  
One question is how such self-induced memory distortion could occur. People cannot 
simply choose what they do and do not believe, so if self-deception was functional in 
our evolutionary history, there must be specific mechanisms that enable people to 
maintain inaccurate views of the world, despite there being evidence to the contrary. 
Von Hippel and Trivers (2011) suggest two specific mechanisms that might promote 
memory distortion following deception: Retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF; Anderson, 
Bjork, & Bjork, 1994) and source monitoring errors (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 
1993). The experiments presented throughout this thesis test these mechanisms to 
investigate whether fabricating false information can indeed impair memory for the truth 
via RIF and source monitoring errors. These mechanisms, and the existing evidence that 
suggests they may be responsible for deception-induced changes in memory, are 
outlined in the next section. 
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1.4 Retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) 
Von Hippel and Trivers (2011) propose that by simply repeating a lie and omitting the 
truth, people may come to forget the truth via the process of RIF. Repeating lies may 
therefore promote omission errors; that is, fewer correct event details are recalled after 
lying about that event, which can also be described as forgetting the truth. 
Though RIF has received little attention in deception research, it has been extensively 
studied in the broader memory literature (Murayama, Miyatsu, Buchli, & Storm, 2014; 
Storm et al., 2015). RIF simply refers to the finding that strengthening memory in one 
respect can impair it in another; memory is improved for practiced information, but 
impaired for related unpracticed information (Anderson et al., 1994). For instance, when 
people practice retrieving the item “orange” in response to “Fruit-Or__”, they are later 
less likely to retrieve the unpracticed item “lemon” in response to “Fruit-Le__” than if 
they had not practiced retrieving the item “orange” (Anderson et al., 1994). The idea is 
that practicing lies might impair memory for the corresponding truthful information in a 
similar way. 
RIF has been studied in a forensic context, specifically looking at the effects that 
selective retrieval practice might have on eyewitness memory. Given that eyewitnesses 
are likely to be questioned on only a subset of the details from a crime, they can 
experience RIF for other aspects of the crime that are omitted from their statements. For 
instance, an investigator might focus on certain important objects like a stolen purse, but 
neglect to ask about other objects that later become relevant to the investigation, like the 
culprit’s backpack, and memory for these objects can suffer as a result (Storm et al., 
2015).  
Studies investigating RIF in an eyewitness context typically replace the category-item 
verbal stimuli like “Fruit-Orange” with mock crime scenarios in the form of 
descriptions, images or videos. After witnessing the mock crime, participants are 
questioned about a subset of the details they saw. Subsequent recall and recognition tests 
indicate that this selective questioning does indeed elicit RIF. In one study, for instance, 
participants imagined that they were police officers examining a crime scene and were 
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shown images of items allegedly stolen from two houses. They were then questioned on 
half of the items witnessed from one of the houses. When participants were later tested 
on all of the items from both houses, their memory for items that they were not initially 
questioned on was significantly poorer when those items came from the same house as 
the items they were questioned on, compared to when those items came from the other 
house (MacLeod, 2002). Questioning a witness about a subset of what they experienced 
therefore led to RIF; that is, it impaired memory for related information that was not 
initially probed.  
Existing research studying the effects of RIF in a forensic context has focused almost 
exclusively on eyewitnesses, showing that eyewitness memory for objects, offender 
characteristics and actions are all vulnerable to RIF (Camp & Wesstein, 2012; MacLeod, 
2002; Migueles & García-Bajos, 2007; Shaw, Bjork, & Handal, 1995). From this 
research, we know that investigative interviewing can inadvertently promote forgetting 
of information that might prove relevant later in an investigation. This may be true 
regardless of whether the interviewee is responding honestly or deceptively. Just as a 
witness is unlikely to be exhaustively questioned about a crime they witnessed, a lying 
suspect is also unlikely to be exhaustively questioned about a crime they have 
committed. RIF may therefore be a problem in other investigative contexts to 
eyewitness memory. But what causes the memory impairments consistently shown in 
these studies? 
The cause of RIF has been debated for more than 20 years (Buchli, Storm, & Bjork, 
2016; Murayama et al., 2014; Storm et al., 2015), but the most recent meta-analysis 
concludes that the evidence favors an inhibition-based account overall (Murayama et al., 
2014). According to the inhibitory account, attempting to retrieve a target item (e.g., 
“orange”) activates other non-target associated items (e.g., “lemon”) that share a 
retrieval cue (i.e., “fruit”). These non-targets compete with the target for retrieval, 
thereby creating interference, which is resolved by inhibiting non-targets. Repeated 
inhibition from multiple retrieval attempts reduces the accessibility of the inhibited 
items, which impairs memory for these items (Anderson et al., 1994; Murayama et al., 
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2014). In other words, practicing retrieval of an item promotes inhibition of related 
items in memory, which impairs later memory for those related items. 
Although the inhibitory account has considerable evidence behind it, there is a rival 
explanation that has been proposed to underlie RIF at least in some circumstances—the 
competition-based account. According to the competition account, inhibition is 
unnecessary to explain the forgetting effects following selective retrieval practice. 
Instead, its proponents claim that practicing retrieval of a subset of items strengthens 
their representation in memory. These stronger memories then interfere with the 
retrieval of weaker, unpracticed items in memory and block their retrieval (Raaijmakers 
& Jakab, 2013). For example, practicing retrieving “orange” in response to “Fruit-Or__” 
strengthens the memory of the association between “orange” and “fruit” so that it blocks 
retrieval of weaker memories associated with the cue “fruit”, like “lemon”. Thus, 
“lemon” is less likely to be recalled simply because stronger memories interfere with its 
retrieval.  
The critical difference between the inhibitory and competition-based accounts of RIF 
concerns their hypotheses about the strength of the memory for unpracticed items. The 
inhibitory account says that the strength of the memory for unpracticed items is directly 
weakened by an inhibitory process engaged during retrieval practice. The competition-
based account instead says that the strength of the memory for unpracticed items is not 
weaker, but their retrieval is just temporarily blocked by stronger items in memory. 
Thus, RIF represents genuine forgetting only for the inhibitory account. For the 
competition-based account, RIF is not really forgetting at all, but merely a product of the 
way that memory is being tested (Chan, Erdman, & Davis, 2015). 
Importantly, the memory impairments shown in RIF studies are not simply due to a lack 
of rehearsal and therefore do not merely reflect the passive decay of memories over 
time. RIF is a unique category of forgetting caused by rehearsing other information. We 
know this because people’s memory for unpracticed items that are unrelated to those 
practiced is consistently better than their memory for related unpracticed items 
(Murayama et al., 2014). To continue with the example above, people’s memory for 
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unrelated unpracticed items such as “whisky” in response to “Drink-Wh__” is better 
than their memory for the related unpracticed item “lemon”. In other words, neither 
“lemon” nor “whisky” were practiced, yet memory for “lemon” suffers as a direct result 
of practicing “orange”, whereas memory for “whisky” does not. Memory for “lemon” is 
therefore below baseline: It is poorer than it would have been had the individual not 
practiced retrieving any items at all.  
It is the “below baseline” forgetting that makes RIF distinct from mere decay over time. 
Experiments must therefore be designed using procedures that can differentiate between 
RIF and decay to establish that RIF is the mechanism underlying any forgetting effects 
found. While several studies investigating the effect of lying on memory have suggested 
RIF as a mechanism, this is typically offered as a post hoc potential explanation of 
forgetting effects (e.g., Christianson & Bylin, 1999; Gronau, Elber, Satran, Breska, & 
Ben-Shakhar, 2015; Paige, Fields, & Gutchess, 2018; Polage, 2018). Such experiments 
therefore do not include appropriate controls to determine that lying can indeed promote 
RIF of the truth. Thus, there is currently no direct research to support von Hippel and 
Trivers (2011) proposal that RIF could be one way that self-deception is achieved. 
While there is little research that explicitly investigates RIF following deception, there is 
a body of research studying omission errors—that is, forgetting—caused by false denials 
(denying aspects of or the entirety of an event that did in fact occur) and feigned 
amnesia (pretending to have forgotten about aspects of or the entirety of an event that 
occurred). We therefore do have some knowledge of how lying could promote 
forgetting. An overview of this research is given below. 
1.4.1 Deception-induced omission errors 
1.4.1.1 False denials 
Studies focused on false denials—that is, denying aspects of or the entirety of an event 
that in fact occurred—show that the most pronounced effect of denial on memory 
appears not to be for the details denied, but instead for the interview in which those 
details are discussed. In one experiment, participants were shown a series of images and 
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were then asked a series of questions about details from a subset of those images. 
Participants responded in one of three ways: The false denial group were instructed to 
(wrongly) deny that the event or object in each question was shown. A second ‘external 
denial’ group were instead instructed to respond honestly, but received feedback from 
the experimenter that the event or object stated in their answer never occurred. The final 
group of participants instead responded honestly by truthfully reporting the details they 
remembered from the images. The next day, participants completed a recognition test 
and a source test to assess their memory for the details from all of the images they 
studied, as well as their memory for whether they spoke about each detail during 
interview. For all groups, there was no impairment to recognition memory; that is, 
memory for the image details addressed in the interview was not affected. However, 
source memory was poorer in the false denial group: False deniers were less likely to 
remember having discussed those details compared to the external denial and honest 
groups (Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, & Wang, 2016). Thus, falsely denying impaired 
memory for the interview, but not the details originally witnessed– a finding called 
denial-induced forgetting (DIF).  
DIF is a non-trivial finding: Poorer memory for what was discussed during interview 
may have its own consequences for lie detection. An individual may be less consistent 
over repeated interviews if they struggle to recall how they have previously responded. 
Since inconsistency is often interpreted as a cue to deception or low reliability (Smeets, 
Candel, & Merckelbach, 2004; Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014), DIF could 
actually facilitate lie detection by promoting inconsistencies across interviews.  
DIF has been consistently replicated across a range of stimulus types and in both 
recognition and recall (Otgaar, Howe, Memon, & Wang, 2014; Otgaar, Romeo, 
Ramakers, & Howe, 2017; Romeo, Otgaar, Smeets, Landstrom, & Boerboom, 2018). It 
should be noted, however, that DIF studies compare false deniers with truth tellers and 
do not include a control group who were not interviewed—given that DIF concerns 
memory for the interview, it is not possible to have a comparison group who are not 
interviewed. Nonetheless, this means that it cannot be determined if DIF represents a 
true forgetting effect arising from false denial or enhanced memory for the interview in 
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truth tellers. Additionally, the lack of an appropriate control can obscure the mechanism 
underlying the forgetting effect, as it means that there is no measure of the individual’s 
baseline forgetting rate. It is therefore difficult to determine if DIF is caused by a 
specific process that is recruited when denying, such as an inhibitory mechanism, or 
simply due to a lack of rehearsal. 
While DIF is a robust finding, the effect of false denials on item memory (that is, 
memory for the details denied) is less consistent. The DIF studies cited above 
consistently show that item memory is unaffected. Furthermore, one experiment found 
that memory for previously studied details may even be improved after denying having 
studied them (Vieira & Lane, 2013). Nonetheless, there is some evidence suggesting 
that denial can impair memory for the details denied. Denying knowledge of crime-
relevant details in a reaction-time-based lie detection test has been shown to increase 
response times to those details when the individual subsequently switches to truth 
telling. Participants were also less accurate when responding honestly after having lied 
(Visu-Petra, Jurje, Opre, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 2014). Slower responses suggest that 
denying knowledge of the crime-relevant details decreased their accessibility in 
memory, however this finding could merely reflect the switch cost of alternating 
between the task of lying and truth telling (Mayr & Kliegl, 2000; Visu-Petra et al., 
2014). 
It is possible that false denials do in fact reduce the accessibility of denied items in 
memory, but that the effect is too subtle to detect with forced-choice recognition tests 
such as those used in DIF studies and Vieira and Lane (2013). This idea is supported by 
one study showing that participants who consistently denied the occurrence of a true 
childhood event reduced their belief that they experienced that event (Polage, 2018). 
Participants did not, however, move from belief to unbelief that the event occurred as a 
result of denying it. Thus, it may be that false denial slightly reduces the accessibility of 
denied items in memory, but not enough to promote forgetting and therefore omission 
errors do not significantly increase. 
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In sum, the evidence to date suggests that false denials impair source memory, such that 
people are worse at remembering when they denied details in a previous interview than 
they are at remembering when they told the truth. The effects of false denials on item 
memory is inconclusive, but the evidence suggests that if false denials do impair 
memory for the details denied, the impairment is likely to be too subtle to significantly 
increase omission errors beyond an individual’s baseline rate of forgetting. Thus, the 
evidence currently favors the hypothesis that there is nothing special about false denials 
that promotes forgetting over and above the decay that would occur with the passage of 
time. 
 1.4.1.2 Feigned amnesia 
The effect of feigning amnesia on memory has received more attention from researchers 
than the effect of false denials, primarily because feigning amnesia is fairly common: It 
has been estimated that 23% of violent criminals claim partial or total amnesia for the 
crime committed (Cima, Nijman, Merckelbach, Kremer, & Hollnack, 2004) and it is 
therefore important to know how this might affect memory. Experiments studying the 
effects of feigned amnesia on memory typically follow a similar procedure. Participants 
first read about or perform a mock crime before undergoing interview, in which some 
participants feign memory loss for the crime-relevant details. They then honestly 
complete a free and cued recall test to assess their memory for the crime-relevant 
details. This same test is repeated after a delay of approximately 1 week to determine 
how feigning amnesia has affected their memory for the crime.  
In one of the first studies using this procedure, participants’ memories actually improved 
across the two sessions after feigning amnesia, however their memory performance was 
still below that of participants who responded honestly. For honest responders, 45% of 
the details recalled were correct, whereas 37% of the details recalled were correct for 
participants who feigned amnesia (Christianson & Bylin, 1999). Subsequent research 
shows a similar pattern of findings (Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2006). The authors 
of both studies conclude that feigning amnesia does indeed impair subsequent recall and 
propose that selectively reporting truthful details of the crime, while pretending to have 
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forgotten others, might have promoted genuine forgetting of those details via RIF. It is 
worth noting that if RIF does underlie the memory undermining effects of feigned 
amnesia, it would not be feigning amnesia per se that drives the memory impairment, 
but the selective truthful retrieval of other crime-relevant information. 
A recent study set out to directly test the hypothesis that RIF is the mechanism 
underlying the forgetting effects found in feigned amnesia studies. The authors adapted 
the classic retrieval practice paradigm from Anderson et al. (1994) such that participants 
practiced retrieving a subset of crime-relevant details and omitted others to determine if 
selective retrieval practice impairs memory for the omitted details (Mangiulli, Van 
Oorsouw, Curci, & Jelicic, 2019).  
Participants watched a mock crime video and were asked to imagine that they were the 
perpetrator, who engages in a violent fight. They were then allocated to either a retrieval 
practice condition, control, or truthful recall condition. Participants in the retrieval 
practice condition studied a subset of the details from the crime and then wrote down 
these details to mimic a situation where an interviewee selectively reports some crime-
relevant details, but omits others by claiming memory loss. This process is analogous to 
the retrieval practice phase of RIF experiments, where participants practice retrieving 
some items they have previously learnt, while omitting others. Participants in the control 
condition were instead asked to simulate memory loss for crime-relevant details, but did 
not receive any further instructions or prompting for which details to omit and report. 
On completion of their tasks, participants in both groups were then asked to honestly 
freely recall as many details from the crime as possible. Participants in the truthful 
condition progressed straight to this honest free recall task after experiencing the mock 
crime. Finally, all participants returned the next day to complete the free recall test for a 
second time (Mangiulli et al., 2019). 
Regardless of whether memory was tested immediately or after a 24-hour delay, 
participants in the retrieval practice condition recalled fewer omitted details than did 
participants in the control condition. The authors interpret this finding as evidence that 
selectively retrieving a subset of crime-relevant details promoted RIF of the information 
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participants omitted in their original reports. However, this interpretation is contestable. 
It is unclear that the procedure is an appropriately modified version of the retrieval 
practice paradigm to yield such a conclusion. A critical component of the retrieval 
practice paradigm is that memory for items that are selectively practiced and omitted is 
compared to a baseline measure of memory for items that are unrelated to those 
participants have practiced retrieving. This is the requisite comparison to conclude that 
RIF underlies any forgetting effects. However, the comparison group in Mangiulli et al. 
(2019) was the control group who feigned amnesia without specific instruction. These 
participants still therefore selectively retrieved and omitted crime-relevant information 
and are not therefore an appropriate comparison with the retrieval practice group. 
Additionally, participants in the retrieval practice group were not explicitly instructed to 
feign memory loss at all, whereas participants in the control group were. It might 
therefore be argued that participants in the retrieval practice group did not feign amnesia 
at all. These factors lead to interpretive issues: It is unknown whether the memory 
impairment found in the retrieval practice group is below baseline memory 
performance– which is a requirement of RIF– and it is also unclear whether the 
impairment reflects any processes that are related to feigned amnesia at all. 
Since the aforementioned studies do not include a no-rehearsal control group who 
neither feigned amnesia nor responded honestly, it remains unclear whether feigning 
amnesia can impair memory. The lack of a no-rehearsal group means that these studies 
cannot provide evidence that feigning amnesia promotes forgetting over and above what 
we would find from the mere passage of time. In fact, studies that include a no-rehearsal 
control group typically find that the memory performance of participants who feigned 
amnesia does not differ from the no-rehearsal group, suggesting that feigning amnesia 
seems to reduce memory performance only because it prevents the truthful rehearsal of 
crime-relevant details (Mangiulli, Van Oorsouw, Curci, Merckelbach, & Jelicic, 2018; 
Sun, Punjabi, Greenberg, & Seamon, 2009; Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004). 
In sum, the research to date provides little evidence that lying by false denials or 
feigning amnesia facilitates forgetting over and above what we would see from the mere 
passage of time. These types of lie do not appear to engage specific processes that 
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increase omission errors beyond the baseline rate of forgetting. Thus, in the context of 
denial and feigned amnesia, there is currently no evidence to support von Hippel and 
Triver’s (2011) hypothesis that RIF can underlie self-deception. However, research into 
the cognition of deception has revealed that there are specific processes recruited when 
people lie that may promote RIF of the truth following repeated fabrication. This is 
explored further in Chapter 2, in which the experiments reported investigate whether 
repeating fabrications can promote RIF of the truth via an inhibitory mechanism. 
While the evidence for deception-induced omission errors is weak and inconsistent at 
best, the evidence for deception-induced commission errors is far stronger. This is 
discussed in the forthcoming section in relation to the second mechanism that von 
Hippel and Trivers (2011) propose to underlie self-deception: Source monitoring errors. 
1.5 Source monitoring 
According to von Hippel and Trivers (2011), a second way that people may come to 
believe their lies is by “self-inducing false memories” (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011, p. 
6). While somebody may initially knowingly report a falsehood, over time they may 
confuse the source of the false information they have generated, such that they later 
believe it to be the truth. Fabricating false information could therefore increase 
commission errors; that is, it may lead people to report more incorrect details.  
The source monitoring framework (SMF; Johnson et al., 1993) is the most widely used 
framework for explaining how people can develop false memories. According to the 
SMF, memories are not encoded with labels that tell us where they originated when we 
retrieve them at a later date. Instead, source monitoring is a decision-making process 
where we infer the source of our memories based on certain subjective qualities they 
have (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988). Memories from different sources are 
systematically different and we use these differences to decide whether our memory is 
based on a genuine experience or an internally generated one (for instance, a 
fabrication).  
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Genuine memories tend to be more vivid than internally generated memories. A genuine 
memory is typically richer in perceptual and contextual details, as well as meaning and 
emotional relevance (Johnson et al., 1993). For example, recalling a childhood trip to 
the seaside is likely to cue the full spectrum of your experience at the time: You may see 
in your mind’s eye the waves crashing against the shore and recall the smell of the sea, 
the sound of gulls overhead and irritation at trying to rid yourself of the gritty sand 
between your toes. If you never had this experience, there will be fewer of these 
associated memories and therefore fewer indicators that this was something that you 
genuinely experienced.  
If you had instead merely imagined a childhood seaside trip, not only will your memory 
have fewer contextual and perceptual details, but you are also likely to have more 
cognitive operations associated with your memory. Cognitive operations are the mental 
processes that are activated when encoding information (Foley & Foley, 2007). These 
include the retrieval processes that allow you to piece together memories from other 
relevant experiences, as well as your knowledge and expectations about what the seaside 
is like so that you can imagine that such a trip happened. Because these processes are 
relatively effortful, the presence of cognitive operations is an indicator that an event was 
not truly experienced, but internally generated.  
The presence or absence of the aforementioned qualities therefore help us to judge 
whether a memory is authentic: Greater perceptual details and contextual 
embeddedness, together with few associated cognitive operations mean that we are more 
likely to attribute a memory to a genuine experience. Conversely, a less perceptually and 
contextually vivid memory, together with more cognitive operations mean that we are 
likely to attribute a memory to an internally generated experience, like a fabrication 
(Lindsay, 2014). 
Most of our source monitoring occurs unconsciously and automatically, and is largely 
accurate (Lindsay, 2008). But errors do happen: If an authentic memory lacks vivid 
perceptual details and contextual embeddedness, it might be incorrectly attributed to an 
internally generated experience. Conversely, if an internally generated event is very rich 
31 
in these details and is retrieved with little effort, such as a very vivid dream, it might be 
mistaken for an authentic memory. Such mistakes are called source monitoring errors 
(Johnson et al., 1993), but for consistency throughout this thesis I refer to them as 
commission errors. 
Returning to deception, it is possible that liars can mistake their lies for the truth through 
failures of source monitoring, as von Hippel and Trivers (2011) suggest. A fabrication 
rich in perceptual and contextual detail may be mistaken for a genuine experience, 
particularly if there are few cognitive operations associated with the lie. Indeed, there is 
a growing body of research showing that fabricating and reporting false information can 
increase commission errors via failures in source monitoring. This literature is reviewed 
below. 
1.5.1 Deception-induced commission errors 
One of the first studies to investigate the effect of fabrication on memory looked at 
deliberate fabrication in an eyewitness context (Pickel, 2004). Participants watched a 
mock robbery video before undergoing interview or allocation to a control group with 
no interview. Participants undergoing interview either fabricated incorrect information 
about what they saw, as an intimidated witness might, or truthfully responded to 
questions. One week later, participants’ memories for the original details of the crime 
were tested. Participants who fabricated information about the perpetrator recalled just 
as many correct details as control participants who were not interviewed, but they 
recalled significantly more incorrect details. Fabrication therefore increased commission 
errors, but not omission errors. Moreover, of the incorrectly recalled details, 27% were 
lies that participants had fabricated during interview. Thus, in over a quarter of cases, 
they confused their lies for the truth. 
The more believable participants' lies were (as assessed by two judges), the more likely 
their fabrications were confused with the truth. Believable lies may be easier to visualize 
and therefore more perceptually vivid, increasing the likelihood that they will be judged 
as authentic memories. They are also more likely to be more consistent with witnesses’ 
wider knowledge of the event and the greater similarity between the lie and truth may 
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have made source monitoring harder (Pickel, 2004, Exp 1). Thus, lie plausibility appears 
to be one factor that moderates the extent to which people come to mistake their lies for 
the truth by virtue of making source monitoring more difficult. 
In a follow up experiment, participants either generated their own fabrications, as in the 
previous experiment, or were given experimenter-generated fabrications to mimic a 
situation where an individual is provided with a false alibi or told what to say by another 
(Pickel, 2004, Exp 2). Regardless of whether the fabrication was self- or experimenter-
generated, liars made more commission errors and more omission errors than truth 
tellers. Note, however, that the experiment lacked a control group who did not undergo 
interview, so we cannot know if the increased omission errors reflect a memory 
impairment from participants who lied or a memory enhancement from participants who 
reported the truth. Nonetheless, the rate of commission errors was affected by the source 
of the fabrication: Participants who reported experimenter-generated fabrications 
incorrectly recalled 56% of their fabrications from the interview as the truth, compared 
to 37% for subjects who generated their own fabrications (Pickel, 2004, Exp 2). 
The finding that experimenter-generated fabrications are more likely to be incorporated 
into memory than self-generated fabrications has subsequently been replicated in the 
forced fabrication literature. In one study, participants witnessed a mock crime and were 
then forced to answer ‘impossible questions’ that addressed aspects of the crime that 
never in fact occurred. Some participants generated their own false answer, whereas 
others received a suggested false answer within the question that they could simply 
copy. Participants were more likely to incorporate the fabrications into memory when 
they were suggested in the question than when they generated them themselves (Pezdek, 
Lam, & Sperry, 2009).  
Similarly, a more recent series of studies showed that participants were more likely to 
recall their fabricated answers to general knowledge questions than their truthful 
answers, but only when they had fabricated the answers themselves. When participants 
instead chose between the truthful answer and a predetermined fabrication from the 
experimenter, they no longer showed a memory advantage (Besken, 2018).  Taken 
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together, these findings suggest that a victim or witness who is forced to state incorrect 
details may be at greater risk of memory impairment than somebody who volunteers a 
lie. 
The findings of these experiments are consistent with the SMF, which predicts that 
commission errors are more likely when a memory is rich in perceptual vividness and 
contextual embeddedness or has fewer associated cognitive operations. An individual 
who has not constructed the lie, but merely reports a ready-made one, is likely to require 
less cognitive effort to lie than an individual who constructs the lie themselves, as they 
do not need to engage cognitive processes for the retrieval, manipulation and 
organization of counterfactual information and can instead focus on lie delivery. The 
memory for an experimenter-generated lie is therefore likely to have fewer associated 
cognitive operations than the memory for a self-generated lie, thus increasing 
commission errors. Consistent with this interpretation, other research has shown that 
factors that are known to influence source monitoring ability affect the likelihood that 
lying will impair memory. One such factor is whether the lie is told merely once or 
repeated.  
There is conflicting evidence regarding the effect of repeating fabrications on memory, 
depending on how source monitoring is affected. One study showed that repeating a 
fabrication twice increased participants’ belief that the fabricated event occurred 
(Polage, 2018). This is consistent with research showing that repeating lies reduces the 
cognitive cost of lying (Van Bockstaele et al., 2012) and that lying can actually become 
easier than truth telling with practice (Hu, Chen, & Fu, 2012). The first time that an 
individual fabricates information, they must generate the false details to report, whereas 
repeating that fabrication on subsequent occasions instead requires that they simply 
retrieve what was previously said. Repeated retellings may enhance memory for the 
contents of the lie, while memory for the cognitive operations used to generate it might 
fade. Indeed, related research into the effects of imagination on memory shows that 
repeatedly imagining an event that did not occur increases belief that the event did 
indeed occur compared to when the event is imagined only once (Goff & Roediger, 
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1998). Thus, fabricated information might more closely resemble a genuine memory 
after it is repeated. 
It should be noted, however, that participants in Polage (2018) repeated their 
fabrications just twice. Other research suggests that when lies are repeated more than 
twice, repetition may instead help protect against memory distortion, rather than 
facilitate it. In one experiment examining the effect of repeated lying on memory, 
participants watched a video and were interviewed about its contents immediately 
afterwards and again two days later. During interview, participants responded truthfully 
to questions concerning details that were present in the video, but had to fabricate 
answers to questions concerning details that were not present in the video. To 
distinguish this from a forced fabrication paradigm, participants were explicitly told that 
they would be asked about details that they had not seen and that they should fabricate 
answers to these questions. Some questions were asked once, whereas others were asked 
thrice so that participants repeated their lies for a subset of questions. Importantly, some 
of the items were not asked about at interview to determine baseline memory 
performance (Rindal, 2017, Exp 1). 
In a recognition test taken two days later, participants were less likely to confuse their 
fabrication for the truth when they repeated those fabrications compared to when they 
told them only once, but still showed increased commission errors for repeated 
fabrications compared to control items. Thus, repeating fabrications still increased 
commission errors, but the most commission errors arose from single lies: Over four 
experiments, fabricating tripled commission errors compared to no rehearsal; 
participants confused their lie for the truth 30% of the time compared to a base rate of 
10% (Rindal, 2017). 
The finding that repeating lies can enhance source monitoring has been shown in 
another study that compared the effects of denial and fabrication on memory. 
Participants studied a series of images consisting of an object together with its label. 
They were then shown a subset of the object labels they had studied, as well as some 
new object labels, and either lied or told the truth about whether they had studied the 
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corresponding object in the previous phase. Participants either truthfully or falsely 
denied seeing something that they had in fact studied or described something they had or 
had not studied. Additionally, some object labels were shown just once, whereas others 
were shown thrice so that participants repeated their truthful or deceptive answers for 
some of the objects.  
Two days later, participants completed a memory test for all of the objects initially 
studied assessing both item memory (i.e., whether they correctly remembered studying 
the object), and source memory (i.e., whether they remembered talking about the object 
subsequently). Participants showed more accurate source memory when they described 
an object, rather than denied it. Source memory was further enhanced when subjects 
repeated their answer three times compared to when they answered just once (Vieira & 
Lane, 2013). 
Subsequent research suggests that it may not be repetition per se that helps to protect 
against memory distortion, but instead that repetition enhances participants’ memories 
for generating the fabrication (Lane, Dianiska, & Cash, as cited in Dianiska, Cash, Lane, 
and Meissner (2019)). Each time the lie is repeated it is likely that memory is reinforced 
for the act of lying, which serves as a reminder that the lie itself is indeed false 
information. Consistent with this interpretation, one study showed that the effect of 
fabrication on memory depended on participants’ memory for having lied. Participants 
who fabricated a childhood event that never happened decreased their belief that they 
had experienced that event when their memory was tested one week later, but only when 
they remembered having lied about that event. Participants who forgot that they lied 
instead increased their belief that the event occurred, a finding called fabrication 
inflation (Polage, 2004). Interestingly, while most participants showed small changes in 
their belief ratings that the fabricated event occurred, a significant proportion of 
participants were described as “big jumpers”: Over 2 experiments, 10% and 16% of 
participants shifted from a low belief rating that the event had happened before 
fabricating to a high belief rating after fabricating. This finding suggests that there may 
be individual differences in people’s susceptibility to memory distortion following 
fabrication (Polage, 2004).  
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One individual difference that seems to affect the likelihood that fabrication will distort 
memory is source monitoring ability. In a second study investigating potential 
moderators of the fabrication inflation effect, participants who had a tendency towards 
dissociative experiences were more likely to increase their belief that the fabricated 
event occurred. Importantly, this finding was unique to fabricated events; high 
dissociators did not increase belief in childhood events that they had not lied about. A 
propensity towards dissociative experiences has been linked to poorer source monitoring 
ability (Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2002). Thus, the increased fabricated inflation in high-
dissociators suggests that individuals who have difficulty source monitoring are more 
prone to memory distortion following fabrication. Participants who reported lying more 
often were also more likely to show fabrication inflation, which may be because they are 
likely to find lying easier and therefore may have fewer cognitive operations associated 
with their memory of the lie (Polage, 2012). 
In sum, there is a growing body of evidence that fabricating counterfactual information 
can indeed promote commission errors—or false memories—and therefore that the 
“self-induced false memories” described by von Hippel and Trivers (2011) are possible. 
Moreover, the likelihood that fabricating will increase commission errors is affected by 
factors known to influence source monitoring. Specifically, people are more likely to 
mistake their lies for the truth when those lies are plausible (Pickel, 2004), not self-
generated (e.g., Pezdek et al., 2009; Pickel, 2004), told on a single occasion (e.g., 
Rindal, 2017), and when the individual lies often or has a propensity towards 
dissociative experiences (Polage, 2012).  
One important factor that is known to affect source monitoring in the broader memory 
literature is cognitive load. Specifically, participants who experience greater cognitive 
load during encoding or retrieval are more prone to memory errors (Knott & Dewhurst, 
2007; Zaragoza & Lane, 1998). The relationship between cognitive load and deception-
induced memory distortion has not yet been investigated. However, this relationship 
warrants special consideration, as the concept of cognitive load in deception is critical to 
the only existing theory that is dedicated to explaining the effect of lying on memory: 
The memory and deception (MAD) framework (Otgaar & Baker, 2018).  
37 
1.6 The memory and deception (MAD) framework 
The MAD framework (Otgaar & Baker, 2018) is currently the only theory that is 
dedicated to explaining when and how lying can affect memory for the truth. Like von 
Hippel and Trivers’ theory of self-deception, the MAD framework focuses on the 
relationship between deception and cognitive load, however it takes the opposite 
perspective on this relationship. Whereas von Hippel and Trivers see memory distortion 
as a strategy for reducing the cognitive load of deception, the MAD framework proposes 
that the high cognitive load of deception may in fact cause memory distortion. 
The MAD framework focuses on three types of lie: [1] false denials (denying aspects of 
or the entirety of an event), [2] feigned amnesia (pretending to have forgotten about 
aspects of, or the entirety of, an event), and [3] forced fabrication (when an individual is 
compelled to provide false details, due to intimidation or an interviewer who forces the 
individual to guess unknown details). The framework is built on the observation that 
these different types of lie appear to affect memory in different ways. As outlined in 
Section 1.4, numerous studies show that when people falsely deny or feign amnesia, 
they are more likely to omit information in later truthful reports than they otherwise 
would if they told the truth all along (they make more omission errors relative to truth 
tellers; e.g., Van Oorsouw & Merckelbach, 2004; Vieira & Lane, 2013). For instance, an 
eyewitness who falsely denies that they saw the perpetrator or claimed to have forgotten 
what they looked like, might subsequently remember fewer details about their 
appearance than if they had truthfully reported them at the outset. In contrast, other 
studies show that when people are forced to fabricate alternative information, they often 
incorporate this information into memory later on (they make more commission errors; 
e.g., Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2009; Polage, 2012). To take the previous example, an 
eyewitness who fabricates that the perpetrator’s hair was blonde when in fact it was 
brown might later falsely remember that their hair was blonde. 
Why do false denials and feigned amnesia increase omission errors, but forced 
fabrications increase commission errors? The MAD framework explains this pattern of 
findings with reference to the cognitive resources required to lie. The central claim of 
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the MAD framework is that lies requiring few cognitive resources increase the 
likelihood of omission errors, whereas lies requiring greater cognitive resources increase 
the likelihood of commission errors. 
According to the MAD framework, both false denials and feigned amnesia require 
relatively few cognitive resources; individuals can simply respond “no” or “I don’t 
remember” to any question. This type of response prevents the rehearsal of truthful 
details, reducing the likelihood that they will be recalled later on (e.g. Van Oorsouw & 
Merckelbach, 2004; Vieira & Lane, 2013). In contrast, fabrication requires more 
cognitive resources because the individual must conjure up counterfactual information 
and construct a story that is plausible and consistent. Like von Hippel and Trivers 
(2011), the MAD framework appeals to the SMF to explain how fabrication can lead to 
commission errors. By fabricating information, the individual creates a source 
monitoring problem, that is, they must later identify what information in memory was 
fabricated and what was truly experienced. If the fabricated information shares the 
subjective characteristics of a genuine memory, it may be mistaken for a memory of a 
real experience, leading to a commission error (e.g. Pickel 2004; Polage, 2012). 
In sum, the MAD framework aims to predict the type of memory error from the 
cognitive effort required to lie. If the lie requires relatively few cognitive resources (e.g. 
false denial and feigned amnesia), we should expect an increase in omission errors, 
whereas if the lie requires more cognitive resources (e.g. forced fabrication), we should 
expect an increase in commission errors. There is currently no research that explicitly 
tests the hypotheses borne out of the MAD framework. Chapters 3 and 4 are dedicated 
to exploring this framework further and begin to test its hypotheses. 
1.7 Conclusion 
We know from a wealth of research that misinformation can distort memory. Although 
lying is a category of misinformation, the additional cognitive load generated by lying 
compared to other types of misinformation may lead to unique effects on memory. The 
effect of lying on memory therefore deserves independent consideration to other types 
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of misinformation. While research in this area is gradually gaining traction, there is still 
much to be investigated. 
The concept of cognitive load plays an important explanatory role in our understanding 
of how lying might affect memory and is a central concept to both of the theories in this 
area. For von Hippel and Trivers (2011), the central idea is that individuals will do what 
they can to reduce the cognitive cost of lying to elude detection. Self-deception may 
achieve this goal by reducing the accessibility of the truth via RIF, or by distorting 
memory for the truth via failures in source monitoring. These mechanisms can reduce 
the liar’s cognitive load by alleviating the need to suppress the truth in memory or 
monitor their behavior, and therefore may help the liar to elude detection. Consistent 
with this idea, there is preliminary evidence that self-deception does indeed decrease 
liars’ cognitive load (Jian, Zhang, Tian, Fan, & Zhong, 2019).  
The MAD framework instead considers cognitive load from the opposite perspective by 
suggesting that liars’ increased cognitive load might actually drive the memory 
impairment. While the concept of cognitive load forms the backbone of both theories, it 
has received no empirical attention in the deception and memory literature. The 
experiments presented within this thesis aim to test some of the claims of von Hippel 
and Trivers’ theory of self-deception and the MAD framework to build the empirical 
literature in this area and contribute to our theoretical understanding of the relationship 
between lying and memory. 
1.8 Research outline 
As outlined in the above review, the effect of lying on memory has received relatively 
little attention from researchers in comparison to other types of misinformation. This is 
particularly true for deliberate fabrication– that is, when an individual knowingly 
communicates false details with the intention of deceiving another– for which there are 
just a handful of studies looking at its effect on memory. In addition, there is just one 
theoretical paper that focuses specifically on developing a theory for how lying can 
affect memory—the MAD framework. 
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Given the prevalence of deception within the criminal justice system, it is vital that a) 
investigators have the best chance of detecting deception where possible and are 
therefore aware of the factors that might influence accurate deception detection, such as 
memory distortion, and b) that accurate information remains retrievable from people 
who wish to retract an initially deceptive statement and respond honestly. 
In light of the above, the research presented in this thesis focuses on deliberate 
fabrication in a forensic context. The current experiments investigate the effect of 
fabricating false information on memory for the truth, while also testing some of the 
purported mechanisms behind these effects to advance our theoretical understanding of 
the relationship between lying and memory. 
In Chapter 2, Experiments 1-3 address the first research question of the thesis: Can 
fabricating false information promote RIF of the corresponding truthful information? 
These experiments are the first in the field that are specifically designed to test for an 
inhibitory mechanism that may promote forgetting of the truth when people fabricate 
information. 
Chapter 3 begins to explore the MAD framework by challenging its proposal that the 
cognitive demand of lying may predict the memory errors that can follow. This chapter 
proposes that centering the framework on cognitive load could lead to misleading 
interpretations of the empirical findings. 
In Chapter 4, Experiments 4 and 5 test the claims made in Chapter 3. Here, the second 
and third research questions of the thesis are addressed: Do cognitively demanding lies 
increase commission errors and what is the relationship between the cognitive effort 
required to lie and source monitoring ability? 
Chapter 5 reports the sixth experiment of the thesis to address the final research question 
of whether fabricating false information in an initial interview can hamper subsequent 
lie detection by impairing memory for the truth. This experiment investigates whether 
the accuracy of a popular lie detection test—the concealed information test (CIT)—can 
be reduced when an individual has fabricated false information in a previous interview. 
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Finally, I bring together the findings from the 6 experiments presented throughout the 
thesis in the general discussion in Chapter 6. Here, I discuss the implications of the 
findings for the two existing theories that hypothesize about the relationship between 
lying and memory—Von Hippel and Trivers’ theory of self-deception and the MAD 
framework, as well as the potential practical considerations for deception detection.  
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Chapter 2: Can repeating fabrications promote retrieval-induced 
forgetting of the truth via an inhibitory mechanism? 
2.1 Introduction 
A good liar is one who practices. There are several reasons for this: An individual who 
practices their lies can embellish them with details in advance, respond to questions 
faster and more fluently, and is more likely to remain consistent over time. Since detail, 
speed and consistency are associated with honesty, practicing lies increases credibility, 
ultimately reducing the likelihood of detection (DePaulo et al., 2003; Granhag & 
Strömwall, 2000; Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike, & Griffith-Ross, 2009). A good liar, 
then, strengthens their memory for the lie so that it is readily available given the right 
cue, for instance, an investigator’s question. But what effect does repeating a lie have on 
the accessibility of the truth? While several researchers have considered that repeating 
lies might render the truth less accessible in memory via the process of RIF (e.g., 
Christianson & Bylin, 1999; Gronau et al., 2015; Paige et al., 2018; Polage, 2018), this 
proposition remains untested. We now know that the cognitive processes that promote 
RIF are also typically engaged when people fabricate false information. Thus, it is 
plausible that repeating fabrications might indeed reduce the accessibility of the truth via 
RIF. Research into the cognition of deception can explain how this might occur. An 
overview of this research is given below. 
2.1.1 The activation-competition-inhibition cycle of RIF 
As detailed in Chapter 1, RIF is an extensively investigated and robust memory 
phenomenon (Murayama et al., 2014). Since RIF is defined and explained in Section 
1.4, only a brief overview of the phenomenon is given here, and this section instead 
focuses on the specific processes that lead to RIF. So to recap, RIF is the finding that 
practicing retrieval of previously learnt information enhances memory for that 
information, but impairs memory for related information that was not practiced 
(Anderson et al., 1994). The forgetting is “retrieval-induced” because it is caused by 
practicing retrieval of other information. As outlined in Section 1.4, it is only inhibitory 
based RIF that represents true forgetting that generalizes across different contexts and 
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modes of testing, whereas competition-based RIF represents accessibility issues that are 
specific to a given test (Anderson, 2003; Chan et al., 2015). The experiments in this 
Chapter therefore focus exclusively on the question of whether repeating fabrications 
can promote RIF of the truth via an inhibitory mechanism. 
According to the inhibitory account of RIF (Anderson, 2003), there is a 3-stage process 
that causes forgetting, which I term the activation-competition-inhibition cycle:  
[1] Activation: Attempting to retrieve a target item in memory activates other items in 
memory that share a retrieval cue, but are not the targets for recall 
[2] Competition: The activated non-targets compete with the target for retrieval and 
therefore interfere with target retrieval 
[3] Inhibition: Activated non-targets are inhibited to resolve the interference and 
facilitate target retrieval, which weakens memory for the inhibited items 
Note that the initiating component for RIF is that the target shares a retrieval cue with 
other items in memory. Thus, when the individual is presented with the cue, multiple 
items are activated, inducing the subsequent processes that ultimately lead to forgetting. 
To recall the example from Section 1.4, it is because the items “orange” and “lemon” 
share the retrieval cue “fruit” that practicing retrieval of “orange” impairs memory for 
unpracticed items like “lemon”, but not unpracticed items like “whisky”.  
Fabricating false information shares this initiating component of RIF, since it also 
generates a situation where there are multiple items in memory associated with the same 
retrieval cue. To illustrate, if an investigator asks a suspect what time they arrived home 
on the night of the crime, this question will likely cue both the truth (since it directly 
solicits it) and a fabricated alternative (since the suspect does not want the investigator 
to know the truth). If the suspect is asked this question on multiple occasions and 
responds with the same fabrication each time, the same conditions that lead to RIF are 
present: There are multiple items in memory that are associated with the same retrieval 
cue, but only one item is selectively practiced (the lie), while the related information 
remains unpracticed (the truth). The question is whether there is a truly analogous 
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situation to RIF, whereby selective practice of the lie impairs later recall of other 
associated items in memory (i.e., the truth). There are numerous reasons to think that 
this might be so. Research into the cognition of deception suggests that the same 
activation-competition-inhibition cycle is also present when people fabricate. In the 
context of fabrication, the target response is the lie and the non-target is the truthful item 
in memory.  
2.1.2 Activation, competition, and inhibition in deception 
A substantial body of research demonstrates that the truth is automatically activated in 
the initial stages of deception and that it plays an important role in lying successfully. 
While some might consider the truth an inconvenience, the best liars use it to their 
advantage. Liars frequently report staying close to the truth as a strategy for avoiding 
detection (Leins, Fisher, & Ross, 2013; Vrij, Granhag, & Mann, 2010). People also use 
the truth to aid lie construction, either to cue related plausible information or to respond 
with the opposite answer (Walczyk et al., 2014; Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & 
Humphrey, 2003). Constructing plausible lies therefore requires that the truth is 
retrieved and active in working memory (Christ, Van Essen, Watson, Brubaker, & 
McDermott, 2009; Debey, De Houwer, & Verschuere, 2014; Suchotzki, Verschuere, 
Van Bockstaele, Ben-Shakhar, & Crombez, 2017; Walczyk et al., 2014; Williams, Bott, 
Patrick, & Lewis, 2013). Since lying requires withholding the truth, some researchers 
claim that lying depends on accurate retrieval of the truth and that the deceiver must be 
conscious of the truth to generate a deceptive response (Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 
2004). 
Consistent with this reasoning, numerous studies show that the truthful (non-target) 
response is the dominant response that is activated on receiving a retrieval cue, such as a 
question. For instance, in one study, participants responded either truthfully or 
deceptively to yes/no autobiographical questions by steering a Nintendo Wii remote to 
either side of a screen. Analysis of arm movement coordinates revealed that participants 
were initially drawn towards the truthful response when answering deceptively. 
Importantly, they did not tend towards the opposite answer when responding truthfully, 
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but rather moved directly towards the true answer (Duran et al., 2010). This suggests 
that lying requires the individual to overcome their automatic tendency to respond 
truthfully. There are also consistently higher error rates in lie trials compared to truth 
trials in reaction-time-based deception studies (Debey, Ridderinkhof, De Houwer, De 
Schryver, & Verschuere, 2015; Johnson et al., 2004; Suchotzki, Crombez, Smulders, 
Meijer, & Verschuere, 2015) This suggests the presence of a dominant truthful response 
that conflicts with the goal to respond deceptively, leading to more errors.  
Despite its importance for constructing plausible lies, automatic activation of the truth 
can create competition because the deceptive response is the recall target, not the truth. 
The response conflict that arises from this competition is evident in the brain scans of 
deceivers. Imaging studies show that deceptive responding recruits brain regions such as 
the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which are associated 
with conflict detection, cognitive control and response selection (Abe, 2011; Sun, Mai, 
Liu, Liu, & Luo, 2011; van Veen, Cohen, Botvinick, Stenger, & Carter, 2001). Lying 
successfully therefore requires a mechanism to overcome response conflict and enable 
execution of an untruthful response. As in RIF, research indicates that this mechanism is 
inhibition. 
Evidence for the role of response inhibition in deception primarily comes from imaging 
and ERP studies. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex is another brain region consistently 
implicated in deceptive responding (Christ et al., 2009; Spence et al., 2001) and we 
know that lesions to this area result in difficulty inhibiting prepotent responses (Iversen 
& Mishkin, 1970). Similarly, ERP signatures of deceptive responses overlap with those 
of classic response inhibition tasks, such as the Go No-Go and Stroop tasks (Johnson et 
al., 2004; Suchotzki et al., 2015). Other studies using techniques that more directly 
measure inhibitory processes, such as delta plot analysis, also demonstrate an important 
role for inhibition during deception (Debey et al., 2015; Williams et al., 2013). 
Taken together, research into the cognition of deception suggests that the cognitive 
processes recruited when people fabricate mirror those underlying RIF and therefore 
that repeating fabrications could promote inhibition of the truth, thereby reducing its 
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accessibility in memory. Although previous research has speculated that RIF could 
underlie memory impairments following deception, no research has explicitly tested this 
possibility using a procedure that is designed to elicit RIF. In the experiments that 
follow, the basic retrieval practice paradigm is modified to investigate if repeating 
fabrications can impair memory via RIF. 
2.2 Experiment 1a 
The basic retrieval practice paradigm consists of 3 main phases: Learning, retrieval 
practice, and a recall/recognition test (Anderson et al., 1994). In the learning phase, 
participants study category-item pairs, such as “Fruit-Orange”, “Fruit-Lemon”, “Drink-
Whisky”, etc. Participants then complete the retrieval practice phase, where they are 
prompted to repeatedly retrieve half of the items from half of the categories by 
completing category-stem pairs (e.g., “Fruit-O__”). After a short delay, participants’ 
memories are tested for all category-item pairs initially studied.  
This procedure creates three types of item: Items practiced in the retrieval practice phase 
(Rp+ items, e.g., “Orange”), items not practiced in the retrieval practice phase, but 
belonging to the same category as those that were practiced (Rp- items, e.g., “Lemon”), 
and items belonging to categories that were not prompted at all in the retrieval practice 
phase (Nrp items, e.g., “Whisky”). RIF refers specifically to the finding that memory for 
Rp- items (unpracticed items related to those practiced) is significantly poorer than 
memory for Nrp items (which represents baseline memory). 
There are two critical components of RIF studies that are required to conclude that an 
inhibitory mechanism underlies memory impairment: First, given that RIF refers 
specifically to below-baseline forgetting, the experiment must measure memory for 
information that is both unpracticed and unrelated to practiced information to determine 
participants’ baseline forgetting rate. In the present experiment, if memory performance 
for the truth falls below this baseline measure after participants practice their 
fabrications, it suggests the existence of an inhibitory mechanism that accelerates 
forgetting. If instead memory performance does not differ from baseline, it suggests that 
any forgetting is merely due to the passing of time and that fabricating does not have 
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any unique effects on memory. Second, the procedure must control for output 
interference in the final memory test so that any difference in recall performance can be 
attributed to changes in memory, as opposed to the order in which information is 
retrieved at test (the importance of controlling for output interference is fully explained 
in Experiment 1b).  
To meet the above conditions and investigate if repeating fabrications can impair 
memory via an inhibitory mechanism, the basic retrieval practice paradigm was 
modified to include a fabrication condition. The paradigm was kept as close to the 
original as possible (as in Anderson et al., 1994) to maintain a high level of 
experimental control and enable a straightforward comparison with previous RIF 
research. As such, participants learnt category-item pairs (e.g., “Clothing-Shorts”, 
“Sport-Tennis”) and subsequently practiced retrieving a subset of those pairs either 
truthfully or deceptively by completing word stems (e.g., “Clothing-S__”). Deceptive 
retrieval involved fabricating an alternative category member beginning with the same 
letter (e.g., “Skirt”) and repeating this fabrication each time it was prompted. After a 
short delay, participants completed a surprise final recall test assessing their memory for 
all items initially learnt. If repeating fabrications promotes inhibition of the 
corresponding truthful information, this should lead to poorer memory for items 
participants practiced fabricating about compared to baseline memory. 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Participants.  
The experiment was completed online by 151 participants in exchange for entry to a 
prize draw. Data from 17 participants were excluded: 13 participants failed to complete 
the experiment and 4 participants failed to correctly recall a single item in the retrieval 
phase, indicating that they had not encoded the material that they were instructed to 
learn. This left data from 134 participants for analysis (81 female, 51 male, 2 preferred 
not to say; 106 aged 18-25, 12 aged 26-34, 11 aged 35-54, 3 aged 65+ and 2 preferred 
not to say). 
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Participants were asked to rate their fluency in English to confirm that they were fluent 
to an excellent or native standard. If participants selected an option lower than 
“excellent”, the experiment was aborted (104 and 30 participants rated themselves as 
fluent or excellent in English respectively). The study was approved by the Psychology 
Department ethics committee at the University of Warwick. 
2.3.2 Stimuli.  
The category-item pairs were selected from published word norms (Van Overschelde, 
Rawson, & Dunlosky, 2004). Categories were selected using similar constraints as 
Anderson et al. (1994): They were a single word in length and semantically and 
phonetically unrelated. The items in each category were selected to have a mid-
taxonomic strength (ranked between 4-7 in Van Overschelde et al.), so that the category-
stem cue would successfully cue the item, without the association between the category 
and its item being so strong that interference from other items would never occur. The 
items within each category began with different letters so that no two items would have 
the same category-stem cue in the retrieval practice or recall phases. 
A pilot questionnaire ensured that participants (n=18) could consistently generate a lie 
for each item; that is, at least one alternative category member beginning with the same 
letter as the item studied (see Appendix 1 for the results). Based on the pilot, 6 items 
were selected from 6 categories, yielding 36 critical items. A further 3 items from 2 
additional categories were selected to yield 6 filler items. Participants therefore learnt a 
total of 42 category-item pairs (see Appendix 2). 
2.3.3 Design and procedure.  
An overview of the procedure is depicted in Figure 2.1. The experiment was created 
using Qualtrics software (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) and conducted online. The experiment 
had a 2 (Veracity: truth, lie) x 3 (Retrieval Practice Status: Rp+ [practiced], Rp- 
[unpracticed, related to practiced], Nrp [unpracticed, unrelated to practiced]) within-
subjects design. The experiment consisted of 4 phases: Learning, retrieval practice, 
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distractor and surprise final recall. Participants were informed that they were 
participating in an experiment on memory and reasoning in deception. 
Learning. Each of the 42 category-item pairs was presented one-by-one in the center of 
the screen. Participants were instructed to learn each pair and informed that their 
memory for the pairs will be tested. The first and last 3 pairs were fillers to control for 
primacy and recency effects. Critical category-item pairs were presented in a blocked 
semi-random order. There were 6 blocks each consisting of one item per category, 
yielding 6 category-item pairs per block. Each pair was on screen for 4 seconds and 
there was a 5s break between blocks. The order of the pairs within each block was 
randomized and the block order was counterbalanced such that half of the participants 
initially learned blocks 1-3 and the remaining half initially learned blocks 4-6. Once all 
blocks had been presented, each block was repeated, once again with the order of items 
within each block randomized and the block order counterbalanced. Participants 
therefore saw each category-item pair twice for 4s each time, yielding a total of 8s 
learning time per pair. 
Retrieval practice. Instructions were provided for the retrieval practice phase and 
participants were asked 3 questions as a comprehension check. Participants could only 
proceed if they answered all 3 questions correctly. In this phase, category-stem cues 
(e.g., “Sport - T__”) were presented one-by-one in the center of the screen for a subset 
of the items learnt (described in more detail below). The task was to complete each stem 
with the truthful answer—the item previously learnt—or a deceptive answer—an 
alternative category member beginning with the same letter that participants fabricated 
themselves. An instruction (LIE/TRUTH) at the top of the screen informed participants 
to answer truthfully or deceptively for each trial. 
Participants first completed 3 filler category-stem cues as practice trials. They then 
truthfully completed stems for half of the items from 2 critical categories and 
deceptively completed stems for half of the items from 2 critical categories (and so they 
were prompted to retrieve a total of 12 different items from 4 categories). Each of the 12 
category-stem cues was presented 4 times so that participants practiced retrieving either 
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the truthful or deceptive response for each pair. For lie trials, participants were 
instructed to provide the same fabrication each time it was prompted.  
As in Anderson et al. (1994) the order of category-stem cues was fixed to an expanding 
schedule, with an average of 4.8 trials between the first and second test, 10.4 trials 
between the second and third test and 11.3 trials between the third and fourth test. Trials 
were also organized so that no two categories were tested consecutively. Participants 
were given a maximum of 1-minute per cue to allow enough time to fabricate 
alternatives in lie trials. If no response was registered within 1-minute, the program 
moved on to the next category-stem cue. The specific category-stem cues presented 
were fully counterbalanced across participants so that every category-item pair served in 
each condition. 
This procedure generates 5 types of item: 
● Rp+ Truth – items participants practiced truthfully 
● Rp+ Lie – items participants practiced lying about 
● Rp- Truth – items participants did not practice, but were in the same category as 
truthfully practiced items 
● Rp- Lie – items participants did not practice, but were in the same category as 
items lied about 
● Nrp – items participants did not practice belonging to categories that were not 
cued at all during retrieval practice 
Distractor. Participants completed a variety of mathematical and reasoning tasks (e.g., 
sudoku, counting the number of triangles in a picture) for 10-minutes, then the 
experiment automatically proceeded to the surprise final recall phase. 
Surprise final recall. Category-stem cues (e.g., “Sport-T__”) for all 36 critical items 
were presented one-by-one in the center of the screen. The task was to complete each 
stem with the truthful answer, that is, the item originally learnt. A comprehension check 
ensured that participants understood this before they could proceed. The stems were 
presented in a random order across participants. This aspect of the procedure is 
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important: Randomizing the order of the category stem cues means that participants 
cannot choose the order in which they recall the items, which controls for output 
interference. This means that we can be more confident that any forgetting effects are 
due to inhibition of items in memory during retrieval practice, as opposed to interference 
caused by retrieving the strongest items in memory first when participants can choose 
the order of recall (Murayama et al., 2014). 
After completing each stem, participants rated their confidence that their answer was the 
item they had originally learnt on a sliding scale of 0-100, where 0 = “completely 
uncertain” and 100 = “completely certain”. Participants completed the task at their own 
pace, but were given a maximum of 1 minute to complete each stem and rate their 
confidence. The experiment automatically progressed onto the next stem if no response 
was registered within one minute. 
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Figure 2.1. Procedural overview of Experiment 1a. 
LEARNING 
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2.4.1 Retrieval practice performance. 
Performance in truth trials of the retrieval practice phase indicates how well participants 
encoded the category-item pairs in the learning phase. Participants performed 
moderately well in truth trials, correctly answering an average of 68.12% (SD = 
24.14%) of trials. However, this indicates that participants failed to encode almost a 
third of the items in the learning phase. Performance in the lie trials indicates that 
participants generally adhered to the lie instruction by providing a correct alternative 
category member: Participants correctly answered an average of 88.74% of lie trials (SD 
= 18.62%). 
In the retrieval practice phase, participants were prompted to retrieve each item 4 times. 
To include the recall data for an item in the final analysis, participants had to answer at 
least 3 out of four trials for that item correctly. Final recall data for items that did not 
meet this criterion were excluded from analyses. Three was chosen as a cut-off point to 
minimize data loss while also only including items for which participants had repeated 
their lies. This led to the removal of 11.68% of the final recall data for liars and 32.13% 
for truth tellers. 
2.4.2 Final recall performance.  
A 2x31 repeated-measures ANOVA on the proportion of items correctly recalled 
revealed a significant main effect of Veracity (F(1, 256.522) = 85.39, p < .001) and 
Retrieval Practice Status (F(1.96, 256.52) = 73.03, p < .001). Main effects were 
superseded by a significant interaction, thus the effect of retrieval practice on the 
proportion of items correctly recalled depended on whether participants lied or told the 
 
1 Since items in the Nrp condition were not included in the retrieval practice phase (by definition), participants neither 
lied nor told the truth about these items. Nrp items therefore do not have a veracity status, i.e., there are no lie trials 
and truth trials for Nrp items. As the design was fully within-participants, this resulted in a fractional factorial design 
consisting of 5 cells: Rp+ Lie, Rp+ Truth, Rp- Lie, Rp+ Truth, and Nrp. To enable a 2x3 ANOVA to be performed, 
the first step of analysis was therefore to make the design fully factorial by splitting the Nrp trials into two levels. 
Each Nrp trial was randomly designated a lie or truth trial to create two levels (NrpLie and NrpTruth).  A paired t-test 
indicated that there was no significant difference in the proportion of items correctly recalled between Nrp trials that 
were randomly allocated to truth/lie levels of the Veracity variable (t(133) = -0.22, p = .83). 
2 Huynh-Feldt-corrected degrees of freedom are reported due to violation of the assumption of sphericity: χ2(2) = 
6.99, p = .03, ɛ = .96). 
54 
truth (F(1.93, 256.52) = 60.74, p < .001). To break down this interaction, the data were 
split on the Veracity variable and simple main effects analyses were performed for lie 
and truth trials separately. The findings are reported below. 
Recall performance in lie trials. The hypothesis of this experiment was that repeating 
fabrications would promote inhibition of the corresponding truthful item and that this 
would impair later recall for that truthful item. For lie trials, Rp+ represents memory for 
the items that participants repeatedly fabricated about. Support for the hypothesis 
therefore requires significantly poorer memory for Rp+ items in lie trials compared to 
baseline memory (Nrp). However, we can see from the top row of Table 2.1 that 
participants did not recall fewer items as a result of repeatedly fabricating about them. 
Indeed, there was no significant effect of retrieval practice status on the proportion of 
items correctly recalled (F(2, 266) = 2.70, p = .07). Repeating fabrications did not affect 
memory for Rp+Lie items (compared to NrpLie items; p = 1, 95% CI [-.05, .08]).  
We can see from Table 2.1 that participants recalled fewer Rp-Lie items compared to 
baseline. Rp- refers to items that participants were not questioned on, but are related to 
lied-about items, as they belong to the same category. This impairment was, however, 
not significant (p = .29, 95% CI [-.10, .02]). Thus, practicing lies did not affect recall 
performance. 
Recall performance in truth trials. Performance in truth trials was analyzed to 
determine a typical RIF effect was elicited; that is, lower recall performance for Rp- 
items compared to baseline memory (Nrp items) in truth trials. The proportion of items 
correctly recalled was affected by the retrieval practice status of the item (F(1.94, 
257.40) = 128.88, p < .001; Huynh-Feldt-corrected degrees of freedom are reported due 
to violation of the assumption of sphericity χ2(2) = 6.50, p = .04, ɛ = .97).  
Participants correctly recalled significantly more items after truthfully practicing them, 
as indicated by a Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of Nrp and Rp+ items (p < 
.001, 95% CI[.29, .42], d = 1.51). This simply reflects a rehearsal effect (Karpicke & 
Roediger, 2008). However, we can see from the second row of Table 2.1 that the typical 
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RIF effect was not replicated: Recall performance was not significantly lower for Rp- 
compared to Nrp items (p = 1, 85% CI[ -.06, .07]). 
Bayesian analysis. Bayesian analyses were performed to determine the likelihood that 
the null hypothesis obtains (that is, that practicing lies does not impair memory 
compared to baseline), as opposed to a Type II error. Bayesian analysis quantifies the 
likelihood that one hypothesis is true over another by first assuming a prior probability 
that one hypothesis holds and then updating this probability from modelling the 
observed data. The resulting Bayes Factor tells us how much more or less likely it is that 
the observed data would be obtained if the null hypothesis were true (BF01) or if the 
alternative hypothesis were true (BF10; van Doorn et al., 2019). A Bayes Factor of 1 
indicates equal support for the null and alternative hypotheses. A BF01 of 1-3 typically 
represents anecdotal evidence in favor of the null, a BF01 of 3-10 represents substantial 
evidence in favor of the null, a BF01 of 10-30 represents strong evidence in favor of the 
null and anything above 100 is considered decisive evidence for the null (Jarosz & 
Wiley, 2014). All Bayesian analyses were conducted using Jasp v0.9.1.0 (Jasp Team, 
2019). 
Bayesian analysis for lie trials. To determine the likelihood that the null hypothesis 
obtains, a one-way Bayesian repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on participants 
recall performance in Rp+, Rp- and Nrp trials for items that participants lied about. The 
prior was set to the default used by Jasp software (Jasp Team, 2019). This revealed a 
BF01 = 3.0 in favor of the null hypothesis, indicating that the data obtained are 3 times 
more likely to have occurred under the null hypothesis than the alternative hypothesis. 
This therefore provides substantial evidence that repeatedly fabricating about an item 
does not affect subsequent recall performance. Post hoc tests with a corrected prior to 
adjust for multiple comparisons (as performed by JASP software [Jasp Team, 2019]) 
provided strong evidence that repeating fabrications does not affect memory for the 
items lied about (BF01= 8.50 for comparing Rp+Lie and NrpLie items). However, the 
evidence that repeating fabrications does not affect memory for items related to those 
lied about was merely anecdotal (BF01 = 2.70 for comparing Rp-Lie and NrpLie). This 
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suggests that the non-significant result for the poorer recall performance for Rp- items 
compared to NrpLie items may indeed be due to a Type II error. 
Bayesian analysis for truth trials. A Bayesian analysis was performed to determine the 
likelihood that the failure to replicate the typical RIF effect is a Type II error. Because 
the only comparison of interest in truth trials is between Rp-Truth and NrpTruth items, a 
Bayesian t-test was performed with the default prior used by Jasp Software (Jasp Team, 
2019). This revealed that the data obtained are more than 10 times more likely under the 
null hypothesis that there is no difference in memory performance for Rp- and Nrp 
items, compared to the alternative hypothesis (BF01 = 10.26). This provides strong 
evidence that the null finding was not a Type II error and therefore that truthfully 
rehearsing information is unlikely to promote forgetting of related unrehearsed 
information using this procedure (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). 
Table 2.1. 
Mean proportion of items correctly recalled and mean confidence ratings (scale 0-100) 
in the final recall test in Experiment 1a as a function of Retrieval Practice Status and 
Veracity. 
  Proportion recalled (SD) Confidence (SD) 
  Nrp Rp- Rp+ Nrp Rp- Rp+ 
Lie 
trials 
.60 (.27) .56 (.27) .62 (.27) 70.47 (22.69) 67.55 (23.37) 74.80 (20.80) 
Truth 
trials 
.61 (.30) .61 (.25) .96 (.13) 72.49 (23.23) 69.64 (23.40) 89.64 (15.47) 
Note:  “Rp+” represents practiced items (practiced lies or practiced truths), “Rp-” 
represents unpracticed items that are related to practiced items, and “Nrp” represents 
unpracticed items that are unrelated to practiced items and therefore serves as the 
baseline to which other groups are compared. 
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2.4.3 Confidence.  
Participants’ confidence in their memories was assessed to determine if practicing lies 
leads to more subtle changes in memory than impairing explicit recall. Confidence 
ratings for trials where participants did not provide an answer or answered “don’t know” 
were excluded from analysis, as the analysis concerned participants’ confidence that the 
item they recalled was correct. This led to the removal of 24.16% of the data (13.63% of 
lie trials and 10.53% of truth trials). 
Table 2.1 shows participants’ mean confidence ratings (0 = completely uncertain to 100 
= completely certain). Confidence was generally high and minimally affected by the 
experimental condition. Nonetheless, the effect of retrieval practice on confidence was 
affected by whether participants lied or told the truth, as indicated by a significant 
interaction between Retrieval Practice Status and Veracity in a 2x3 repeated measures 
ANOVA (F(2, 264) = 8.69, p < .001). Again, simple main effects analyses were 
performed on lie and truth trials separately to break this interaction down and the 
findings are reported below. 
Confidence ratings in lie trials. Confidence significantly differed across item types 
(F(2, 264) = 8.69, p < .001). Participants were significantly more confident in their 
memories for items they had practiced lying about compared to baseline, as indicated by 
Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison of Rp+ and Nrp items (p = .03, 95% CI[0.24, 
8.43], d = 0.20). This adds further evidence that practicing lies did not promote 
forgetting of the corresponding truthful items. Although participants were marginally 
less confident in their memories for items related to those they lied about (Rp- items) 
compared to baseline (Nrp items), this reduction was not significant (p = .29, 95% CI[-
7.14, 1.30]). 
Confidence ratings in truth trials. Confidence significantly differed across item types 
(F(2, 266) = 70.77, p < .001). Unsurprisingly, participants were most confident in their 
memories for items they practiced retrieving truthfully compared to baseline, as 
indicated by Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparison or Rp+ and Nrp items (p < .001, 
95% CI[12.69, 21.57], d = 0.87). Once again, this simply reflects a rehearsal effect. 
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Confidence did not significantly differ for items related to those truthfully practiced 
(Rp-) compared to baseline (Nrp items). This follows the same pattern of results as the 
recall data. Thus, there was no evidence of a typical RIF effect in recall or confidence 
ratings. 
2.5 Discussion 
Repeating fabrications did not impair recall or decrease confidence in memory for the 
corresponding truthful item. Memory performance for items that participants repeatedly 
lied about did not differ from baseline, indicating that repeating fabrications was 
equivalent to no rehearsal in the time between learning and recall. Thus, using a 
procedure that is designed to elicit RIF, there was no evidence of an inhibitory 
mechanism that increases omission errors when people repeat their fabrications. RIF 
also did not occur in truth trials and the experiment therefore failed to replicate the 
typical RIF effect.  
One possibility for why RIF was not found in neither lie nor truth trials is that the 
association between the categories and each item might not have been strong enough to 
elicit RIF. RIF results from inhibition that is recruited to resolve retrieval competition 
between items in memory, and so, for RIF to occur, the retrieval cue must activate both 
the target for recall and other associated non-targets to create the conditions that lead to 
forgetting (Rowland, Bates, & DeLosh, 2014; Storm, 2011). 
Eliciting a typical RIF effect in truth trials therefore requires that the retrieval cue—the 
category-stem cue (e.g., “Sport-R__”)—activates both the target (e.g., “Running”), as 
well as other studied non-target category members (e.g., “Tennis”), leading to 
competition for recall and therefore inhibition of the non-targets. However, if the 
association between the category and the studied items is too weak, the cue will not 
activate multiple items in memory and the target is therefore retrieved without needing 
to engage inhibitory processes.  
Eliciting RIF in lie trials instead requires that the retrieval cue—e.g., “Sport-R__”—
activates both the target lie response (e.g., “Rugby”) and the associated non-target truth 
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response “e.g., “Running”). It is only when both the lie and the truth are activated in 
memory that the truth should compete for recall and therefore require inhibiting. Thus, if 
the association between the category and the truthful item is too weak, the lie can be 
retrieved without any interference from the truth, obviating the need for inhibition. 
Consistent with this idea, research has shown that RIF effects are larger when items are 
strongly associated with their category (Anderson et al., 1994; Storm, Bjork, & Bjork, 
2007). Nonetheless, the category items selected had mid – not weak – taxonomic 
strength and past research shows that RIF still occurs with weaker items, but merely to a 
lesser extent (Storm et al., 2007). In addition, the within-subjects design of the present 
experiment meant that participants were switching between lying and truth telling, and 
past research suggests that this can affect the retrieval and inhibitory processes engaged 
when people lie (Van Bockstaele et al., 2012). As such, the failure to find forgetting in 
the present study might be due to the procedure, rather than the stimuli. 
The modified paradigm used here differed from the original retrieval practice procedure 
in several ways. The most significant departure was the addition of a lie condition, but 
more minor departures include the number of repetitions and the length of the category-
stem cue. Participants practiced retrieving the item – truthfully or deceptively – 4 times, 
whereas Anderson et al. (1994) included only 3 repetitions. Additionally, only the first 
letter of each item was provided as a cue, whereas Anderson et al. provided the first 2 
letters. To identify whether the results of the present experiment were due to the stimuli 
or procedure, a second experiment was conducted using the original retrieval practice 
paradigm, but with the present stimuli. Thus, the deception condition was removed and 
the original retrieval practice procedure was used. 
2.6 Experiment 1b 
Experiment 1b consisted of a learning, retrieval practice, and distractor phase, followed 
by one of two recall tests: Participants completed either a category-stem-cued recall test 
or a category-only-cued recall test. The category-stem-cued recall test was identical to 
that used in Experiment 1a, except the stem consisted of two letters instead of one (e.g., 
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“Sport-Ru__”). The category-only-cued recall test instead provided only the category 
name and participants listed all items they could recall from the learning phase.  
Studies using category-only-cued recall find RIF more consistently, and with a larger 
effect size, than those using category-stem-cued recall (Murayama et al., 2014). This is 
because category-only-cued recall confounds inhibitory effects with output interference. 
When freely recalling category items, participants choose the order in which items are 
recalled. This means that they are more likely to recall practiced items first because they 
are most easily retrieved. However, this can block retrieval of unpracticed items, 
resulting in below baseline memory performance for such items. Controlling the order 
of recall by providing category-stem cues eliminates output interference so we can be 
more confident that any memory impairment is due to inhibition during retrieval 
practice, rather than output interference at final recall. Both types of recall test were 
included to determine if RIF can be elicited under any circumstances using the stimuli 
from Experiment 1a. 
2.7 Method 
2.7.1 Participants. 
The experiment was completed online by 80 Amazon Mechanical Turk workers in 
exchange for a small monetary reward. One participant failed to complete the 
experiment and their data were excluded, leaving data from 79 participants for analysis 
(38 female, 40 male and 1 preferred not to answer; 11 aged 18-25, 35 aged 26-34, 25 
aged 35-54, 6 aged 55-64, 1 aged 65+ and 1 preferred not to say). As in Experiment 1a, 
participants were able to proceed to the experiment only if they rated their fluency as 
“fluent” or “excellent”. Participants were not permitted to complete the experiment if 
they rated their fluency lower than excellent (73 were native English speakers, 1 rated 
themselves fluent to a native standard and 5 rated their fluency as excellent). The study 




The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1a (see Appendix 2). 
2.7.3 Design and procedure. 
The experiment had a 3 (Retrieval Practice Status: Rp+, Rp-, Nrp) x 2 (Recall Test: 
category-cued, category-stem-cued) mixed design. The recall test was tested between 
subjects. The dependent measure was the proportion of items correctly recalled in the 
final recall test. The experimental design and procedure was the same as Experiment 1a, 
except for the following changes to mimic the original RIF procedure in Anderson et al. 
(1994): 
Learning. Each category-item pair was presented only once for 5 seconds. 
Retrieval practice. Participants truthfully completed category-stem cues for half of the 
items from 3 of the 6 categories (9 practiced items in total). The word stems showed the 
first 2 letters of the item, rather than only the first letter (e.g., “Sport-Te__”) and each 
category-stem pair was presented 3 times. If the stem was not completed in 10 seconds, 
the experiment moved onto the next item. 
As in Experiment 1a, the category-stem cues were counterbalanced across participants 
so that every category-item pair served in each condition. All stems were completed 
truthfully. Participants were tested on an expanding schedule: there was an average of 
3.1 trials between the first and second test of a given item and 6.2 trials between the 
second and third test (a similar spacing to Anderson et al. (1994), who used an average 
of 3.5 trials and 6.5 trials respectively). On completion, participants proceeded to the 
distractor phase, which was identical to Experiment 1a. 
Final recall. Participants were randomly assigned to the category-cued (n=39) or 
category-stem-cued recall test (n=40). In category-cued recall, each category name was 
sequentially presented at the top of the screen (e.g., “Sport”) and participants listed all 
items belonging to the category that they could recall from the learning phase. The 
experiment moved onto the next category after 30 seconds. The first category was 
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always a filler category and the order of the subsequent critical categories was randomly 
determined across participants. 
In category-stem-cued recall, category-stem cues (e.g., “Sport-Te___”) were presented 
one-by-one in the center of the screen for each of the 36 critical items studied in the 
learning phase. This followed an identical format to the retrieval practice phase: The 
category cue consisted of the category name together with the first two letters of the 
item and participants had 10 seconds to complete each stem. The first two category-stem 
cues were filler items and the subsequent 36 critical item cues were presented in a 
random order across participants. 
2.8 Results 
2.8.1 Retrieval practice performance. 
Participants performed moderately well in the retrieval practice phase, answering 
correctly in an average of 70.89% of trials (SD = 20.93%). However, this still leaves a 
significant proportion of items that were incorrectly recalled, indicating that participants 
did not adequately encode many of the items in the learning phase. 
Participants were marked as correct or incorrect overall for each item they were 
prompted to recall. To be marked correct overall for a given item, participants must have 
answered at least two out of three trials for each item correctly. Two was chosen as a 
cut-off point to minimize data loss while also only including items that participants had 
repeatedly retrieved. This led to the exclusion of 30.20% of trials in the category-cued-
recall condition and 24.44% of trials in the category-stem-cued-recall condition. 
2.8.2 Final recall performance. 
Category-cued recall. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that the 
proportion of items correctly recalled significantly differed according to the retrieval 
practice status of the item (F(1.53, 58.14) = 121.03, p < .001; Huynh-Feldt-corrected 
degrees of freedom are reported due to violation of the assumption of sphericity: χ2(2) = 
15.81, p < .001, ɛ = .77). We can see from Table 2.2 that recall performance was highest 
for Rp+ items, which indicates a typical rehearsal effect. Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise 
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comparisons confirmed that participants recalled significantly more of these items 
compared to baseline (p < .001, 95% CI[.36, .55], d = 1.82). 
RIF was found for Rp- items: Participants recalled fewer Rp- items than Nrp items (p = 
.04, 95% CI[.002, .13, d = 0.29). Nonetheless, the RIF effect was small – memory was 
impaired by just 6%. 
Category-stem-cued recall. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that the 
number of items correctly recalled significantly differed according to retrieval practice 
status (F(2, 78) = 54.71, p < .001). As expected, participants recalled significantly more 
Rp+ items, which again simply indicates a rehearsal effect (p < .001, 95% CI[.20, .34], d 
= 2.13). However, participants did not show RIF: They retrieved a similar proportion of 
unpracticed items, regardless of whether those items were related (Rp-) or unrelated 
(Nrp) to practiced items (p = 1, 95% CI[-.05, .10]). 
Table 2.2 
Mean proportion of items recalled for participants completing category-cued and 
category-stem-cued recall tests in Experiment 1b as a function of Retrieval Practice 
Status. 
 Mean proportion of items correctly recalled (SD) 
Nrp Rp- Rp+ 
Category-cued .32 (.21) .26 (.21) .78 (.29) 
Category-stem-cued .66 (.15) .64 (.20) .94 (.11) 
 
2.9 Discussion 
Using a procedure that mimicked the original retrieval practice paradigm, participants 
demonstrated RIF only when output interference was not controlled. This suggests that 
no inhibitory mechanisms were engaged when participants selectively practiced 
retrieving the category-item pairs and that the memory impairment for Rp- items in the 
category-cued recall test is merely due to interference created by the order in which 
64 
participants recalled the items at test. We can therefore be reasonably confident that the 
lack of RIF in Experiment 1a was due to the stimulus set, rather than some interaction 
between retrieval processes and deception.  
RIF was not found when controlling for output interference in the category-stem-cued 
recall test. This suggests that the category items are not strongly enough associated with 
their category to compete for recall and therefore did not require inhibiting. As in 
Experiment 1a, retrieval practice performance was fairly poor, indicating that the 
category-item pairs were not well encoded. Given that the pairs were unrelated and 
abstracted from any context, it is likely that they were not deeply encoded. New stimuli 
were therefore developed to encourage deeper, semantic processing for Experiment 2. 
2.10 Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, participants viewed a mock crime, which should be more meaningful 
to participants, easier to encode, and more relevant to a deception context. The new 
mock crime stimuli consisted of pictures of items for memorization together with a 
label. Images are typically better remembered than words (Maisto & Queen, 1992; 
McBride & Dosher, 2002). Images are thought to have more distinctive features than 
words, which encourage deeper, semantic processing (Curran & Doyle, 2011; McBride 
& Dosher, 2002). Pictorial stimuli with verbal labels were therefore developed to create 
dual modes of encoding for a stronger memory trace. 
Previous research has successfully elicited RIF with pictorial stimuli in the context of 
eyewitness memory, showing that participants experience RIF when questioned about a 
portion of an event they previously experienced (MacLeod, 2002; Shaw, Bjork, & 
Handal, 1995). In one study, for instance, participants were shown images of items 
allegedly stolen from two houses and were then questioned on half of the items from 
one of the houses. When participants were later tested on all of the items from both 
houses, they showed an 11% memory impairment for items that came from the same 
house as the items they were questioned on, compared to when those items came from 
the other house (MacLeod, 2002).  
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The present experiment used a similar procedure to MacLeod (2002), except the framing 
was reversed: Participants were asked to imagine that they were a perpetrator, rather 
than a witness, and a fabrication condition was added. The stimulus categories were a 
crime-relevant image sequence (containing items from the mock crime) and a crime-
irrelevant image sequence (containing items from a non-criminal activity), analogous to 
the two houses used as stimulus categories in MacLeod. Each image sequence contained 
10 items for participants to memorize. Participants were then repeatedly questioned on 
half of the items from one of the image sequences and responded either truthfully (by 
providing the correct answer) or deceptively (by fabricating their own false answer). 
After a short delay, participants completed a surprise final recall test for all items 
initially learnt. It was expected that participants would show better memory for the 
pictorial mock crime stimuli and that this would bring about the conditions necessary to 
elicit RIF in both liars and truth tellers. 
2.11 Method 
2.11.1 Participants. 
The experiment was completed in the laboratory by 182 participants in exchange for 
course credit (mean age = 19.6 years, SD = 2.73 years, range = 18-44; 39 male, 143 
female). Most participants were native English speakers (n = 123). Of those remaining, 
39 rated their English as excellent, 17 as good, 2 as satisfactory and 1 did not answer. 
The study was approved by the Psychology Department ethics committee at the 
University of Warwick. 
2.11.2 Stimuli.  
The stimuli consisted of 20 still images extracted from two videos. First, the two video 
sequences were filmed, one for each stimulus category: Crime-relevant and crime-
irrelevant. The crime-relevant sequence depicted a gloved person breaking into a 
laboratory to hack a computer and steal numerous documents, and the crime-irrelevant 
sequence showed a gloved person performing numerous cleaning duties, such as 
emptying a bin and vacuuming. The videos were filmed using a GoPro Hero 4 Session 
with a resolution of 1920x1440. Filming took place in a campus building that students 
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cannot access to ensure that participants would not recognize any of the items or scenes 
taken from the videos. Each video was filmed from a point-of-view (POV) perspective 
and depicted a sequence of actions, as well as items associated with those actions (for 
example, breaking open a door with a crowbar).  
Ten still images were then extracted from each video, each depicting one action and its 
associated item. Participants were instructed to memorize each item. The actions and 
associated items are described in Appendix 3. Image sequences were used instead of the 
videos themselves to control the encoding time for each item. Each still image included 
a caption displayed at the bottom of the screen describing what was happening in the 
image with the item for memorization written in red. Items for memorization were also 
presented in the top right corner of the screen to show them clearly and ensure that 
participants focused on remembering the item specifically. Figure 2.2 shows example 
images from the crime-relevant sequence. 
The first and last items in each image sequence were non-critical items to control for 
primacy and recency effects and the middle 8 items were critical items for which 
memory was tested. Each sequence also contained several filler images that did not 
show any item to be remembered, but were inserted for storytelling purposes. Piloting 
ensured that baseline memory did not significantly differ across the two sequences (see 
Appendix 4).  Participants completed the experiment in the laboratory on 22-inch 
monitors with a resolution of 1920x1080. 
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Figure 2.2. Three images from the crime-relevant image sequence. Participants were 
instructed to memorize items written in red. 
2.11.3 Design and procedure. 
The experimental design was the same as Experiment 1a, except the Veracity variable 
was manipulated between-subjects, such that participants either lied or told the truth in 
response to all questions in the retrieval practice phase. This allowed a fully factorial 
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3x2 design and precluded the possibility that task switching between lying and truth 
telling would obscure any effects of repeating lies on memory. Participants were 
informed that the study concerned the relationship between intelligence and the ability 
to construct plausible lies. This was to motivate participants to effortfully construct 
plausible lies. After providing consent and demographic information, participants began 
the learning phase. 
Learning (perpetration). Participants were asked to imagine that they worked as a 
cleaner for a company that develops high-tech devices, and that they steal and sell on the 
company’s developments to supplement their income. Participants were informed that 
they must steal the blueprints for a new device while at work and that they therefore 
have two tasks: To execute their daily cleaning duties and to break into the office to 
steal the blueprints. Participants then watched the crime-relevant (theft) and crime-
irrelevant (cleaning) image sequences and were instructed to memorize items written in 
red. Images containing items for memorization were displayed for 8 seconds each and 
filler images were displayed for 5 seconds each. The total time to watch the image 
sequences was 4 minutes. All images were presented full screen. The order of the crime-
relevant and crime-irrelevant image sequences was counterbalanced across participants. 
Retrieval practice (interrogation). Participants were questioned on half of the items 
from one of the image sequences (4 critical items; for example, “What was the password 
to access the IT system?”). Questions were presented one-by-one in the center of the 
screen and participants typed their response. Half of the participants were instructed to 
answer the questions truthfully by reporting the relevant item from the image sequence 
memorized in the learning phase. The remaining participants were instructed to respond 
deceptively by fabricating a false answer. Participants responding deceptively were told 
that they should construct plausible lies that a law enforcement officer would believe. 
They received 1 minute to answer each question, after which point, the experiment 
automatically progressed onto the next question. 
Each question was asked three times and the question order was predetermined so that 
retrieval practice occurred on an expanding schedule (as in Anderson et al., 1994). There 
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was an average of 3 trials between the first and second test and an average of 5.25 trials 
between the second and third test. Within the expanding schedule, the trial order was 
organized so that there were no recurring patterns of questions. Liars were asked to 
repeat the same lie each time the relevant question was asked. To ensure that 
participants understood the task, the first two questions were practice questions that 
asked about the first and last items in the relevant image sequence, as these were filler 
items inserted only for controlling for primacy and recency effects. Liars were given 
example answers and a comprehension check to ensure that they understood how they 
were expected to answer. For instance, the example of a plausible lie given in response 
to the question “What was used to get into the office?” was “a number code” (instead of 
the truthful answer: “a keycard”). The retrieval practice phase therefore consisted of 14 
questions in total: 2 practice and 12 critical (1 question for each of the 4 critical items, 
repeated 3 times). 
The items addressed in this phase varied according to 4 counterbalancing sets across 
participants to ensure that every item served in each retrieval practice condition (Rp+, 
Rp-, Nrp). Each set contained half of the items from one of the categories (crime-
relevant or crime-irrelevant). Items were randomly allocated to each set. 
Distractor. This was identical to Experiment 1a, except the tasks were described as 
intelligence tests to fit with the cover story. 
Surprise final recall. Participants were questioned about all 16 critical items from the 
learning phase and were explicitly instructed to answer all questions truthfully. 
Questions were shown one-by-one in the center of the screen in a random order across 
participants to control for output interference. There was no time limit for this task. 
Items asked about in the retrieval practice phase were cued using the same questions; the 
phrasing was unchanged. After answering each question, participants were asked to rate 
their confidence that the item they recalled was the item learnt in phase one on a scale of 
0-100, where 0 = completely uncertain and 100 = completely certain. On completion, 
participants were thanked and debriefed. 
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2.12 Results 
2.12.1 Retrieval practice performance. 
Participants performed well in the retrieval practice phase, indicating that they encoded 
the mock crime items well and adhered to instructions. Truth telling participants 
correctly recalled the item in 87.73% of trials (SD = 17.76%). Lying participants 
followed instructions by providing an alternative response in 92.67% of trials (SD = 
16.79%). The mock crime stimuli therefore led to considerably better performance in the 
retrieval practice phase than the category-item pairs used in the previous experiments. 
Participants were asked about each item three times in the retrieval practice phase. Items 
were included in the recall analyses only when participants answered all three trials for 
that item in the retrieval practice phase correctly (7.97% of the recall data for liars and 
5.77% of the recall data for truth tellers was excluded based on this criterion).  
2.21.2 Final recall performance. 
All 182 participants were included in the analysis. A 2x3 mixed ANOVA performed on 
the proportion of items correctly recalled revealed a significant main effect of Veracity 
(F(1, 180) = 10.89, p = .001) and Retrieval Practice Status (F(1.91, 343.543) = 10.62, p 
< .001). These main effects were superseded by a significant interaction (F(1.91, 
343.543) = 6.50, p = .002), thus the effect of retrieval practice on the proportion of items 
correctly recalled depended on whether participants lied or told the truth. Simple main 
effects analyses were conducted to follow up this interaction and the results are reported 
below for liars and truth tellers individually. Table 2.3 shows the descriptive statistics 
for participants’ final recall performance. 
Recall performance in liars. As in Experiment 1a, the hypothesis was that repeating 
lies would promote inhibition of the corresponding truthful item and that this would lead 
to poorer recall performance for items participants practiced lying about (Rp+ items) 
compared to baseline (Nrp items). Recall performance was indeed significantly impaired 
 
3 Huynh-Feldt-corrected degrees of freedom are reported due to violation of the assumption of sphericity: (χ2(2) = 
11.93, p = .003, ɛ = .95). 
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in liars (F(1.87, 167.45) = 5.0, p = .009; Huynh-Feldt-corrected degrees of freedom are 
reported due to violation of the assumption of sphericity: (χ2(2) = 8.99, p = .01, ɛ = .93). 
However, the impairment to recall performance was not as predicted: Recall was poorer 
for Rp- items, rather than Rp+ items, as indicated by the following post-hoc tests. 
Repeating fabrications did not affect later memory for the corresponding truthful 
information. Although Table 2.3 shows that recall performance for Rp+ items is 
marginally lower than Nrp items, Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise comparisons indicated 
that this difference was not significant (p = 1, 95% CI[-.04, .09]. 
Nonetheless, practicing lies did impair memory for Rp- items; that is, items that 
participants did not lie about in the retrieval practice phase, but are related to items they 
lied about by belonging to the same image sequence. Table 3 shows that participants 
recalled 10% fewer of these items as a result of practicing their lies. Bonferroni-adjusted 
pairwise comparisons indicated that this is a significant impairment (p = .007, 95% 
CI[.02, .17], d = 0.44). Poorer performance for Rp- items compared to Nrp items mimics 
the typical RIF effect. Practicing lies therefore did lead to RIF of the truth, but not in the 
way hypothesized. 
Bayesian analysis. As in Experiment 1a, a Bayesian analysis was conducted to 
determine the likelihood that the null finding reflects no genuine effect, as opposed to a 
Type II error. A Bayesian one-way ANOVA on the proportion of items correctly 
recalled for Nrp, Rp- and Rp+ items in liars revealed an overall BF01 = 0.28, which 
provides substantial evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
difference in recall performance across the three retrieval practice groups (Jarosz & 
Wiley, 2014).  
Post hoc tests with a corrected prior to adjust for multiple comparisons (as performed by 
JASP software; [Jasp Team, 2019]) were consistent with the findings of the Frequentist 
ANOVA, revealing a BF01 = 5.72 for the difference in recall performance between Nrp 
and Rp+ items. This provides substantial evidence for the null hypothesis that there is no 
difference in recall performance between baseline items and items participants 
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repeatedly lied about. Comparing the difference in recall performance between Nrp and 
Rp- items revealed a BF01 = 0.09, which is considered strong evidence in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that repeating lies did impair memory for items related to those 
lied about (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). Thus, the Frequentist and Bayesian ANOVA 
converge on the conclusion that repeating fabrications did not impair memory for the 
corresponding truthful items, but did impair memory for related items. 
Recall performance in truth tellers. The recall performance of truth tellers follows the 
same pattern of results as in Experiment 1a: Performance was affected by the retrieval 
practice status of the item (F(2, 180) = 13.94, p < .001) due to improved memory 
performance for items truthfully practiced (Rp+ items; p < .001, 95% CI [.06, .17], d = 
0.58), but not impaired memory for related items that were unpracticed (Rp- items; p = 
1, 95% CI [-.07, .06]). Thus, the typical RIF effect was again not replicated. A Bayesian 
t-test comparing recall performance for Rp- and Nrp items revealed that the data 
obtained were more than 8 times more likely under the null hypothesis compared to the 
alternative hypothesis (BF01 = 8.62), providing substantial evidence that there is no RIF 
effect using this procedure (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). 
Table 2.3 
Mean proportion of items correctly recalled and mean confidence ratings (scale 0-100) 
in the final recall test in Experiment 1a as a function of Retrieval Practice Status and 
Veracity. 
  Proportion recalled (SD) Confidence (SD) 

























Note:  “Rp+” represents practiced items (practiced lies or practiced truths), “Rp-” 
represents unpracticed items that are related to practiced items, and “Nrp” represents 
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unpracticed items that are unrelated to practiced items and therefore serves as the 
baseline to which other groups are compared. 
2.12.3 Confidence. 
As in Experiment 1a, Participants’ confidence in their memories was assessed to 
determine if practicing lies led to more subtle changes in memory than impairing 
explicit recall. Confidence ratings for trials where participants did not provide an answer 
or answered “don’t know” were excluded from the confidence analysis, which led to the 
removal of 10.77% of the data (truth tellers = 5.0%, liars = 5.77%). 
Table 2.3 shows participants’ mean confidence ratings (on a scale of 0 = completely 
uncertain to 100 = completely certain). Confidence was generally high and the 
differences between conditions were very small.  A 2x3 mixed ANOVA revealed a main 
effect of Veracity: Truth tellers were overall more confident than liars (MTruth = 83.40, 
SD = 15.38; MLiars = 78.56, SD = 18.52; F(1,180) = 5.34, p = .02; 95% CI[0.70, 9.0], d = 
0.28). Confidence was also affected by the retrieval practice status of the item, indicated 
by a main effect of Retrieval Practice Status (F(2, 360) = 4.25, p = .02). Specifically, 
participants were more confident in their memories for Rp+ items compared to Nrp 
items (MRp+ = 83.0, SD = 17.59; MNrp = 80.21, SD = 14.52; p = .05, 95% CI[0.03, 5.56], 
d = 0.17), but there was no difference in confidence ratings between Rp- items and Nrp 
items (p = 1, 95% CI[-2.55, 3.51]), as indicated by Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise 
comparisons. Although liars’ showed impaired recall for items related to those that they 
lied about (Rp- items), there was no corresponding decrease in their confidence: The 
interaction between Veracity and Retrieval Practice Status was not significant (F(2, 360) 
= 2.60, p = .08). Thus, there was no evidence of RIF in participants’ confidence ratings. 
2.13 Discussion 
As in Experiment 1a, repeating fabrications did not impair recall of the corresponding 
truthful item. However, there was RIF of the truth, but not in the way predicted: 
Memory was impaired for items that were not prompted in the retrieval practice phase 
but belonged to the same category as lied-about items.  
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RIF of items related to those lied about is a surprising finding, especially since RIF was 
not found in truth telling participants. The effect is therefore specific to fabrication. One 
explanation for this finding is that the act of generating a plausible alternative answer 
initiated a retrieval search that activated other items from the same image sequence. 
Items from the same image sequence might achieve threshold activation quickly because 
they were recently studied. Indeed, one prominent theory of the cognition of 
deception—Activation Decision Construction Action Theory (ADCAT; Walczyk et al., 
2014)—states that recently encoded memories are the first to be activated in the 
construction of plausible lies. Since items from the image sequence could not be used as 
a fabrication, their activation may have interfered with the retrieval of useful 
alternatives, which in turn may have initiated the inhibitory processes that promote 
forgetting. Nonetheless, this raises the question of why the truthful item was not also 
activated and in turn inhibited. It is therefore unclear what underlies this effect. 
One reason why RIF was not found for the corresponding truthful items might be that 
the association between the studied items and their cues was still too weak, despite 
efforts to promote better encoding. In standard RIF studies, there are two considerations 
regarding associative strength: [1] the strength of the association between the cue (e.g., 
“Fruit-Or__”) and the recall target (e.g. “orange”) and [2] the strength of the association 
between the cue and the associated non-targets/competitors (e.g. “lemon”). RIF only 
occurs if the association between the cue and the competitors is equal to or stronger than 
the association between the cue and the target, since it is only under these conditions 
that there is competition for recall and therefore a retrieval search for the target 
(Anderson, 2003; Anderson et al., 1994). If the association between the cue and target 
outweighs that between the cue and the competitors, the target is quickly and easily 
retrieved without any interference from associated items, obviating the need to inhibit 
them (Norman, Newman, & Detre, 2007).  
For the present experiments, the retrieval target is the lie and the associated non-target is 
the truth. Thus, for the truth to be a competitor, the association between the cue and the 
truth must be equal to or stronger than the association between the cue and the lie. If not, 
the lie may be retrieved without any interference from the truth. Because participants 
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lied about recently learnt material, it is likely that their memory for the truthful answer 
was simply not strong enough to compete for recall with the lie. Participants 
encountered each item only once in the learning phase but delivered their lie in the 
subsequent retrieval practice phase three times. This may have led to a stronger, and 
more recent, memory of the lie than the truth such that the lie was quickly and easily 
retrieved without a competing truthful response. A different approach is therefore 
required so that participants possess strong memories of the truth to create the 
conditions necessary to see RIF. This interpretation is supported by the further finding 
that the standard RIF effect was again not replicated in truth tellers. 
According to ADCAT, we require inhibition of the truth to a greater extent when the 
truth is well-rehearsed, or “entrenched” because the truth is more likely to be the 
automatic dominant response in such cases (Walczyk et al., 2014). In fact, ADCAT 
hypothesizes that “entrenched truths (e.g., those central to respondents’ lives, deeply 
held beliefs) will cause more proactive interference with lying, that must be inhibited, 
than will peripheral or recently encoded truths” (Walczyk et al., 2014, p. 32). It is 
therefore likely that repeating a lie might only lead to RIF of the truth when the truth is 
entrenched, rather than recently learnt (as in Experiments 1a and 2). Consistent with this 
reasoning, one study showed that liars were more effectively discriminated from truth 
tellers when they lied about details pertaining to their everyday lives, and are therefore 
entrenched in memory, compared to when they lied about recent autobiographical events 
(Walczyk et al., 2009). This suggests that lying about entrenched truths does indeed 
generate more proactive interference when lying, which in the present context might 
create the retrieval competition necessary to see RIF of the truth. Experiment 3 therefore 
manipulates the strength of the truth in memory in a final attempt to determine if there 
are inhibitory processes engaged during fabrication that can promote RIF of the truth. 
2.14 Experiment 3 
An obvious way to manipulate the accessibility of the truth in memory is to include a 
training session whereby participants strengthen their memory for a subset of items. 
However, a training session is essentially a form of retrieval practice, which could 
76 
obscure any further effects of selective practice in the retrieval practice phase. This 
experiment could not therefore use a training session to increase accessibility or any 
stimuli that participants would be encountering for the first time (such as a mock crime). 
Instead, stimuli that capitalize on participants’ existing knowledge was used to ensure 
that high accessibility items were indeed entrenched in memory. Experiment 3 therefore 
returned to verbal stimuli to allow greater control of each item’s accessibility. 
Similar to Experiment 1a, the stimuli were composed of items that belong to a category. 
However, instead of learning category-item pairs, participants learnt question-answer 
pairings (e.g., instead of “Country-Japan”, participants learnt “Q: What country does 
Sushi come from? A: Japan”). Each item therefore formed an answer to a question. This 
meant that all participants could learn the same items, while allowing their accessibility 
to be manipulated across participants by changing the question difficulty with which the 
item is associated. Thus, for one participant, the item “Japan” should be highly 
accessible when cued with the easy question “What country does sushi come from?”, 
but for another participant, “Japan” should be less accessible (if at all) when cued with 
the hard question “What country consists of over 6800 islands?”. This design therefore 
eliminated item effects to ensure that any difference in memory between the low and 
high accessibility conditions is indeed attributable to the item’s strength in memory and 
not because one group of items is inherently better remembered than the other. 
Because entrenched truths are unlikely to be forgotten, a reaction-time (RT)-based 
recognition test was used that could detect more subtle changes in an item’s accessibility 
after lying, rather than a recall test. Past research has shown that RIF is apparent in RT-
based recognition tests, as well as recall tests. This manifests as slower RTs to Rp- items 
than Nrp items, indicating reduced accessibility for Rp- items (Perfect, Moulin, 
Conway, & Perry, 2002; Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004). Furthermore, the use of 
RTs in detecting deception is increasingly popular and these tests consistently show that 
liars are slower to respond to crime-relevant items than truth-tellers (Verschuere et al., 
2018). If repeating lies reduces the accessibility of truthful items in memory, 
participants undergoing these tests might experience less interference from the truth and 
respond faster to crime-relevant items after practicing their fabrications. This is unlikely 
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to change the outcome of the test, but it may create noise and reduce the test’s 
diagnosticity. Prior research has shown that RTs can indeed change from repeated lying 
(Van Bockstaele et al., 2012). Thus, Experiment 3 investigates whether repeating 
fabrications can impair item recognition, as indicated by slower RTs.  
The hypothesis was that RIF would occur for items that are highly accessible in memory 
(i.e., items cued by easy questions), as these items should be strongly associated with 
their retrieval cue. For truth tellers, the standard RIF effect was predicted (longer RTs to 
Rp-Truth items). For liars, highly accessible truths should ‘pop’ into people’s minds on 
receiving the question, interfere with lie generation, and therefore require inhibiting. It 
was therefore predicted that liars would show longer RTs to lied-about items (Rp+Lie) 
in the recognition test. Longer RTs for items related to those lied about (Rp-Lie) were 
also predicted to replicate the RIF effect found in Experiment 2. 
2.15 Method 
2.15.1 Participants. 
The experiment was completed in the laboratory by 211 participants (mean age = 21.14 
years, SD = 5.02 years, range = 18-50; 139 females, 72 males) in exchange for course 
credit or a small monetary reward. Most participants were native English speakers (n = 
153). Of those participants whose first language was not English, 44 participants rated 
their English as excellent and the remaining 14 participants rated their English as good 
or satisfactory. The study was approved by the Psychology Department ethics 
committee at the University of Warwick. 
2.15.2 Stimuli and apparatus. 
The stimuli were taken from the same published word norms as Experiment 1a (Van 
Overschelde et al., 2004). Forty-eight items from 6 different categories (8 per category) 
were selected as the critical items. These items formed the answers in the question-
answer pairings. An additional 4 items from 2 further categories were selected to use as 
fillers, yielding a total of 56 items. 
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The categories were semantically and phonetically unrelated to one another to prevent 
cross-category interference. The items were selected to have high taxonomic strength to 
ensure that they were clearly associated with their category. The 7 highest-ranking items 
from each category were selected with the constraint that no two items from a single 
category could start with the same letter. The items had a mean ranking of 4.63 (SD = 
0.62; Overschelde et al., 2004). 
Each item formed the answer to 2 questions—one easy and one hard. This was to 
manipulate the accessibility of the items in memory.  Easy questions were designed to 
cue the answer quickly (high accessibility), whereas hard questions were designed so 
that participants either would not know the answer or would have to think harder to 
retrieve it (low accessibility). An online pilot questionnaire was conducted to ensure that 
this manipulation was successful, in which participants (n=56) were asked the easy or 
hard questions for each item and typed their answers. Participants’ recall performance 
and RT to respond was used to assess the question difficulty. Participants recalled all 
items more often in response to easy compared to hard questions. The proportion of 
participants who provided the correct answers in the easy condition (M = 0.92, SD = 
0.11) was significantly greater than the proportion of participants who provided correct 
answers in the hard condition (M = 0.26, SD = 0.03; t(55) = 46.57, p < .001, 95% 
CI[0.63, 0.67]). Furthermore, when participants answered correctly for hard questions, 
they did so significantly slower than for easy questions (Mhard = 15.52s, SD = 20.88s; 
Measy = 8.32s, SD = 3.03s; t(55) = -2.66, p = .01, 95% CI[-12.63s, -1.77s], d = 0.48). We 
can therefore be confident that items were significantly more accessible when cued with 
easy questions compared to when cued with hard questions. The stimuli are listed in 
Appendix 5. Participants completed the experiment on 22-inch monitors with a 
resolution of 1920x1080. The experiment was programmed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 
2007). 
2.15.3 Design and procedure. 
The experiment had a 2 (Veracity: lie, truth) x 2 (Accessibility: low, high) x 3 (Retrieval 
practice status: Rp+, Rp-, Nrp) mixed design. Veracity was the between-subjects 
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variable. The experiment consisted of 4 phases: Learning, retrieval practice, distractor 
and a surprise final recognition test. The dependent measure was the RT to identify an 
item as old or new (learnt or not learnt in the learning phase respectively) in the final 
recognition test. Figure 2.3 shows an overview of the experimental procedure. 
Learning. Participants were told that the experiment concerned the role of memory and 
reasoning skills in lie construction. After providing consent and demographic 
information, participants began the learning phase, in which the 56 (48 critical, 8 filler) 
question-answer pairings were presented, together with the category to which they 
belong, one-by-one in the center of the screen (see Figure 2.3 for examples). Participants 
were instructed to learn the answer to each question and were told that their memory 
would be tested.  
Each question began with the category name (e.g. ‘What fruit…’, ‘What country…’) so 
that all questions unambiguously belonged to their category and to prime participants 
with the category. For each question-answer pairing, the category name and question 
first appeared for 2.5 seconds, followed by the answer, which remained on screen for 5s. 
The presentation of the answer was delayed in this way to ensure that participants read 
the questions and did not only focus on the answers. There was a 0.5s interval between 
each pairing. 
The question answer pairings were presented in a blocked semi-random order. The first 
and last 4 pairings were filler items to control for primacy and recency effects. For 
critical pairings, there were 8 blocks each containing one question-answer pairing per 
category (and therefore 3 easy and 3 hard pairings). The order of the pairings within 
each block and the block order were randomized across participants. There was a 5 
second break in-between blocks. 
As previously stated, all participants learnt the same 56 items, but the question difficulty 
was varied to manipulate accessibility so that category and item effects were eliminated 
in the final recognition test. Participants always learnt 3 easy (high accessibility) 
categories and 3 hard (low accessibility) categories. To ensure that all items served in 
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the low and high accessibility conditions, two counterbalancing sets were created so that 
half of the participants received easy question-answer pairings for 3 of the 6 categories 
and the remaining half received hard question-answer pairings for those same 
categories. 
Retrieval practice. Participants answered half of the questions for 2 of the 3 easy 
categories and half of the questions from 2 of the 3 hard categories. They were therefore 
questioned about 16 items in total (8 easy and 8 hard). Questions were presented one-
by-one in the center of the screen. 
Half of the participants answered the questions truthfully and the remaining half 
answered deceptively. Deceptive participants were asked to construct plausible 
fabrications in response to the questions so that somebody who didn’t know the truthful 
answer would believe their lie. Truthful participants responded with the answer they 
learnt in the learning phase. Participants had 12 seconds to write their answer. If they 
did not respond within 12 seconds, the experiment moved onto the next question. Each 
question was asked 3 times, yielding 48 questions in total. The order of questions was 
predetermined in the same way as Experiment 2.  
The questions varied according to 6 counterbalancing sets. Each set contained half of the 
items from 2 of the 3 easy categories and 2 of the 3 hard categories. Thus, every item 
served in all retrieval practice conditions (Rp+, Rp-, Nrp). 
Distractor. This was identical to Experiment 2. 
Final recognition test. The recognition test was based on the RT-based test used by 
Veling and van Knippenberg (2004). The test consisted of 10 practice and 96 critical 
trials, in which the 48 critical items from the learning phase and 48 new items were 
presented one-by-one in the center of the screen. New items were selected from a further 
6 categories from Overschelde et al. (2004) using the same criteria that were used to 
select the critical items.    
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Each trial began with an asterisk in the center of the screen, followed by a word after a 
random interval between 1.5 and 2 seconds. Participants were instructed to indicate 
whether they learnt the word in the learning phase and to press the “A” key to indicate 
“yes” and the “L” key to indicate “no” as quickly and accurately as possible. The word 
remained on screen until keypress. The response options were counterbalanced across 
participants.  
The first 10 trials were practice trials consisting of the 5 of the filler items from the 
learning phase and 5 new items. Participants were provided with feedback after each 
trial to familiarize them with the task. On completion of the practice trials, participants 
were informed that they would no longer receive feedback on their performance. 
Feedback was not provided for critical items, so that participants could not use this to 
aid their memory in subsequent trials. On completion of the recognition test, participants 



















2.16.1 Retrieval practice performance.  
Ten participants failed to answer any of the questions correctly and were excluded from 
all subsequent analyses. Analyses are therefore based on data from 201 participants. 
Participants performed well in the retrieval practice phase, indicating that they 
sufficiently encoded the items in the learning phase. Truth telling participants correctly 
recalled the item in an average of 83.97% of trials (SD = 36.69%). Lying participants 
correctly provided an alternative response in an average of 82.88% of trials (SD = 
37.67%). 
Participants were asked about each item three times in the retrieval practice phase. To be 
scored as correct overall for each item, they had to answer at least two trials for each 
item correctly. Two correct trials was chosen as a cut-off point to minimize data loss 
while also only including items for which participants had repeated their lies. The 
corresponding recognition data for items scored as incorrect overall were excluded from 
all subsequent analyses. This led to the removal of 12.75% of the recognition data. 
2.16.2 Recognition performance. 
RTs above and below 2 standard deviations of each participant’s mean RT per condition 
were excluded. This led to the removal of less than 0.1% of the data. A multilevel model 
was fitted to RTs for correct trials only to assess recognition performance. 
Multilevel linear models. A multilevel linear model can be likened to a regression 
model that accommodates within-subject variables by explicitly modelling clustered 
variables (Field, Miles, & Field, 2012). Thus, a multilevel model is a regression model 
that can be used for within-subjects designs. Specifically, a multilevel model accounts 
for the fact that RTs for each level of the Item Accessibility and Retrieval Practice 
Status variables come from the same participants and are therefore correlated. A 
multilevel model was used instead of a repeated-measures ANOVA, as the computer 
randomization led to an unbalanced design of 124 liars and 77 truth tellers. Multilevel 
models are preferable to repeated-measures ANOVA when data are unbalanced or 
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missing because they do not require whole cases to be removed or data to be imputed 
where there are missing data, but instead can model parameters based on the available 
data (Field et al., 2012; Maas & Hox, 2005). Multilevel models are therefore used 
throughout this thesis instead of repeated-measures ANOVA wherever there is an 
unbalanced design or missing data. All multilevel models throughout this thesis were 
conducted in R (R Core Team, 2018) using the nlme package (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, 
Sarkar, & R Core Team, 2020). 
Model fitting. First, the fitting of the model to the data is described and the results are 
then interpreted. Figure 2.4 shows that RTs differed depending on the retrieval practice 
status of the item—including Retrieval Practice Status significantly improved the model 
fit compared to an intercept-only model (χ2(7) = 33.67, p < .001). Adding the main 
effect of Item Accessibility did not further improve the model fit (χ2(8) = 0.10, p = .75), 
but including the main effect of Veracity did (χ2(9) = 6.20, p = .01). 
Adding the interaction term between Retrieval Practice Status and Item Accessibility did 
not improve the model fit  (χ2(11) = 5.72, p = .06) at the alpha level of .05, but the model 
was significantly improved when including the interaction term between Retrieval 
Practice Status and Veracity  (χ2(13) = 25.46, p < .001). The three-way interaction 
between Retrieval Practice Status, Item Accessibility and Veracity did not improve the 
model fit (χ2(16) = 0.10, p = .95). The three-way interaction was therefore removed from 
the model. Because the interaction between Retrieval Practice Status and Item 
Accessibility just missed the 0.05 significance level, it was kept in the model to further 
explore the interaction. 
Model interpretation. A typical RIF effect is defined by longer RTs to Rp- items than 
Nrp items, reflecting reduced accessibility of Rp- items. The primary question of this 
experiment was whether repeating fabrications leads to RIF only when the truth is 
highly accessible in memory. Support for this hypothesis requires a significant three-
way interaction between Retrieval Practice Status, Item Accessibility and Veracity, or at 
least a significant interaction between Retrieval Practice Status and Item Accessibility. 
Since the fit of the multilevel model was not improved when including any interaction 
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terms containing Item Accessibility, this hypothesis was not supported: Item 
Accessibility did not significantly affect RTs. 
However, we can see from Figure 2.4 that although Item Accessibility did not 
significantly predict RTs, the overall pattern of results suggests that it did have some 
effect on participants’ performance. Interestingly, the pattern shown is the opposite to 
that predicted. It was predicted that liars would take longer to respond to items that they 
had practiced lying about (Rp+ items) and related items (Rp- items) compared to 
baseline (Nrp items), but only for high accessibility items. In fact, the direction of the 
results shown in Figure 2.4 suggests RIF only for low accessibility items.  
The model contrasts suggest a potential RIF effect for low accessibility items. Contrasts 
were set to compare both Rp groups to the baseline Nrp group for low and high 
accessibility items, collapsed across the Veracity condition. These revealed that the 
difference between RTs for Nrp and Rp- items was greater for low accessibility (Mdiff = -
39.28, SD = 281.80) compared to high accessibility items (Mdiff = 11.56, SD = 282.89), 
but this difference was not significant at the alpha level of .05 (b = 50.84, t(590) = 1.82, 
p = .07). The difference in RTs between for Nrp and Rp+ items did not significantly 
differ for low accessibility (Mdiff = 100.80, SD = 320.16) and high accessibility items 
(Mdiff = 102.29, SD = 384.12; b = -13.62, t(590) = -0.48, p = .63). 
The question is therefore whether the longer RTs for low accessibility Rp- items merely 
reflects a chance finding or if the non-significance is due to a Type II error from a lack 
of statistical power. A Bayesian analysis was conducted to determine which of these 
possibilities is most plausible. A Bayesian one-way ANOVA comparing RTs for Nrp, 
Rp- and Rp+ items for low accessibility items revealed a  BF01 < .0001, which is 
considered decisive evidence in favor of the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
difference between retrieval practice groups for low accessibility items (Jarosz & Wiley, 
2014). Post hoc tests with a corrected prior to adjust for multiple comparisons (as 
performed by JASP software; [Jasp Team, 2019]) revealed a BF01 = 1.26 for the 
difference in RTs between Nrp and Rp- low accessibility items, which is considered 
only anecdotal evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). This 
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suggests that the non-significant difference between RTs for low accessibility Nrp and 
Rp- items may be a Type II error due to a lack of statistical power. Consistent with the 
multilevel model contrasts, the comparison of RTs for low accessibility Nrp and Rp+ 
items revealed a BF01 = 0.02, which again provides only anecdotal evidence in favor of 
the null hypothesis and suggests that RTs may indeed differ for these groups. 
As in Experiments 1a and 2, a rehearsal effect was found in truth tellers, represented by 
the significant interaction between Retrieval Practice Status and Veracity. This 
interaction is depicted in Figure 2.5, which shows that truth tellers responded more 
quickly to Rp+ items than liars. The model contrasts revealed that the difference in RTs 
between Nrp and Rp+ items is significantly greater in truth tellers (Mdiff = 141.86, SD = 
159.22) than liars  (Mdiff = 61.14, SD = 328.08; b = -125.34, t(393) = -4.32, p < .001). 
This reflects stronger memory from truthfully rehearsing the items in the retrieval 
practice phase. The difference in RTs between Nrp and Rp- items did not significantly 
differ for liars (Mdiff = -11.88, SD = 181.73) and truth tellers (Mdiff = -17.04, SD = 
225.74; b = 5.16, t(393) = 0.18, p = .86). In sum, when not controlling for the 
accessibility of the truth, repeating lies did not affect later memory for items learnt in the 
learning phase, but telling the truth improved memory, due to a standard rehearsal 
effect. 
2.16.3 Recognition results summary. 
Taken together, these results indicate that manipulating the accessibility of the truth in 
memory did not influence the RIF effect in this experiment. However, the results of the 
Bayesian analysis suggest that there may indeed be an RIF effect for low accessibility 
items, but that this effect was missed due to a lack of statistical power. Nonetheless, the 
present data do not provide sufficient evidence that repeating lies promotes RIF of the 
truth via an inhibitory mechanism; participants were not significantly slower to respond 
to items that they had practiced lying about (Rp+ items) compared to baseline items for 
neither low nor high accessibility items. Additionally, the standard RIF effect in truth 
tellers was once again not replicated: Participants were not slower to respond to items 
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related to those they had practiced retrieving (Rp- items) compared to baseline items for 
low or high accessibility items. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Mean reaction time (ms) for liars (top panel) and truth tellers (bottom panel) 
to indicate whether an item was learnt in the learning phase as a function of Retrieval 
Practice Status and Item Accessibility. Error bars indicate ±1 SE of the mean. 
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Figure 2.5. Mean reaction time (ms) for liars and truth tellers to indicate whether an 
item was learnt in the retrieval practice phase as a function of Retrieval Practice Status 
(collapsed across Item Accessibility). Error bars indicate ±1 SE of the mean. 
2.16.4 Error rates. 
Participants’ error rates supplement the RT analyses, as any difference in errors across 
conditions compared to baseline may arise from changes in memory attributable to 
selective retrieval practice. An error constitutes participants incorrectly responding “no” 
that the item shown was not studied. The error rates therefore provide an estimate of the 
rate of omission errors for each type of item. A multilevel model was fitted to the error 
rate data in the final recognition test. 
Model fitting. As for the recognition analyses, the fitting of the model is described first 
and the model results are then interpreted. Error rates differed depending on the retrieval 
practice status of the item—including Retrieval Practice Status as a predictor 
significantly improved the model compared to an intercept-only model (χ2(7) = 39.52, p 
< .001). Adding the main effect of Item Accessibility did not further improve the model 
fit (χ2(8) = 1.73, p = .18) or Veracity (χ2(2) = 21.5, p < .001), but the main effect of 
Veracity did (χ2(9) = 16.26, p < .001). 
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Figure 2.6 shows that there was a clear interaction between all variables. Indeed, the 
model fit was improved with the addition of the interaction between Retrieval Practice 
Status and Item Accessibility (χ2(11) = 18.81, p < .001), Retrieval Practice status and 
Veracity (χ2(13) = 60.66, p < .001), and the three-way interaction between Retrieval 
Practice Status, Item Accessibility and Veracity (χ2(16) = 22.83, p < .001). 
To break down this three-way interaction, separate multi-level models were fitted to 
truth tellers’ and liars’ error data. For liars, including the main effect of Retrieval 
Practice Status significantly improved the model fit compared to an intercept-only 
model (χ2(7) = 9.21, p = .01), but the main effect of Item Accessibility did not further 
improve the model fit (χ2(8) = 2.65, p = .10). Including the interaction term between 
Retrieval Practice Status and Item Accessibility significantly improved the model fit 
(χ2(10) = 35.16, p = < .001). 
For truth tellers, including the main effect of Retrieval Practice Status significantly 
improved the model fit compared to an intercept-only model (χ2(7) = 103.25, p < .001), 
but neither the main effect of Item Accessibility (χ2(8) = 0.01, p = .93) nor the 
interaction between Retrieval Practice Status and Item Accessibility (χ2(10) = 1.71, p = 
.43) significantly improved the model fit. 
Model interpretation. First, for liars, the top panel of Figure 2.6 reveals that the 
accessibility of the item influenced error rates only for items lied about (Rp+ items). 
Error rates were higher for low accessibility items that were lied about compared to high 
accessibility items. The model contrasts confirmed that the difference in error rates 
between Nrp and Rp- items did not significantly differ between low and high 
accessibility items (b = -0.05, t(367) = -1.72, p = .09). However, repeatedly lying about 
an item (Rp+ items) significantly increased errors when those items were less accessible 
compared to when they were more accessible (b = 0.11, t(367) = 4.16, p < .001). 
For truth tellers, the bottom panel of Figure 2.6 suggests that the accessibility of the 
items did not influence the effect of retrieval practice on error rates (confirmed by the 
non-significant interaction between Retrieval Practice Status and Item Accessibility). 
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Unsurprisingly, truth tellers made significantly fewer errors for items they had practiced 
retrieving in the retrieval practice phase (Rp+ items) compared to Nrp items (b = -0.24, 
t(152) = -8.65, p < .001). There was no difference in error rates between Rp- items and 
Nrp items (b = -0.02, t(152) = -0.79, p = .43). In sum, truth tellers made fewer errors if 
they practiced retrieving the item in the retrieval practice phase. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Mean proportion of errors in the RT-based-recognition test for liars (top 
panel) and truth tellers (bottom panel) as a function of Retrieval Practice Status and Item 
Accessibility. Error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean. 
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2.16.5 Error rate results summary. 
The accessibility of the truth in memory affected liars’ error rates, but not truth tellers’. 
For liars, error rates were increased when participants repeated their lies for items that 
were less accessible in memory (cued by hard questions) compared to items that were 
more accessible in memory (cued by easy questions). This suggests that an individual 
who repeatedly lies about information that is weaker in memory might make more 
omission errors later on than if they had not lied. Conversely, truth tellers’ error rates 
were lower for items they had practiced truthfully retrieving in the retrieval practice 
phase, regardless of the item’s accessibility in memory (whether it was cued by an easy 
or hard question). 
2.17. Discussion 
The goal of Experiment 3 was to determine if repeating fabrications leads to RIF of the 
corresponding truthful information only when the truth is highly accessible or 
“entrenched”. If so, this would suggest that the null findings of the previous experiments 
may be due to the accessibility of the truth being too low to create the conditions that 
lead to RIF. It was predicted that RIF would occur only for highly accessible items and 
therefore that RTs would be slower for items participants repeatedly lied about 
(RP+Liars) and for items related to those lied about (Rp-Liars) compared to baseline 
(Nrp).  
The hypothesis was not supported. The accessibility of the truth did not significantly 
affect RTs. The null findings in the previous experiments were therefore unlikely to be 
the result of weak memory for the truth. In fact, contrary to the hypothesis, the results 
suggested that RIF may be more likely to occur for weaker items in memory in both 
liars and truth tellers (although this finding was not statistically significant, the Bayesian 
analysis indicated that it may be a missed effect due to a lack of statistical power).  
Interestingly, participants made fewer omission errors after repeating fabrications for 
high accessibility items compared to when they repeated fabrications for low 
accessibility items. This suggests a slight rehearsal effect: Repeating lies may slightly 
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facilitate memory when the truth is highly accessible. This slight rehearsal effect was 
not reflected in participants’ RTs, but this could be because RTs were only analyzed for 
correct trials. Thus, when participants successfully remembered the item studied, there 
were no further differences in the ease of retrieval of high and low accessibility items 
studied. 
One reason that lying about high accessibility items decreased omission errors could be 
that highly accessible truths were indeed automatically activated and therefore covertly 
rehearsed. Interestingly, the facilitative effect on memory suggests that the truth was not 
activated to the extent that it interfered with lie construction and required inhibiting. The 
implications of this possibility are discussed further in the next section. 
2.18 General Discussion 
2.18.1 Summary of main findings 
The experiments reported in this chapter aimed to determine if repeating fabrications 
can promote RIF of the truth via an inhibitory mechanism. Given that the cognitive 
processes that lead to RIF also appear to be recruited when people fabricate, it was 
predicted that repeating fabrications would promote inhibition of the corresponding 
truthful item in memory and that this would impair later recall of the truth. 
Experiments 1a and 2 investigated the effect of repeating fabrications on recall, whereas 
Experiment 3 investigated its effects on recognition. Contrary to the hypothesis, 
repeating fabrications did not impair recall or recognition of the corresponding truthful 
information and there was no evidence of impaired memory in participants’ confidence 
ratings. Thus, no evidence was found that repeating fabrications can impair memory for 
the corresponding truthful information via RIF. 
Repeating fabrications did, however, promote RIF of related truthful information that 
was not probed in the retrieval practice phase. In Experiment 2, repeating fabrications 
led to an absolute memory impairment of 10% and a relative impairment of 13% – a 
small to medium effect size consistent with the RIF literature (Murayama et al., 2014). 
A small, but non-significant, impairment for these items was also found in Experiment 
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1a, however the Bayesian analyses suggested that this non-significant finding could be a 
missed true effect. This may be due to a lack of statistical power arising from the 
exclusion of recall data for items participants did not correctly respond to in the retrieval 
practice phase. Similarly, the overall pattern of results in Experiment 3 suggested a 
small, but non-significant, impairment in recognition for low accessibility items related 
to those participants practiced fabricating about, and the Bayesian analyses again 
suggested that this may be due to low statistical power. 
The impairment in recall was unique to lying participants. Experiments 1a and 2 failed 
to replicate the standard RIF effect in truth tellers. Despite using a variety of stimuli and 
switching to a between-subjects design so that truth telling was procedurally identical to 
a standard RIF experiment, selective truthful retrieval practice did not affect the 
accessibility of related information in memory. The standard RIF effect was found only 
in Experiment 1b, but this is likely to be due to output interference during recall, rather 
than genuine forgetting caused by an inhibitory mechanism engaged during retrieval 
practice. 
Overall, these experiments suggest that repeating fabrications has no effect on memory 
for the corresponding truthful information but may impair memory for related 
information via an inhibitory mechanism. The RIF effects found have been discussed in 
Section 2.13, and I therefore consider in more detail here what might explain the null 
effects. 
2.18.2 Why was there no RIF of corresponding truthful information? 
Repeating fabrications did not impair recall below baseline for the corresponding 
truthful information in any experiment. This finding indicates that, in this context, 
practicing lies was equivalent to not rehearsing the items in the interval between 
learning and recall. This is a surprising finding, as these items were cued in this 
interval—they were directly probed in the retrieval practice phase. Despite being cued, 
there were no detrimental effects on memory (and even a slight facilitative effect for 
high accessibility items in Experiment 3). This suggests that the activation-competition-
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inhibition cycle outlined in Section 2.1.2 that induced RIF was not initiated when 
participants repeated their fabrications. 
As outlined in Section 2.1.2, research into the cognition of deception indicates that the 
three main processes that induce RIF are also recruited when people fabricate—
activation, competition, and inhibition. Although the present experiments do not provide 
direct evidence that these processes were not engaged when people repeated their 
fabrications, they suggest that at least one of the three components that induce RIF was 
not engaged. One possibility is that the retrieval cues provided in the present 
experiments did not activate the truth to the extent that it interfered with the generation 
of a deceptive response. This raises some interesting theoretical questions regarding 
truth automaticity in deceptive responding. 
It is generally agreed among deception researchers that one of the first cognitive steps 
involved in deception is automatic activation of the truth in working memory (Debey et 
al., 2014; Walczyk et al., 2014). Truth automaticity depends first and foremost on its 
accessibility; if the truth is not accessible, it cannot automatically be retrieved. But even 
when the truth is accessible, there may be other influences on the extent to which it is 
activated and therefore the cognitive processes that follow. One such influence might be 
the way in which participants lie. Much of the research into the cognition of deception 
requires participants to lie by providing the opposite answer to the truth in response to 
yes/no questions (Debey et al., 2014; Duran et al., 2010; Suchotzki et al., 2017). This 
procedure is typically used because it allows a high degree of experimental control and 
for specific inferences to be made about the cognitive processes recruited by measuring 
participants’ RTs under different conditions. Such research has shown that lying 
participants take longer to respond than truth telling participants—a robust effect called 
the lying constant (Sheridan & Flowers, 2010). The additional time to respond is taken 
as evidence that liars must override the automatic tendency to respond truthfully in order 
to lie (Duran et al., 2010; Williams et al., 2013).  
However, lying by providing the opposite response to the truth is a very constrained 
form of lying. In such cases, strong activation of the truth might play an important role 
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because the probability of inadvertently answering truthfully is 50% (given that there are 
two possible answers: yes or no). With just two possible response options, it is 
important that the truth is first known so that the opposite answer can be delivered. 
However, activation of the truth may play a less important role when deception is 
unconstrained—as in the present experiments where participants were free to fabricate 
whichever response they liked. In these cases, the probability of inadvertently answering 
truthfully is much lower, given that any answer can be provided, so long as it is 
accessible and plausible. Fabrication therefore does not require such strict monitoring of 
the truth. This idea is consistent with past research showing that people more often 
report needing to suppress the truth when lying in response to closed, rather than open-
ended questions (35.5% and 82% of cases for open- and closed-questions respectively; 
Walczyk et al., 2003). 
It is therefore possible that the activation, competition, inhibition cycle that leads to RIF 
may only be apparent in cases of constrained deception. Past research has studied 
something similar: Whether practicing lies by responding with the opposite to the truth 
reduces the cognitive cost of lying (Van Bockstaele et al., 2012). Practicing lies in this 
way decreased participants’ RTs for the items they lied about. One explanation for this 
finding may be that repeated inhibition of the truthful response during practice resulted 
in less interference from the truthful response later on. Thus, one avenue for further 
research is to combine the RIF paradigm with a speeded constrained deception paradigm 
to determine if lying in this way can impair memory for the truth.  
2.18.3 Theoretical and practical implications 
As discussed in Section 1.4, several researchers have proposed that RIF may be a 
mechanism underlying the deception-induced memory impairments found in prior 
research. Von Hippel and Trivers (2011) also propose that by repeating lies and omitting 
the truth, people can come to forget the truth via the process of RIF, and therefore self-
deceive. To conclude that RIF is an underlying mechanism of any forgetting effect, 
memory must fall below the individual’s baseline forgetting rate and should also reflect 
a genuine memory impairment, rather than an artifact of the way that memory is tested. 
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The experiments described in this chapter are the first the use a paradigm that is 
designed to elicit RIF to test the possibility that the accessibility of the truth can be 
reduced merely by repeating fabrications.  
If the purpose of self-deception is to help the liar to escape detection, then any memory 
impairment should be for the corresponding truthful information, since it is this 
information that the liar wishes to conceal. However, there was no evidence that 
repeating fabrications and omitting the truth can impair memory for the corresponding 
truthful information in any of the experiments reported here. Thus, these experiments do 
not provide evidence that RIF may be a mechanism underlying self-deception. 
Nonetheless, repeating fabrications did impair memory below baseline for related 
truthful information. Memory can therefore suffer merely from repeating fabrications 
and omitting the truth (although it should be noted that the impairment was small). In a 
criminal investigation, this could mean that crime-relevant information that is not the 
subject of initial investigations can become less accessible as a result of fabricating false 
information about other crime-relevant details. If such information later becomes 
relevant to the investigation, the individual may find it easier to lie about these details 
and be more likely to escape detection as a result. In terms of the practical implications 
of such forgetting, a question for further research is whether the forgetting effects 
persist. 
In sum, the primary purpose of the experiments reported here was to test the proposal 
that RIF is a possible mechanism underlying self-deception. No evidence for this claim 
was found. It remains possible that people can come to forget the truth or believe their 
lies after having repeated them and omitting the truth, however, there is currently no 
evidence that RIF underlies this effect. I therefore move onto the second mechanism by 
which people could come to believe their own lies: Source monitoring, and in particular, 
its relationship with cognitive load. 
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Chapter 3: Does the cognitive effort of lying accurately predict 
subsequent memory errors? Correlation, causation and Simpson’s 
Paradox in the memory and deception framework 
As outlined in Section 1.5.1, there is considerable existing evidence that people can 
come to mistake their lies for the truth via source monitoring errors and incipient 
research investigating the factors that moderate such errors. One potential moderator is 
the cognitive load that a liar experiences in the generation and delivery of the lie. 
Indeed, the recently developed MAD framework goes one step further by proposing that 
cognitive load might directly cause source monitoring errors, rather than merely 
moderate those errors. In this chapter, the hypothesis that liars’ cognitive load causes 
subsequent memory errors is questioned. It is also argued that cognitive load might not 
be a useful predictor of the memory errors that follow deception. Chapter 4 then tests the 
claims made in the present chapter. 
3.1 The MAD framework revisited 
Since the MAD framework (Otgaar & Baker, 2018) is detailed in Section 1.6, only a 
summary is provided here. To recap, the MAD framework is based on the observation 
that the type of memory error that follows deception seems to depend on the liars’ 
cognitive load. Specifically, lies that require fewer cognitive resources to generate (false 
denials and feigned amnesia) typically increase omission errors, whereas lies that 
require more cognitive resources to generate (fabrications) typically increase 
commission errors. The central hypothesis of the framework is therefore that low 
cognitive load lies should increase omission errors (forgetting of the truth), whereas 
high cognitive load lies should increase commission errors (source monitoring errors or 
false memories). Moreover, the framework proposes that increasing the cognitive effort 
required to lie should increase commission errors. In what follows, I question the 
validity of these hypotheses. 
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3.2. Cognitive effort is a marker, but not a mechanism 
Although cognitive effort is the central concept underpinning the MAD framework, it is 
unclear how the cognitive effort of lying helps to explain subsequent memory errors. 
Despite stating that the effect of lying on memory is the result of the cognitive effort 
required, the MAD framework does not treat cognitive effort as a mechanism that 
causes omission and commission errors, but rather treats cognitive effort as a marker 
that correlates with other processes that cause omission and commission errors. 
The MAD framework does not attribute the increased omission errors resulting from 
false denials and feigned amnesia to low cognitive effort, but instead to a lack of 
rehearsal. Specifically, the framework states that “when the draw of cognitive resources 
is less (such as in simple versions of false denials), issues such as a lack of rehearsal 
come into play and lead to omissions” (Otgaar & Baker, 2018, p. 9). In this statement, 
the fact that these lies require fewer cognitive resources is descriptive, but not 
explanatory. Instead, a lack of rehearsal is stated as the mechanism that explains the 
omission errors resulting from false denials and feigned amnesia. 
Similarly, in the case of fabrication, increased commission errors are not attributed to 
high cognitive effort, but to source monitoring difficulties. Specifically, the framework 
states that “when more cognitive resources are required, participants must remember 
exactly what they lied about and remain consistent. As a result, the threat of source 
monitoring errors is lurking, which potentially leads to commission errors/false 
memories” (Otgaar & Baker, 2018, p. 9). Again, the fact that these lies require greater 
cognitive resources is descriptive, and source monitoring instead is the mechanism that 
explains the commission errors resulting from fabrication. 
These mechanisms—a lack of rehearsal and source monitoring—do the heavy lifting in 
explaining the different memory errors produced by different types of lie. Cognitive 
effort, however, adds little to our understanding of how lying affects memory over and 
above the mechanisms with which it is associated. And that is because it is not obvious 
how cognitive effort should affect omission or commission errors without reference to 
these other causal mechanisms. 
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Why does it matter if the cognitive effort of lying correlates with other processes, but 
does not itself cause the different memory errors? After all, even if cognitive effort plays 
no causal role in producing memory errors, it may still legitimately predict the memorial 
outcome of lying, as long as it correlates highly with the actual causal processes. To 
draw an analogy, it might be possible to predict the number of shark attacks in a season 
from the water temperature, despite the fact that shark attacks are not caused by warmer 
water, but rather by an increase in the number of swimmers on warmer days. The 
problem is that the water temperature can dissociate from the number of swimmers; that 
is, there may be days when there are many swimmers, but cold water, and vice versa. On 
these days, your prediction will be inaccurate if based on the water temperature alone. 
Thus, if you know that shark attacks are caused by more swimmers, not by warmer 
water, then it is preferable to base your prediction on the number of swimmers 
accordingly to strive for maximal accuracy. In general terms, robust theories or 
frameworks center on causal mechanisms, not on correlated variables. 
Returning to the MAD framework, the key issue can be summarized as this: MAD treats 
the cognitive effort of lying as analogous to water temperature in the above example (i.e. 
a correlate), but simultaneously encourages researchers to use it as a predictor, as if it 
were analogous to the number of swimmers (i.e. a cause). But the cognitive effort of 
lying and the type of lie are not interchangeable predictors: The cognitive effort of lying 
can dissociate from the type of lie in the same way that water temperature can dissociate 
from the number of swimmers. To illustrate, fabrication typically requires greater 
cognitive resources than does false denial or feigning amnesia, but not necessarily so. 
For instance, an individual guilty of committing some crime might find it very easy to 
fabricate a cover story when an investigator has little evidence or limited knowledge of 
the crime, since the individual does not have to worry about their story being consistent 
with the investigator’s knowledge. Moreover, this individual might expend less 
cognitive effort to fabricate a story than somebody who instead falsely denies 
information in response to a knowledgeable investigator and therefore must think 
carefully about what they can deny, given what the investigator knows or what they 
themselves have disclosed in the past. Thus, there might be cases where fabrication is 
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easier than selectively denying information. The cognitive effort required within a single 
lie type can also significantly vary depending on situational and individual factors. For 
instance, a well-practiced liar might require few cognitive resources to fabricate a lie, 
but a primarily honest individual might require many. Similarly, a more elaborate 
fabrication will likely require many more cognitive resources than a simple one.  
In cases like those above where the type of lie dissociates from the cognitive effort 
required to create it, it is unclear what type of memory error the MAD framework would 
predict. For instance, if a fabrication requires few cognitive resources, should we expect 
increased commission errors because fabricating information increases vulnerability to 
source monitoring errors, or should we expect increased omission errors because the lie 
required little cognitive effort?  This uncertainty stems from predicting memory errors 
from a non-causal variable. If we are to maximize the accuracy of our predictions, we 
will need to predict subsequent memory errors from their underlying mechanisms. Any 
theory of how lying affects memory should therefore center on these underlying 
mechanisms. 
In the next section, it is explained why failing to dissociate two distinct variables—in 
this case, the cognitive effort of lying and the type of lie—can lead to incorrect 
interpretations of the existing empirical evidence. Specifically, pooling research on the 
basis of a non-causal variable can lead to Simpson’s Paradox and consequently to 
incorrect statistical inferences.  
3.3 The cognitive effort of lying and commission errors: A potential case of 
Simpson’s Paradox 
Simpson’s paradox occurs when a relationship between variables reverses direction 
when controlling for additional variables. It is best illustrated with an example. In 1973, 
the University of California-Berkeley was sued for an apparent gender bias in graduate 
admissions. Overall, 44% of male applicants were admitted, compared to only 35% of 
female applicants, showing a clear bias in favor of admitting men. However, when the 
academic department was factored into the analysis, the pattern reversed, showing a 
small bias in favor of admitting women (Bickel, Hammel, & O’Connell, 1975). Women 
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more often applied to Humanities departments that had few places and were therefore 
difficult to get accepted into, whereas men more often applied to mathematical and 
science departments with more places. Differences in the number of places available 
across departments helped to explain the differing admission rates between genders, but 
this was ignored in the initial analysis—it was a lurking explanatory variable. Instead, 
the admission data were improperly pooled into a “gender” variable, resulting in a 
spurious relationship between gender and admission rates. How does this relate to the 
MAD framework? Focusing on commission errors, the next section shows how pooling 
research into a cognitive effort continuum, as the MAD framework does, could lead to 
an instance of Simpson’s Paradox. 
Because existing research on the effect of lying on memory has not explicitly 
manipulated the cognitive effort of lying, we can currently only infer the relationship 
between the cognitive effort of lying and commission errors. Instead, the research to 
date has studied the effects of different types of lie on memory. From this, we know that 
false denials and feigned amnesia (which typically fall at the low end of the cognitive 
effort continuum) produce few commission errors (but more omission errors), but 
fabrications (which typically fall at the high end of the continuum) produce more 
commission errors. Thus, plotting the rate of commission errors against the cognitive 






Figure 3.1. Schematic diagram plotting the rate of commission errors for lies at either 
end of the cognitive effort continuum. 
It is clear from the figure that we know little about the commission errors produced from 
lies in the middle of the cognitive effort continuum—lies that are more cognitively 
demanding than denial or feigning amnesia typically is, but less cognitively demanding 
than fabrication typically is. As a result, we do not have enough information to join the 
data points in Figure 3.1. That is, we do not know if the relationship between 
commission errors and the cognitive effort of lying is linear (commission errors increase 
proportionally with cognitive effort) or nonlinear (commission errors increase 
disproportionately with cognitive effort). The MAD framework states that “the side 
effect of increasing cognitive resources during deceptive attempts such as fabrication is 
that lying will have similar characteristics as genuine memories” (Otgaar & Baker, 
2018, p. 8). Thus, by pooling existing research into a single cognitive effort continuum, 
the framework implies a positive association between the cognitive effort of lying and 
the rate of commission errors. 
Pooling research findings can be problematic when the variable into which they are 
pooled is confounded with other variables, as in this case. There is currently no research 
that dissociates the cognitive effort of lying from the type of lie participants are 
instructed to tell. As such, the conclusions about the effect of cognitively demanding lies 
on memory have been drawn from research into one type of lie (i.e., fabrication), but our 
conclusions about the effect of cognitively less demanding lies on memory have been 
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drawn from research into a different type of lie (i.e., denial, feigned amnesia). In other 
words, it is not yet possible to make any claims about the relationship between the 
cognitive effort of lying and the rate of commission errors because we cannot separate 
the effects of cognitive effort from the effects of the type of lie that was told. 
Determining the role of cognitive effort requires manipulating the cognitive effort of the 
same type of lie and seeing what effect this has on the memory errors that follow 
(Experiments 4 and 5 described in Chapter 4 are designed for this purpose). Moreover, 
because the cognitive effort of lying does not cause commission errors per se (as 
discussed in Section 3.2), there is likely to be a lurking explanatory variable that 
explains the apparent increase in commission errors as we move up the cognitive effort 
continuum. 
The lurking explanatory variable in question may simply be the type of lie told. As the 
MAD framework highlights, fabricating an event creates false details in memory that 
can be confused for the truth, whereas denying an event or feigning amnesia does not. 
This difference seems sufficient to explain why fabrication can create commission 
errors, without invoking cognitive effort. Thus, the increase in commission errors from 
lies at the high end of the cognitive effort continuum might be primarily explained by a 
shift in the type of lie, from those that do not create alternative imagined details to those 
that do. But to be an instance of Simpson’s paradox, controlling for the type of lie must 
reverse the apparent positive relationship so it becomes negative, that is, commission 
errors should decrease as the cognitive effort of lying increases.  
3.4 Why might controlling for the type of lie imply a different relationship between 
lying and commission errors? 
The MAD framework cites the SMF (Johnson et al., 1993) to explain why lies requiring 
greater cognitive resources can increase commission errors. But the SMF can also 
predict the opposite result that lies requiring greater cognitive resources can decrease 
commission errors. As outlined in Section 1.5, the SMF predicts that internally 
generated information (such as fabricated information) is more likely to be incorporated 
into memory when it has characteristics that resemble a true memory. But recall that the 
SMF also posits another factor that influences whether fabricated information will be 
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incorporated into memory: Cognitive operations. To recap, these are the mental 
processes that are activated when encoding information, for example, the retrieval 
processes engaged when generating fabricated information and the processes that led 
you to choose to report certain details over others (Foley & Foley, 2007). 
According to the SMF, the cognitive operations associated with a memory help people 
to identify when information was generated internally versus based on a real experience, 
and consequently, commission errors are reduced when relatively more cognitive 
operations are associated with a memory (Johnson et al., 1988; Sugimori & Tanno, 
2010). Thus, whereas fabricating information might produce characteristics typical of 
genuine memories, the act of fabrication might also produce cognitive operations that 
prevent this information from being incorporated into memory. Moreover, it may be that 
the more effortful—or cognitively demanding—the process of fabrication is, the more 
cognitive operations are associated with the fabricated information. Fabrications that 
require more cognitive resources might therefore result in fewer commission errors than 
do fabrications that require fewer cognitive resources. 
There is also preliminary empirical evidence suggesting that increasing the cognitive 
effort of lying can decrease commission errors. For instance, studies comparing the 
effect of self- vs other-generated fabrications show that other-generated fabrications are 
more likely to increase commission errors, suggesting that the additional cognitive 
processes recruited to self-generate lies somewhat protected participants from 
incorporating those lies into memory (Pezdek et al., 2009; Pickel, 2004). Consistent with 
this line of reasoning, we know that frequent liars are more likely to incorporate 
fabricated details into memory than are those who lie less often (Polage, 2012). 
Practiced liars presumably find it easier to lie and therefore need to recruit fewer 
cognitive resources to do so. Nonetheless, because these studies did not directly 
manipulate cognitive effort, we cannot be sure that this explains the observed 
differences. However, they do suggest that a negative association may exist between the 
cognitive effort of fabrication and the rate of commission errors. 
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It is an empirical question whether increasing the cognitive effort of fabrication 
decreases or increases commission errors. But this can only be established when 
research dissociates the cognitive effort of lying from the type of lie. If future research 
does not do this, then it might seem that the association between the cognitive effort of 
lying and the rate of commission errors is positive, even if it is actually negative. In 
other words, a negative association could be masked by the fact that cognitive effort is 
confounded with lie type. The next section illustrates this. 
3.5 Why might pooling commission errors on a cognitive effort continuum lead to 
interpretive issues? 
Imagine that we conducted an experiment to see how lying affects commission errors at 
different points along the cognitive effort continuum, but we do not control for the type 
of lie told. In this imaginary experiment, we ask people to deny an event (as a low 
cognitive effort condition), fabricate a one-word answer (as a mid-cognitive effort 
condition), or fabricate an elaborate answer (as a high cognitive effort condition). 
Suppose that our hypothesis is that the rate of commission errors will be higher for lies 
requiring greater cognitive effort, in line with MAD, and that the results show 
something like the pattern in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Schematic diagram depicting the results of an imaginary experiment that 
plots the rate of commission errors for lies requiring low, mid, and high cognitive effort. 
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If we modelled the data in Figure 3.2, with cognitive effort as our predictor, we would 
see a positive association between the cognitive effort of lying and commission errors, 
as depicted in the left panel of Figure 3.3. But this apparent positive association is 
misleading because it neglects the fact that the data points come from different types of 
lie—the lurking explanatory variable. Once we include the type of lie in the model, the 
association reverses, as depicted in the right panel of Figure 3.3. Thus, the apparent 
positive association between the cognitive effort of lying and commission errors might 
actually be a negative association once the type of lie is controlled for. In other words, 
there may be an interaction between the cognitive effort of lying and lie type, such that 
the effect of cognitive effort on commission errors depends on the type of lie told. But 
unless the research explicitly dissociates the cognitive effort of lying from the type of 
lie, we cannot express this relationship as an interaction and this can lead us to 
misinterpret the findings. 
 
Figure 3.3. Schematic diagram depicting Simpson’s paradox. Left panel: A spurious 
positive association between the cognitive effort of lying and commission errors when 
data are pooled along a single cognitive effort continuum. Right panel: A negative 
relationship between the cognitive effort of lying and commission errors when 




By synthesizing the existing research on lying and memory, Otgaar and Baker (2018) 
have imposed a much-needed structure on this area of research. Despite many missing 
puzzle pieces, they developed a plausible and testable framework that can greatly further 
our understanding of how lying affects memory. Nonetheless, the framework confounds 
distinct variables, which could lead to interpretive issues. 
This chapter began by stating that a good theory or framework predicts an outcome from 
a causal mechanism because this will yield the most accurate predictions. The MAD 
framework predicts the type of memory error that lying produces based on the cognitive 
effort of lying. However, it seems that the cognitive effort of lying does not cause 
memory errors, but instead correlates with other causal mechanisms (namely, a lack of 
rehearsal and source monitoring difficulties). Predicting the memorial outcome of lying 
from cognitive effort could therefore lead us to draw the wrong conclusions. This is 
because pooling lies, irrespective of the type of lie, into a single cognitive effort 
continuum might lead us to overlook the actual cause of the different memory errors. As 
we have seen, this improper pooling can lead to Simpson’s paradox—what looks like a 
positive association between cognitive effort and a certain type of memory error might 
actually be a negative association when we control for lurking explanatory variables.  
The next chapter outlines 2 experiments that were designed to explicitly dissociate the 
cognitive effort required for lie generation and the lie type. The experiments tested the 
hypothesis that when controlling for the type of lie, commission errors may actually be 
higher when participants lie under low cognitive load and lower when they lie under 
high cognitive load (contrary to the MAD framework’s prediction). 
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Chapter 4: Does the cognitive effort of lying affect whether fabrications 
are incorporated into memory? 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter questioned the MAD framework’s assumption that the cognitive 
effort of lie generation and the type of lie told are interchangeable predictors of the 
memory errors that may follow deception. Instead, it was proposed that the cognitive 
effort of lie generation should be treated as a distinct variable that can moderate the 
effect of different types of lie on memory. In real life, there are several factors that may 
dissociate the cognitive effort of lying from the type of lie told. For instance: 
● Practice—an individual who fabricates often will likely require fewer cognitive 
resources to generate their fabrication than somebody who fabricates rarely. This 
is supported by research showing that people are quicker at lying after practice 
(Van Bockstaele et al., 2012). Similarly, spontaneous fabrication generally 
imposes greater cognitive load than delivering pre-prepared fabrications 
(Walczyk et al., 2014). 
● The length of the lie—single- or few-word fabrications will likely require fewer 
cognitive resources than lengthy narrative fabrications (Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, & 
Tcholakian, 2013) 
● Plausibility—ADCAT (Walczyk et al., 2014) proposes that the cognitive cost of 
fabrication is inversely related to lie plausibility, such that constructing more 
plausible fabrications requires less cognitive effort. This is because plausible 
fabrications are typically closer to the truth and are therefore easier to construct. 
Less plausible fabrications tend to result from limited experience with the event 
in question and therefore tend to be constructed from more general schemata and 
scripts (Sporer, 2016), rather than specific experiences. This requires greater 
cognitive effort to the extent that it requires the manipulation of knowledge 
stores. 
● Situational factors, such as the knowledge of the enquirer. If the enquirer has 
extensive knowledge of the event in question, it is likely that more cognitive 
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effort will be required to construct fabrications that are consistent with the 
known facts compared to when the enquirer knows little. 
While all of the above may be natural variants of the cognitive effort required for 
fabrication, they cannot form the basis of an experimental manipulation to test the 
hypothesis that increasing the cognitive effort of lie generation decreases commission 
errors. This is because they all confound cognitive load with another factor. For 
instance, if cognitive load is manipulated by asking participants to tell spontaneous 
versus practiced lies, it cannot be known if any later differences in memory are due to 
the diminished cognitive load from practice, or because practice increases fluency and 
affects source monitoring in other ways.  
To isolate the effects of cognitive load independently of its covariates, the following two 
experiments manipulated the cognitive effort of fabrication using anagrams. Participants 
were provided with a ready-made fabrication in the form of an anagram that first must 
be solved in order for the lie to be delivered. The difficulty of the anagram was used as a 
proxy for the effort required to construct the fabrication: The harder the anagram, the 
more the individual contributes to the lie’s construction. This allowed control over the 
type of lie as well as the specific lie told. All participants reported the same fabrications, 
but had to put varying effort into the construction of that fabrication according to how 
difficult it was for them to solve the anagram. This provided a strictly controlled method 
of manipulating the cognitive effort required for lie construction. Anagrams are 
frequently used in broader memory literature to examine the relationship between 
cognitive effort, cognitive operations and subsequent memory performance (e.g., 
Bertsch, Pesta, Wiscott, & McDaniel, 2007; Foley & Foley, 2007; Taconnat & Isingrini, 
2004). Although this method compromises external validity, it provides good 
experimental control to test the hypothesis that the cognitive effort of lie construction 
can dissociate from the type of lie told with different memorial outcomes. 
4.2 Experiment 4 
Experiment 4 tested the hypothesis developed in Chapter 3 that commission errors will 
be higher when the cognitive effort of lying is low and lower when the cognitive effort 
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of lying is high—the opposite prediction to the MAD framework. Importantly, the type 
of lie was controlled such that all participants delivered the same fabrications. Since 
participants did not construct their own lies, this is analogous to when an individual 
reports details heard from someone else, or when an accomplice gives the individual 
their alibi.  
The experiment was conducted over 2 sessions. In Session 1, participants watched an 
interactive mock crime before undergoing interview or filler tasks (a no fabrication 
control condition). All participants lied at interview under conditions of low or high 
cognitive load. Participants either simply received the lie to deliver (low load condition) 
or they received the fabrication as an anagram that required solving before the lie could 
be delivered (high load condition). Three weeks later, participants completed a 
recognition test to assess their memory for the items from the mock crime. There were 
two main predictions: First, that participants who provide false answers (fabrications) to 
questions about the mock crime will show more commission errors, poorer recognition 
discriminability, and lower confidence than participants who do not fabricate any 
details. Second, that contrary to the MAD framework’s prediction, participants in the 
low load condition will show more commission errors, poorer recognition 
discriminability and lower confidence than participants in the high load condition. The 




The experiment was completed by 159 participants (mean age = 19.6 years, SD = 2.5 
years, range = 18-34 years; 38 male, 120 female, 1 other) in exchange for course credit 
or a small monetary reward. Participants were primarily native English speakers 
(n=119). Of those whose first language was not English, 31 rated themselves as fluent to 
a native or excellent standard and the remaining 9 subjects rated their English as either 
good (n=7) or satisfactory (n=2). 
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A power analysis in R was conducted to determine an appropriate sample size using the 
BUCSS package (Anderson & Kelley, 2019) that adjusts effect sizes from previous 
studies for publication bias and uncertainty (Anderson, Kelley, & Maxwell, 2017). The 
power analysis was based on Pezdek et al.’s (2009) forced fabrication study, as the 
design and study goals most closely approximated those of the present experiment. In 
Pezdek et al., some participants were forced to fabricate their own answers to questions 
concerning a mock crime they witnessed (self-generated), whereas other participants 
answered with a fabrication suggested in the question (other-generated). The power 
analysis was based on this between-subjects comparison, which is analogous to the high 
and low cognitive load comparison in the present experiment (self-generating a 
fabrication is likely to be more cognitively demanding than merely accepting one 
supplied in the question). Based on the adjusted effect size of d=0.79 from Pezdek et al., 
the present experiment required 51 participants per group (a total of 153 participants) to 
achieve a power of 0.8 with an alpha level of .05 and assurance of 0.7 (assurance is the 
percentage of times that the experiment would reach the specified power (Anderson et 
al., 2017). The study was approved by the psychology department ethics committee at 
the University of Warwick. 
4.3.2 Stimuli and apparatus. 
Mock crime. This experiment used the mock crime video that was used in Experiment 2 
(only the crime-relevant video was used in the present experiment). To recap, the video 
was filmed from a POV perspective and depicted a gloved individual carrying out 
numerous actions culminating in the theft of an expensive device and some important 
documentation. For the present experiment, the mock crime video was edited to make it 
interactive. At various points throughout the video, participants were required to select 
the correct item to carry out an action described (this is outlined in more detail in 
Section 4.3.3). This was to make the mock crime more engaging and ensure that 
participants remained focused throughout the video, ultimately to promote better 
encoding. Participants watched the video full screen on 22-inch monitors with a 
resolution of 1920x1080 (duration = 8 minutes, 50 seconds). The interactive mock crime 
was developed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). 
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Lie creation. Participants were provided with the fabrications to deliver during the 
interview. A pilot survey was conducted to ensure that the fabrications were plausible 
alternatives to the truthful corresponding details from the mock crime (see Appendix 8). 
In the high cognitive load condition, the fabrication was presented as an anagram that 
required solving before the lie could be delivered. The anagrams were developed using 
the same method as past research (Foley & Foley, 2007). A pilot study was conducted to 
ensure that participants could solve the anagrams, but also considered them more 
cognitively demanding to solve than merely reading the answer (see Appendix 8). 
4.3.3 Design and Procedure. 
The experiment was fully between-subjects and included a single independent variable 
with 3 levels (Fabrication Type: low cognitive load, high cognitive load, no 
fabrication/control). The experiment involved two sessions, completed 3 weeks apart. 
Session 1 consisted of a perpetration, distraction and interview phase, and was 
completed in individual laboratory cubicles. Session 2 was a recognition test that 
participants completed online. Participants were given a cover story to prevent them 
from ascertaining the study’s true purpose– they were informed that the experiment 
concerned verbal lie detection over time (a suspicion check was included to determine 
the success of the cover story; the results are reported below). 
Session 1 
Mock crime phase. After consenting to participate and providing demographic 
information, participants read a background story to immerse them in the mock crime 
scenario. They were asked to imagine that they had been in financial difficulty and 
resorted to borrowing money from a loan shark, who they were unable to repay. In a 
mock phone call, the angry loan shark informed the participant that they could wipe 
their debt if they break into a university building to steal some valuable equipment and 
documentation. Participants then received instructions on how to execute the crime to 
clear their debt. The instructions consisted of 18 statements, each outlining an action 
together with the item needed to complete the action written in red (e.g., “lever open the 
workshop door using a crowbar”). Participants were instructed to memorize the items 
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and had 3 minutes to do so. The first and last items were filler items to control for 
primacy and recency effects, leaving 16 critical items for memorization. 
Participants ‘performed’ the mock crime by watching the interactive mock crime video, 
consisting of the 18 actions outlined in the instructions. Before each action in the video 
was executed, an inventory appeared on the screen showing the 18 items and a 
description of the upcoming action (see Figure 4.1). Participants then selected the item 
required to complete the action from the inventory. The inventory items were arranged 
in a random order, but the order was kept constant across all 18 actions. 
Distractor phase. Participants completed 10 minutes of mathematical, reasoning and 
word puzzles. The experiment automatically progressed to the interview phase after 10 
minutes. More than 10 minutes-worth of tasks were included and no participants 
completed the given tasks in this time, suggesting that they were occupied for the full 
duration. 
Interview phase. The computer program randomly allocated participants to either the 
high cognitive load, low cognitive load or no fabrication/control condition. Participants 
in the no fabrication/control condition continued to complete word puzzles for a further 
10 minutes to prevent them from rehearsing the details of the mock crime and were then 
thanked and dismissed. 
Participants in the low and high cognitive load conditions underwent interview on the 
actions carried out in the mock crime. The interview consisted of pre-recorded videos of 
a ‘rival’ of the loan shark, who was allegedly planning a similar crime and wanted to 
know how it was done. Participants were told to conceal their methods by lying in 
response to his questions by delivering the lie provided onscreen as convincingly as 
possible. The interview consisted of 18 subtitled videos, each containing a question 
about an item from the mock crime (e.g. “What did you use to cover the CCTV 
camera?”). The question videos played one-by-one in a random order. 
For each video, once it finished playing, the lie appeared below the video (the stimuli 
are listed in Appendix 6). Participants in the low cognitive load condition simply read 
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the lie, retyped it and stated it aloud (e.g. A CLOTH). Participants in the high cognitive 
load condition received the lie in the anagram form (e.g., “A COHTL”) and were 
instructed to type the solution and state it aloud. If participants could not solve the 
anagram, a hint appeared on screen, consisting of an easier anagram that was solved by 
rearranging 3 underlined letters. To encourage participants to solve the anagrams 
themselves and not simply wait for the easier version, the hints appeared only after 90 
seconds. In both conditions, participants were reminded to be as convincing as possible 
when delivering their lies and instructed to picture the deceptive answer in their mind’s 
eye. All deceptive answers were one or two words in length. The first 2 questions were 
practice questions addressing the filler items to familiarize participants with the task. 
Feedback was provided for these questions. 
On completion of the interview, participants completed a manipulation check to 
determine whether the cognitive load manipulation worked. Participants rated how 
much mental effort they required to answer the interview questions on a scale of 1-9 
ranging from “very low mental effort” to “very high mental effort”. Past research has 
shown this to be a reliable index of cognitive load (Paas, Van Merriënboer, & Adam, 





Figure 4.1. The item inventory for the interactive mock crime. Participants selected the 
correct item to carry out the action described for each of the 18 actions in the mock 
crime video. 
Session 2 
Participants were emailed a link to complete Session 2 of the study online 21 days after 
completing Session 1. They were directed to a yes/no recognition test that tested their 
memory for the 16 critical items from the mock crime. The instruction was to “answer 
all questions truthfully, i.e., “yes” if you saw the item in the mock crime video and “no” 
if you did not see the item in the mock crime video, regardless of whether you lied in 
response to these questions in part 1”. Participants completed a comprehension check to 
ensure that they understood this instruction. There were 2 questions for each item 
(yielding 32 questions in total) – one containing the truthful answer, requiring a “yes”’ 
response (e.g. “was the CCTV camera covered with shaving foam?”) and one containing 
the deceptive answer, requiring a “no” response (e.g. “was the CCTV camera covered 
with a cloth?”). Participants indicated “yes” or “no” and rated their confidence that their 
answer was correct on a scale of 0 = completely uncertain to 100 = completely certain. 
Each question appeared one-by-one in the center of the screen and the question order 
was randomized across participants. The first 2 questions were practice questions 
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addressing the filler items and participants were given feedback for these questions. On 
completion of the recognition test, participants were asked to state what they believe the 
study’s hypothesis is, as a suspicion check. No participants correctly guessed the study’s 
hypothesis. 
4.4 Results and discussion 
4.4.1 Preliminary analyses 
Before addressing the primary research question of the experiment, four manipulation 
and performance checks were performed. 
Engagement in mock crime. Participants performed well in the interactive mock crime 
and selected the correct item to perform each action for most of the instructions (M = 
94.58%, SD = 22.64%). This indicates that participants were engaged with the mock 
crime scenario and encoded the crime-relevant items well. 
Manipulation check. Participants’ ratings of the mental effort required to complete the 
interview suggest that the cognitive load manipulation was unsuccessful: The difficulty 
ratings for the low load and high load conditions did not significantly differ (Mlow load = 
3.30, SD = 1.85; Mhigh load = 3.72; SD = 1.75; t(104)= -1.19, p = .23). Participants did, 
however, take significantly longer to answer each interview question in the high 
cognitive load condition (M = 19.56s, SD = 14.84s) than the low cognitive load 
condition (M = 15.87s, SD = 6.7s;  (t(104) = 4.23, p < .001, 95%CI[1.95, 5.39]. This 
suggests that the anagram solutions were not immediately obvious and therefore that 
participants did have to think harder to solve them than to merely read the word in the 
low load condition. It is therefore plausible that participants in the high load condition 
still required greater cognitive effort to answer the interview questions than participants 
in the low load condition, but this difference is nonetheless smaller than anticipated. 
Interview performance. First, participants’ verbal responses to each interview question 
were transcribed to ensure that they both typed and stated aloud the correct answer to 
each. Participants in the low load condition were merely retyping and saying the lie 
written onscreen and therefore achieved perfect performance for typing their responses 
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(M = 100%, SD = 0%) and almost perfect performance for stating their responses aloud 
(M = 99.88%, SD = 3.43%). Participants in the high load condition typed and stated 
aloud the correct anagram solution for most questions (Mtyped = 97.05%, SD = 16.93%; 
Maloud = 97.41%, SD = 15.91%). If participants in the high load condition did not solve 
the anagram within 90 seconds, they received a hint in the form of an easier anagram. 
The hint was required for 1.15% of questions (collapsed across all participants). 
Attrition across sessions. Two participants failed to complete Session 2. Complete 
recognition data was therefore obtained from 52 participants in the control condition, 52 
participants in the high load condition and 53 participants in the low load condition. 
The average amount of time elapsed between completion of Session 1 and 2 was 21.50 
days (SD = 0.73 days) and the time between sessions did not differ significantly across 
conditions, F(2, 156) = .06, p = .95. 
4.4.2 Signal detection theory and analysis  
Signal detection measures were used to assess recognition performance. Signal detection 
theory (SDT) can be applied whenever an individual must distinguish a signal 
(previously encountered stimuli) from noise (new stimuli; Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999). 
Signal detection measures are therefore commonly used in yes/no recognition tests that 
include signal and noise trials, as in the present study. Signal trials were questions 
containing truth items, that is, items that were experienced in the mock crime. Noise 
trials were questions containing lie items, that is, items that participants provided as a lie 
during interview.  
An individual’s performance in the recognition test can be defined by their hit rate (HR) 
and false alarm rate (FAR). The HR is the probability of correctly responding “yes” in 
truth trials (questions containing an item from the mock crime) and the FAR is the 
probability of incorrectly responding “yes” in lie trials (questions containing an item that 
participants provided as a lie). According to SDT, the HR and FAR do not only reflect 
people’s recognition memory (their ability to distinguish lies from truths in memory, 
i.e., “discriminability”), but also their general tendency to answer either “yes” or “no”, 
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i.e., “response bias”). Since we are interested in whether lying affects recognition 
memory, a pure measure of discriminability is required that is not confounded with 
response bias. Without such a measure, it cannot be known whether lying alters people’s 
ability to distinguish truths from lies in memory, or if lying merely alters people’s 
willingness to state that an item was experienced or a lie (or both). Signal detection 
measures provide separate indices for an individual’s discriminability and response bias 
to more precisely determine how lying affects later memory for the truth. A’ (Pollack & 
Norman, 1964) and B” (Grier, 1971) were used as non-parametric measures of 
discriminability and response bias respectively (as recommended by Stanislaw & 
Todorov, 1999). 
4.4.3 Recognition performance 
To assess participants’ performance in the recognition test, HRs (number of “yes” 
responses in truth trials / total number of truth trials) and FARs (number of “yes” 
responses to lie trials / total number of lie trials) were calculated for each participant. 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for each condition. 
FARs (commission errors) and HRs (omission errors).  It was predicted that 
participants who lied during interview would make more commission errors (i.e., have a 
higher false alarm rate) in the recognition test than control participants who did not 
undergo interview. This hypothesis was supported: FARs differed significantly across 
conditions, as indicated by a between-subjects one-way ANOVA (F(2,154) = 7.39, p < 
.001). Furthermore, planned contrasts indicated that participants who lied at interview 
showed a significantly higher FAR than control participants (Mlie = 0.23, SD = 0.12, 
Mcontrol = 0.16, SD = 0.09; t(154) = 3.79, p < .001, d = 0.63). Lying therefore increased 
commission errors, consistent with past research (e.g., Pickel, 2004; Rindal, 2017). 
The HR also significantly differed across conditions (Welch’s F4(2, 100.41) = 3.0, p = 
0.05). Participants who lied at interview showed a significantly lower HR than control 
subjects (Mlie = 0.86, SD = 0.10, Mcontrol = 0.90 SD = 0.07 ; t(154) = -2.14, p = 0.03, d = 
 
4 Welch’s F is reported due to unequal variances (as assessed by Levene’s test; F(2, 154) = 3.89, p = 0.02). 
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-0.44), as indicated by planned contrasts. Thus, lying at interview increased both 
commission and omission errors: Participants who lied were more likely to mistake a lie 
for the truth and to remember fewer items from the mock crime than if they had not lied. 
Both the FAR and HR were unaffected by the cognitive effort of lying. Although 
participants in the low load condition did indeed show higher FARs than participants in 
the high cognitive load condition (see Table 4.1), planned contrasts indicated that this 
difference was not significant (t(154) = 0.65, p = 0.52). Similarly, participants in the low 
and high load conditions did not significantly differ in their HRs (t(154) = 0.89, p = 
0.37). The prediction that participants in the low load condition would make more 
commission errors (increased FARs) than participants in the high load condition was 
therefore not supported. 
A’ (discriminability) and B” (response bias). For the signal detection analysis, the 
formulae described by Stanislaw and Todorov (1999) were used to calculate each 
participant’s A’ (discriminability) and B” (response bias) values. The formula 
straightforwardly applied for A’, but it was necessary to adjust the HRs and FARs for 
B” to accommodate a participant who achieved perfect performance (HR=1, FAR=0). 
B” values were adjusted using the loglinear approach (Hautus, 1995), which adds 0.5 to 
both the number of hits and false alarms and adds 1 to both the number of signal trials 
(questions containing an item from the mock crime) and noise trials (questions 
containing a corresponding lie item) for all participants. This means that the entire 
dataset is treated equally, whereas the commonly used approach to adjust signal 
detection values (Macmillan & Kaplan, 1985) only adjusts extreme values in the dataset. 
The loglinear approach therefore produces less biased values than Macmillan and 
Kaplan’s approach (Hautus, 1995). Table 4.1 therefore shows the B” values based on the 
adjusted HRs and FARs. 
As a measure of discriminability, A’ typically ranges from 0.5 (indicating chance 
performance) to 1 (indicating perfect performance). We can see from Table 4.2 that 
discriminability was generally high, but participants who lied showed slightly lower 
discriminability than controls. A between-subjects one-way ANOVA revealed that A’ 
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values significantly differed across groups (Welch’s F5(2, 94.27) = 9.52, p < .001). As 
predicted, planned contrasts confirmed that lying significantly reduced participants’ 
ability to discriminate items that they had stated as a lie from items that they 
experienced in the mock crime, compared to control participants (Mlie = 0.88, SD = 0.08, 
Mcontrol = 0.92, SD = 0.04; t(154) = -3.63, p < .001, d = -0.58). However, discriminability 
did not significantly differ between the low and high cognitive load conditions (t(154) = 
0.43, p = .67). Thus, contrary to the hypothesis, the cognitive effort of lying did not 
affect discriminability. 
Analysis of B” values was exploratory, as detailed in the study preregistration, because 
there is no precedent to hypothesize how varying interviewees’ cognitive load while 
lying might affect response bias. B” values range from -1 (extreme liberal bias in favor 
of stating that an item was shown in the mock crime) to 1 (extreme conservative bias in 
favor of stating that an item was not shown in the mock crime), and a B” of 0 represents 
no bias. We can see from Table 4.1 that participants showed a slight liberal bias in all 
conditions (i.e., a general tendency to state that they experienced the item in the mock 
crime, regardless of whether they remember doing so.) Although participants in the low 
load condition showed a slightly stronger tendency to state that they experienced an item 
in the mock crime than participants in the control and high load conditions, B” values 
did not significantly differ across conditions (F(2,154) = 1.69, p = 0.19). Response bias 
was therefore unaffected by lying. This suggests that the increase in commission errors 
for participants who lied during interview is indeed attributable to poorer 






5 Welch’s F is reported, as A’ variances were unequal (as assessed by Levene’s test; F(2, 154) = 7.32, p < .001). 
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Table 4.1 
Mean hit rate (HR), false alarm rate (FAR), discriminability (A’), and response bias 
(B”) for each condition. 
 HR (SD) FAR (SD) A’(SD) B”(SD) 
Control 0.90 (0.07) 
 
0.16 (0.09) 0.92 (0.04) -0.15 (0.32) 
Low Load Lie 0.87 (0.10) 0.24 (0.11) 0.89 (0.07) -0.23 (0.28) 
High Load Lie 0.86 (0.10) 0.22 (0.13) 0.88 (0.08) -0.14 (0.22) 
 
4.4.4 Confidence 
Participants’ confidence in the accuracy of their memories was analyzed to determine if 
lying under varying levels of cognitive load leads to more subtle changes in memory 
than increased commission or omission errors. Participants rated their confidence that 
they had answered correctly for each question in the recognition test on a scale of 0-100. 
A new factor was created (Accuracy) by splitting the confidence ratings into 2 levels: 
ratings for questions participants answered correctly and ratings for questions 
participants answered incorrectly. The analysis focused on comparing confidence for 
questions containing lie items (fabrications) with questions containing truth items (items 
from the mock crime) across the three experimental conditions. The analysis plan in the 
study pre-registration stated that a one-way ANOVA would be performed to determine 
if confidence differs across the 3 conditions. However, it was likely that the item type 
and the accuracy of participants’ responses would significantly affect the relationship 
between confidence and condition. Because the Accuracy and Item Type variables were 
within-subjects and because the levels of the Accuracy variable were unbalanced, the 
confidence data were analyzed using a multilevel linear model (see Section 2.16.2 for an 
explanation of multilevel linear models). 
Model fitting. First, the fitting of the model to the confidence data is described and the 
model results are then interpreted. Figure 4.2 shows that confidence was generally high, 
but was clearly affected by participants’ accuracy and whether the item in question was 
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from the mock crime (truth item) or a fabrication (lie item). Indeed, including Accuracy 
as a predictor significantly improved the multilevel model fit compared to an intercept-
only model (χ(6) = 140.61, p <. 001), and adding Veracity further improved the model 
fit (χ(7) = 4.61, p = .03). The cognitive load condition did not improve the model fit 
(χ(9) = 1.84, p = .40). Adding the interaction term between Accuracy and Veracity 
further improved the model fit (χ(10) = 76.00, p <. 001), however no other interaction 
terms significantly improved the model (all ps > .05). All non-significant variables and 
interaction terms were removed from the model. The final model therefore included the 
main effects of Accuracy and Veracity and the interaction between Accuracy and 
Veracity (χ(8) = 75.96, p <. 001). 
Model Interpretation. From Figure 4.2, we can see that confidence for questions 
containing truth items generally corresponded with accuracy, such that confidence was 
high when participants correctly stated that the item was from the mock crime (M = 
85.18, SD = 11.54), but lower when they incorrectly stated that the item was not from 
the mock crime; that is, when they made an omission error (M = 62.62, SD = 22.89).  
The difference in confidence for correct and incorrect answers was far smaller for 
questions containing lie items. Interestingly, confidence did not correspond with 
accuracy for lie items. Again, confidence was high when participants correctly stated 
that the item was not experienced in the mock crime (M = 79.31, SD = 13.37), but 
dropped very little when participants incorrectly stated that the lie item was experienced 
in the mock crime; that is, when they made a commission error (M = 73.81, SD = 
17.85). Thus, when participants made a commission error, they were generally very 
confident that the lie was indeed the truthful answer. The model contrasts confirmed that 
the decrease in confidence for incorrect compared to correct answers was significantly 
greater when participants were asked about items from the mock crime (truth items) 
than when they were asked about the lies they told (lie items; b = 17.43, t(281) = 9.08, p 
< .001). Thus, participants confidence ratings aligned more with their accuracy for when 
they were asked about items from the mock crime compared to when they were asked 
about the lies they told. 
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Although participants’ confidence in their memories was high when they made 
commission errors, the non-significant improvement to the multilevel model when 
including the cognitive load condition or any of its interaction terms indicates that the 
higher confidence was not caused by lying at interview. If it were, we would expect the 
confidence for participants in the control condition to significantly differ from 
confidence in the lying conditions, since control participants did not lie at interview. 
This suggests that the increased confidence for commission errors is not because lying 
led subjects to falsely remember their lie as the truth. 
The increased confidence for commission errors might be explained by the slight liberal 
response bias participants showed in all conditions. Responding incorrectly to a lie item 
meant that participants answered “yes” to these questions, whereas responding 
incorrectly to a truth item means that participants answered “no”. Because participants 
showed a tendency to answer “yes” to all questions, they may have been more confident 
giving a “yes” response, regardless of whether it was the correct answer. Thus, a liberal 
response bias might have led to high confidence when they incorrectly stated that a lie 




Figure 4.2. Mean confidence ratings (scale 0-100) for lie items (items subjects stated as 
a lie during interview [top panel]) and the corresponding truthful item from the mock 
crime [bottom panel]. Ratings are shown as a function of Cognitive Load and whether 
the item was correctly identified as a lie or the item from the mock crime in the 
recognition test (Accuracy). Error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean. 
4.4.5 Discussion 
Taken together, the findings of Experiment 4 suggest that lying at interview led people 
to remember fewer items from the mock crime (i.e., to make more omission errors) and 
to more often mistake their lies for the truth (i.e., to make more commission errors), 
regardless of the cognitive effort required to lie. However, the prediction that 
commission errors would be higher in participants who lied under low load was not 
supported. Commission errors were indeed marginally higher for participants who lied 
under low load, but this increase was not significant. The manipulation check suggests 
that the cognitive load manipulation was not strong enough to elicit significant 
differences between groups. Strengthening the cognitive load manipulation may 
therefore induce a significant difference in commission errors in the predicted direction. 
The signal detection measures tell us that lying impaired participants’ recognition 
ability, and therefore has real effects on people’s memory, as opposed to their tendency 
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to answer “yes” or “no” at test. Nonetheless, the cognitive effort of lying did not 
moderate the effect of lying on memory for any measures. Confidence was also 
unaffected by the cognitive effort of lying. Because the cognitive load manipulation was 
weak, the findings are inclusive regarding the implications for the MAD framework’s 
cognitive load hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, this experiment shows that lying by providing counterfactual information 
(fabrications) not only increased commission errors, but also omission errors. The 
fabrications in this experiment therefore led to a global memory impairment, not a 
selective increase in commission errors. Experiment 5 strengthens the cognitive load 
manipulation used in the present study to provide more conclusive results regarding the 
MAD framework. 
4.5 Experiment 5 
The aims of Experiment 5 were two-fold: First, to strengthen the cognitive load 
manipulation used in Experiment 4, and second, to investigate how manipulating 
different types of cognitive load might affect memory differently. As outlined in Section 
1.2, there are many factors that contribute to the increased cognitive cost of lying 
occurring at each stage of deception, from the decision to lie to the lie’s delivery. 
Regarding lie generation specifically, lying is typically more cognitively demanding to 
the extent that it requires manipulation of existing memories to construct a 
counterfactual answer (Sporer, 2016; Walczyk et al., 2014). Altering the difficulty of the 
anagram in Experiment 4 is analogous to increasing the extent to which people must 
manipulate available information to construct a fabrication. However, this is just one 
way that the cognitive effort of lying can be increased. Other methods of increasing 
cognitive load during deception may affect memory differently. 
According to ADCAT (Walczyk et al., 2014), there are different types of cognitive load 
that might contribute to the additional demand of lying. The authors draw on cognitive 
load theory (Sweller, van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998) to divide the cognitive load that 
liars experience into two categories: [1] Intrinsic cognitive load, defined as “the demand 
on cognitive resources inherent to deceive well” (Walczyk et al., 2014, p. 23). For 
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instance, constructing elaborate lies is inherently more difficult than constructing simple 
lies. [2] Extraneous cognitive load, defined as “any situational factor external to the act 
of deception that reduces respondents’ cognitive resources while lying” (Walczyk et al., 
2014, p. 23). The most common way to increase extraneous load is to introduce a 
concurrent secondary task. For instance, asking interviewees to perform a driving 
simulation task occupies attentional and working memory processes that otherwise 
could be used to facilitate lying (Walczyk et al., 2014). The anagram method used in 
Experiment 4 therefore targeted intrinsic cognitive load by increasing the inherent 
difficulty of lie generation. But it may be that increasing liars’ intrinsic load has 
different effects on memory compared to increasing extraneous load. Indeed, previous 
research suggests that this may be the case.  
There are three main ways that increasing the cognitive demand of fabrication might 
affect later memory. First, it might affect the liar’s memory for the truth (truth item 
memory). This is the main remit of the MAD framework. Second, it might affect the 
liar’s memory for the specific lie they told (lie item memory), and thirdly, it might affect 
the liar’s memory for having lied at all (source memory). Broader memory research 
suggests that increasing the cognitive demand of fabrication could affect all three types 
of memory. Moreover, the way in which memory is affected may depend on the type of 
cognitive load that is targeted – intrinsic or extraneous. 
4.5.1 The potential effect of increasing liars’ intrinsic cognitive load 
Previous studies suggest that increasing the intrinsic cognitive load of a task promotes 
better encoding of source and improves later source attributions accordingly. This has 
primarily been studied in the context of the generation effect – the finding that memory 
performance is better for information that participants generate themselves compared to 
information they merely read (Bertsch et al., 2007; Slamecka & Graf, 1978). Such 
research shows that source memory (but not necessarily item memory) is more accurate 
for items that are hard to generate compared to items that are easy to generate 
(Nieznański, 2011). In other words, when the intrinsic cognitive demand of generation is 
higher, participants are better at source monitoring. Related research has shown that 
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participants are better at identifying whether they saw or merely imagined a shape when 
imagining the shape was harder compared to when it was easier (Finke, Johnson, & 
Shyi, 1988). The idea is that the more effortful generation is, the more cognitive 
operations are recruited to complete the task, and so the more cognitive operations are 
available to aid source decisions at test (Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Hicks & Marsh, 
1999). 
Returning to deception, a fabrication will be intrinsically more cognitively demanding 
when it is harder to generate than when it is easy to generate. If a fabrication is difficult 
to concoct, it will not ‘spring to mind’, but rather will require the liar to search long term 
memory and manipulate existing details to form a counterfactual answer (Sporer, 2016). 
These processes – retrieval, manipulation, and organization – are the exact cognitive 
operations that the SMF posits will later help us to identify information in memory as 
self-generated rather than experienced (Johnson et al., 1993; McDonough & Gallo, 
2008). A questioning procedure that forces liars to recruit more cognitive operations 
might therefore improve later source memory, meaning that the individual is more likely 
to remember that they lied. This in turn might make it easier for the individual to 
discriminate lies from truths later on. Commission errors could therefore decrease when 
the intrinsic cognitive load of fabrication is higher, contrary to the MAD framework’s 
hypothesis. Moreover, because such cognitive operations are likely to be recruited less 
often when participants generate easier fabrications, source monitoring could be 
poorest—and commission errors highest—when people fabricate under low cognitive 
load. Thus, contrary to the predictions born out of the MAD framework, fabricating 
under low load may increase commission errors, whereas fabricating under high 
intrinsic load may decrease them (as predicted in Experiment 4). 
4.5.2 The potential effect of increasing liars’ extraneous cognitive load 
Increasing the extraneous demand of fabrication might instead have negative effects on 
memory. Requiring participants to complete a secondary task divides attention and 
disrupts encoding so that a weaker memory trace is formed (Troyer & Craik, 2000). 
Consistent with this, numerous studies show that introducing a secondary task at 
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encoding impairs later memory performance (Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & 
Anderson, 1996; Lane, 2006; Pérez-Mata, Read, & Diges, 2002; Peters et al., 2008). 
This has been studied using both misinformation and the Deese-Roediger-McDermott 
(DRM) paradigms. In the DRM paradigm, participants learn lists of words that are 
semantically associated with an unpresented word. In later recall and recognition tests, 
participants often falsely remember the unpresented word, despite not having initially 
learnt it (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). When participants undertake a secondary task 
while learning the word lists, false recall rates increase further. For example, in one 
study, participants completed an articulatory suppression task, which required them to 
repeat the words “coca cola” out loud while learning the word lists. The authors 
proposed that the secondary task divided attention during encoding so that participants 
processed the words more superficially. Participants therefore failed to encode key item-
specific information that would help them monitor the source of their memories at test. 
Thus, the addition of a secondary task impaired source monitoring (Van Damme, 
Menten, & d’Ydewalle, 2010). 
Studies using the misinformation paradigm have shown similar effects. In one study, 
participants witnessed a mock crime under full attention or while completing a 
secondary music task. They then answered misleading questions about the event before 
their source memory was assessed. Participants were significantly more likely to 
incorporate the misleading post-event information into memory when they encoded the 
original event under divided attention compared to under full attention (Lane, 2006). 
This is thought to be because dividing attention prevented participants from encoding 
the visual, spatial and contextual details that would later assist their source monitoring 
decisions. 
Returning to deception, the aforementioned research suggests that dividing attention 
while participants fabricate might disrupt their encoding of the interview and result in 
poorer memories for what they lied about (source memory) or the specific lies they told 
(lie item memory). This could have knock-on effects for the liar’s memory of the truth, 
but conflicting hypotheses can be formed about whether truth item memory will be 
impaired or improved. On the one hand, we know that poorer source memory for having 
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lied increases the likelihood that participants will incorporate their lies into memory 
(Polage, 2004). Thus, if increasing extraneous cognitive load impairs source memory, 
commission errors may increase. On the other hand, divided attention while lying might 
prevent participants from visualizing their lies, so they generate fewer perceptual details 
that would lead them to misattribute the source of their memories later on. This might 
make it easier for them to distinguish their memories of the truth (encoded under full 
attention) from memories of their lies (encoded under divided attention). Thus, if 
increasing extraneous cognitive load impairs lie item memory, commission errors may 
decrease. 
In sum, increasing the extraneous cognitive load of fabrication by requiring participants 
to complete a secondary task could affect all three types of memory: Source memory, lie 
item memory, and truth item memory. By disrupting encoding of the interview, the 
individual might later have a poorer memory for their lies and this in turn may affect 
how well they remember the truth. Given that this could increase or decrease 
commission errors, no specific hypothesis can be developed regarding support for the 
MAD framework. 
Why is it important to understand how increasing different types of cognitive load 
during deception affects later memory? The main reason is that cognitive load is not 
only an important concept in the MAD framework, but also forms an entire approach to 
lie detection that is popular amongst deception researchers (Vrij et al., 2017). If 
manipulating interviewees’ cognitive load can affect their memory, this could have 
implications for lie detection approaches that rely on increasing cognitive load. 
4.5.3. Implications for lie detection 
Several researchers have endorsed the idea that the cognitive burden of lying can 
exploited to assist lie detection (Vrij, Fisher, et al., 2008; Walczyk et al., 2012, 2014) 
and this has been termed the cognitive approach to lie detection (CALD; Vrij & Fisher 
et al., 2008). CALD recommends techniques that further increase the interviewee’s 
cognitive load during questioning. Liars typically have fewer residual cognitive 
resources than truth tellers, so further increasing cognitive demand should lead to 
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cognitive overload in liars, which magnifies otherwise faint and unreliable cues to 
deception, such as slower response times, fewer details, and increased inconsistencies 
(Vrij et al., 2011; Vrij, Mann, et al., 2008). 
Consistent with cognitive load theory (Sweller et al., 1998), lie detection can be 
facilitated by increasing the intrinsic or extraneous cognitive load of lying. Researchers 
have tested several ways to increase the intrinsic cognitive load of lying. One of the first 
attempts was time restricted integrity-confirmation (TRI-Con), a questioning procedure 
developed by Walczyk et al., (2005). TRI-Con attempts to make the truth more salient in 
an individual’s memory and requires rapid responses to interrelated unanticipated 
questions that may induce contradictions. Asking unanticipated questions is an approach 
unto itself that prevents liars from rehearsing their stories, thus increasing the intrinsic 
demand of lying and, in turn, cues to deceit (Ioannou & Hammond, 2015; Shaw et al., 
2013).  
Extraneous cognitive load is typically increased by asking interviewees to perform a 
secondary unrelated task while they undergo questioning. Because working memory 
capacity is constrained, interviewees may experience cognitive overload—and impaired 
performance—if attempting additional tasks when working memory is already at 
capacity (Sweller et al., 1998). Indeed, research has shown that when people lie, they 
increase their driving speed while operating a driving simulator (Gawrylowicz et al., 
2016) or sort fewer objects in a haptic sorting task (Lancaster, Vrij, Hope, & Waller, 
2013). 
Taken together, the previous sections suggest that increasing the cognitive demand of 
lying might affect memory differently depending on how cognitive load is increased. 
Overall, existing evidence suggests that increasing intrinsic cognitive load might benefit 
memory, whereas the anticipated effect of increasing extraneous cognitive load is less 
clear. This has potentially important implications for lie detection in interview settings. 
An individual who does not remember the lies they have told or the fact that they lied 
may be less consistent if they undergo repeated questioning. Inconsistency is a cue to 
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deception (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2005; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & 
Mann, 2011; Vredeveldt et al., 2014). Increasing the intrinsic demand of lying might 
therefore help the liar by making it easier for them to be consistent over time, whereas 
increasing extraneous cognitive load might hinder the liar by increasing the likelihood of 
inconsistencies over multiple interviews. It is therefore important to investigate the 
interaction between lying and memory, as this might influence the efficacy of the 
cognitive approach to lie detection in interview settings. 
4.5.4 Method summary 
To begin to understand the complex interactions between cognitive load, memory, and 
lie detection, Experiment 5 manipulated the intrinsic and extraneous cognitive load of 
lying to determine their influence on source and item memory. As in Experiment 4, 
participants were provided with fabrications to approximate a situation where an 
individual knowingly reports false details that they have heard elsewhere or been told to 
say (e.g., an intimidated witness). The experiment was conducted over two sessions. In 
Session 1, participants witnessed a mock crime before undergoing questioning. All 
participants lied about some items and told the truth about others under either low 
cognitive load, high intrinsic cognitive load or high extraneous cognitive load. 
Once again, anagrams were used to manipulate the extent to which participants were 
involved in lie generation. Participants in the low load condition received the lie as an 
easy anagram, whereas participants in the high intrinsic load condition received the lie 
as a hard anagram. Participants therefore had to put more mental effort into creating the 
lie itself and should therefore have experienced greater intrinsic cognitive load than 
subjects in the low load condition. The anagram difficulty was further increased 
compared to those used in Experiment 5 to ensure that the manipulation worked. 
Participants in the high extraneous load condition received the lie as an easy anagram, 
but completed a concurrent articulatory suppression task that required them to repeat 
aloud a string of nonsense syllables. This is a theoretically informed choice of secondary 
task recommended by Walczyk et al. (2013). According to Walczyk et al., articulatory 
suppression occupies the phonological loop, a subsystem of working memory that is 
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considered critical for successful deception (Sporer, 2016). The phonological loop 
temporarily stores verbal information and keeps it active via vocal or subvocal rehearsal 
(Baddeley, 2012) and is taxed significantly more during lying than truth telling (Sporer, 
2016). Thus, if the phonological loop is occupied using articulatory suppression, the 
executive supervisory system must prioritize engagement in either the articulatory 
suppression task or lying. Articulatory suppression therefore increases extraneous 
cognitive load by targeting the same cognitive resources required for lying. 
In Session 2 of the experiment, participants completed a recognition and source test to 
assess their item and source memory for the details of the mock crime. The study was 
preregistered on the Open Science Framework at the following link: 
https://osf.io/ydt2m/?view_only=1cb24ce5a377441fa746628d242910ed 
It was predicted that: [1] Participants in the high intrinsic load condition will make 
fewer commission errors and show better discriminability for mock crime items that 
they previously lied about than for items they did not speak about (control items). In 
other words, increasing the intrinsic cognitive load of lying will improve memory 
relative to not rehearsing the details. [2] Participants in the low load condition will make 
more commission errors and show poorer discriminability for mock crime items that 
they previously lied about than for control items. In other words, low cognitive effort 
when lying will impair memory relative to not rehearsing the details, and [3] Source 
memory performance will be highest for participants in the high intrinsic load condition 
and lowest for participants in the high extraneous load condition. 
4.6 Method 
4.6.1 Participants. 
The experiment was completed by 180 adults in exchange for course credit or a small 
monetary reward (mean age = 18.72 years, SD = 1.62 years; 21 male, 158 female, 1 
other). Participants were primarily native English speakers (n = 133). Of those whose 
first language was not English, 29 rated themselves as fluent to a native or excellent 
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standard and the remaining participants rated their English as either good (n = 10), 
satisfactory (n = 4) or poor (n = 4). 
To determine an appropriate sample size, a power analysis was conducted using 
G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et al., 2007). Experiment 4 found a medium effect size for the 
difference in memory performance for items participants lied about versus control items. 
The power analysis was therefore based on a medium effect size of Cohen’s d = 0.5 (f = 
0.25), which revealed that the present experiment requires a total of 158 participants to 
achieve a power of 0.8 with an alpha level of .05.  The study was approved by the 
psychology department ethics committee at the University of Warwick. 
4.6.2 Stimuli and apparatus. 
Mock crime. The experiment used a mock crime video developed for use in eyewitness 
research (Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006). This soundless video depicts an 
electrician, Eric, snooping around somebody’s house and stealing various items while 
on the job. Twenty critical details were selected from the video for participants to 
memorize (18 critical, 2 practice), for example, that Eric found the key under a 
flowerpot, stole earrings, and drank a can of coke. 
To ensure that participants encoded the critical items well, the video was edited using 
PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007) to include snapshots of these items. After each item was 
featured in the video, a snapshot image appeared on screen, together with a label, for 5 
seconds. Four attention checks were also included to assess whether participants paid 
attention to the video. Each check consisted of a multiple-choice question concerning a 
detail that immediately preceded it (details unrelated to target items). Participants 
selected one of 5 possible answers and were given feedback. If they answered 
incorrectly, they were told the correct answer and asked to pay more attention to the 
video. The attention checks were placed at fixed intervals in the video: The first at 50 
seconds, the second at 2 minutes, the third at 3 minutes 45 seconds and the fourth at 7 
minutes 20 seconds. Together with the snapshots and attention checks, the video’s 
duration was 9m 6s. 
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Lie creation. As in Experiment 4, participants were provided with the lies to deliver 
during interview, therefore mimicking a situation where an individual knowingly reports 
false details that they have heard elsewhere or been told to say (e.g., an intimidated 
witness). A corresponding lie was therefore created for each of the 20 critical items from 
the mock crime, for example doormat, necklace, and Pepsi were the corresponding lies 
for the items flowerpot, earring, and coke. 
As in Experiment 4, participants were presented with the answer to each interview 
question in anagram form. Each answer was presented as either an easy anagram that 
required participants to switch two underlined letters, or a hard anagram that required 
participants to rearrange all, or most, letters. The full stimulus set is shown in Appendix 
7. 
4.6.3 Design and procedure. 
The experiment was a 3 (Cognitive Load: low load, high intrinsic load, high extraneous 
load) x 3 (Veracity: lie, truth, control) mixed design. Cognitive Load was the between-
subjects variable. The experiment involved 2 sessions, completed 3 weeks apart. Session 
1 consisted of a mock crime, distraction and interview phase and was completed in 
individual laboratory cubicles. Session 2 consisted of a recognition and source test and 
was completed online. To prevent participants from ascertaining the study’s purpose, 
they were informed that the aim of the experiment was to examine people’s problem-
solving skills and memory when lying under pressure. A suspicion check was included 
to determine if any participants ascertained the study’s true purpose. 
Session 1 
Mock crime phase. After providing consent and demographic information, participants 
viewed the mock crime video. Participants were asked to imagine that they had an 
electrician friend, Eric, who they accompany on a job. While on the job, they witness 
Eric taking certain liberties and stealing several items. Participants were instructed to 
imagine that they were with Eric witnessing the events unfolding and to memorize the 
items that appear as snapshots. They were also informed that there would be attention 
checks at random intervals. 
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Distractor phase. This was identical to Experiment 4. 
Interview phase. Next, participants were informed that Eric had been arrested and that 
they were to be questioned about the activities they saw him perform. They were 
informed that they would be provided with the answers as anagrams that they must solve 
and deliver, and told that they will give a mixture of deceptive and truthful answers to 
protect Eric, but avoid arousing suspicion. The interview addressed 12 of the 18 critical 
items from the video and the question order was randomized across participants. The 
remaining 6 items were not addressed during interview and therefore served as control 
items to determine baseline memory. Each question was written on screen and 
participants were provided with the answers in anagram form to solve and deliver. Half 
of the answers were lies, highlighted in yellow, and half were truths, highlighted in grey. 
The answers were highlighted in their respective colors so that participants were sure 
which were truthful and which deceptive (as per Rindal, 2017). Participants were given 
30 seconds to type their response. If a response was not registered in this time, the 
program moved onto the next question. 
Participants were randomly allocated to the low load, high intrinsic load, or high 
extraneous load condition. They were given full instructions followed by two example 
questions and answers, and then two practice questions that addressed the practice items. 
Feedback was given for these questions. Participants in the low load condition were 
given each answer in the form of an easy anagram that required them to switch the 
position of two underlined letters to reveal the answer. For instance, in response to the 
question “What item of jewelry did Eric steal from the first bedroom?”, participants 
solved either the truthful anagram “EARIRNGS” or the deceptive anagram 
“NECLKACE”. Participants in the high intrinsic load condition were given hard 
anagrams to solve. Again, participants rearranged underlined letters to reveal the 
answers, but either all or most of the letters were underlined. For example, the hard 
anagrams for the above question were “KNELCEAC” (necklace) and “GERARINS” 
(earrings). 
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Participants in the high extraneous load condition were given the same easy anagrams as 
those in the low load condition, but engaged in a concurrent articulatory suppression 
task while answering each question. Specifically, participants repeated a nonsense 
syllable sequence (‘bah-bay-bee-boo’; as recommended by (Walczyk et al., 2013) in 
time to a 120bpm metronome before the question and answer appeared. Participants 
were instructed to repeat the syllable sequence in time with the beat while they solve the 
anagram and type their response. Participants’ verbal responses were recorded to ensure 
that they complied with the articulatory suppression task. A self-paced break was taken 
in-between questions to enable participants to rest from repeating the syllable sequence. 
All participants were instructed to give their answers as part of a full sentence, rather 
than merely report the solved anagram and to picture the item in their mind’s eye. Thus, 
for the above example, participants would answer with something like, “Eric stole a 
necklace/earrings from the first bedroom.” This was to encourage participants to 
integrate the answer with the question. 
The specific items that participants told the truth, lied about, or were not asked about 
were counterbalanced so that every item served in each Veracity condition equally 
across participants. To achieve this, the 18 critical items were randomly allocated to one 
of 3 sets of 6 items. Participants lied about one set, told the truth about another and were 
not asked about the third. 
On completing the interview, participants rated how much mental effort they required to 
answer the questions on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from “very low mental effort” to 
“very high mental effort” (as in Experiment 4). 
Session 2. 
Twenty-one days after completing Session 1, participants were emailed a link to 
complete Session 2 of the study online. Memory was assessed for the 18 critical items 
witnessed in the mock crime using a recognition and source test. Participants were 
instructed to answer all questions truthfully and completed 4 practice questions with 
feedback before beginning. 
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The recognition test was an identical format to that used in Experiment 4; that is, there 
were two questions per critical item—one containing the truthful answer (e.g., “Did Eric 
steal earrings from the first bedroom?”) and one containing the corresponding deceptive 
answer (e.g., “Did Eric steal a necklace from the first bedroom?”). For items that 
participants did not lie about, the question containing the deceptive answer functioned as 
a lure. Participants indicated “yes” or “no” to each question and rated their confidence 
on a scale of 0 = completely uncertain to 100  = completely certain. 
To assess source memory, on the next page, participants were asked “Please choose an 
option that best describes your memory for the item ___” (whichever item was 
addressed on the previous page) and selected one of five options: 1) This was shown in 
the mock crime and I gave it as a truthful answer to a question at interview; 2) This was 
shown in the mock crime, but I lied when I was asked about it at interview; 3) This was 
shown in the mock crime, but I was NOT asked a question about it at interview; 4) This 
was NOT shown in the mock crime, but I gave it as a lie in response to a question at 
interview; 5) This was NOT shown in the mock crime and I was NOT asked a question 
about it at interview. 
The source question for each item always followed the recognition and confidence 
questions for that same item, but the order in which items were addressed was 
randomized across participants. On completion of the memory test, participants were 
asked to state what they believed the study’s hypothesis was. No participants correctly 
guessed the study’s hypotheses, but 20 participants discerned that the experiment 
concerned some relationship between lying and memory.  
4.7 Results 
4.7.1 Preliminary analyses 
Before addressing the primary research question of the experiment, four manipulation 
and performance checks were performed. 
Engagement in mock crime. Participants’ performance in the attention checks 
indicates that they engaged appropriately with the mock crime. Attention check data 
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from 28 participants were lost due to an equipment error. The remaining 152 
participants passed an average of 88.82% of checks (SD = 16.22%). Only 1 participant 
failed more than 50% of attention checks and was excluded from all further analyses (as 
set out in the study pre-registration).6 
Manipulation check. Participants’ ratings of the mental effort required to complete the 
interview indicated that the cognitive load manipulation was successful. Mental effort 
ratings significantly differed across conditions (F(2,175) = 55.71, p < .001). Compared 
to those interviewed under low load (M = 3.43, SD = 1.84 [scale of 1-9]), participants 
reported using significantly more cognitive effort when interviewed under high intrinsic 
load (M = 5.93, SD = 1.82, p < .001, 95% CI[1.72, 3.29]) and high extraneous load (M = 
6.76, SD = 1.68, p < .001, 95% CI[2.54, 4.13]), as indicated by Bonferroni-adjusted 
pairwise comparisons. Additionally, participants in the high extraneous load condition 
rated the task as significantly more effortful than did participants in the high intrinsic 
load condition (p = .04, 95% CI[0.04, 1.61]).  
Interview performance. Participants’ performance levels during the interview were 
good across all conditions. Participants in the low load and high extraneous load 
conditions achieved the highest performance, correctly solving an average of 97.70% 
(SD = 15.0%) and 95.69% (SD = 20.31%) of anagrams respectively. Participants in the 
high intrinsic load condition performed at a lower level, correctly solving an average of 
79.78% (SD = 40.19%) of anagrams. For incorrect answers, the corresponding memory 
data for that item were excluded from subsequent analyses. All participants in the high 
extraneous load condition complied with the articulatory suppression task by repeating 
the syllable sequence aloud for the duration of the interview. 
Attrition across sessions. The average time that elapsed between completion of 
Sessions 1 and 2 was 22.39 days (SD = 1.70 days). The time between sessions did not 
significantly differ across conditions, as indicated by a one-way between-subjects 
ANOVA (F(2,162) = .03, p = .97). Data were excluded from 7 participants who failed to 
 
6 Because only 1/152 participants failed more than 50% of attention checks, the 28 participants for whom we did not 
have attention check data were included in subsequent analyses. 
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complete part 2, and a further 7 participants who failed to complete part 2 within the 4-
week deadline specified in the pre-registration. Subsequent analyses are therefore based 
on data from 165 participants, which still exceeded the sample size target of 158 
participants. 
The primary research question is now addressed in three parts: Determining the extent to 
which increasing cognitive load while lying influenced participants’ [1] recognition 
performance, i.e., their ability to accurately recognize details from the crime event, [2] 
confidence in their memory performance, and [3] source memory, i.e., their ability to 
remember the origin of each item and how they spoke about them during interview. 
4.7.2 Recognition performance 
As predicted, the type of cognitive load imposed during interview affected participants’ 
recognition performance. Signal detection measures were used to assess recognition 
performance, as in Experiment 4. To recap, signal detection theory defines each 
participant’s recognition performance with a HR and FAR. The HR is defined as the 
probability of correctly responding “yes” in truth trials (recognition questions containing 
an item from the mock crime, e.g., “Did Eric steal earrings?”) and the FAR is defined as 
incorrectly responding “yes” in lie trials (recognition questions containing a lie. E.g., 
“Did Eric steal a necklace?”).  
As in Experiment 4, A’ and B” were also calculated as a measure of discriminability and 
response bias respectively. Table 4.2 shows the descriptive statistics for each condition. 
To assess recognition performance, multilevel models were fitted to the data from each 
signal detection measure with Veracity and Cognitive Load as predictors. For each 
measure, I first describe the fit of the model to the data before interpreting the results. 
FARs (commission errors): As a direct measure of commission errors, FARs are the 
primary measure for assessing the experimental hypotheses. Increased FARs represent 
increased commission errors. 
Including Veracity as a predictor significantly improved the model fit, compared to an 
intercept-only model (χ2(6) = 42.16, p < .001), but adding the main effect of Cognitive 
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Load did not further improve the model fit (χ2(8) = 3.98, p = .14). The model was 
significantly improved when including the interaction term between Veracity and 
Cognitive load (χ2(12) = 18.13, p = .001), indicating that the effect of lying on 
commission errors depended on the cognitive load imposed during interview. Separate 
multilevel models were fitted to each cognitive load condition to break down this 
interaction. 
For participants interviewed under low load, the model including Veracity was a 
significant improvement to an intercept-only model (χ2(6) = 32.69, p < .001). 
Furthermore, the model contrasts indicate that the prediction that commission errors 
(i.e., FARs) would increase was supported. As Table 1 shows, commission errors almost 
doubled for items that participants lied about under low load compared to control items 
(b = .19, t(110) = 5.43, p < .001), suggesting that lying under low cognitive load 
impaired memory for the truth. Commission errors did not increase for items that 
participants reported truthfully during interview compared to control items (b = .01, 
t(110) = 0.29, p = .77), indicating that the memory impairment was specific to lied-
about items. 
For participants interviewed under high intrinsic load, including Veracity was a 
significant improvement to an intercept-only model (χ2(6) = 21.41, p < .001). It was 
predicted that commission errors would decrease for participants who lied under high 
intrinsic load, but contrary to this prediction, commission errors actually increased by 
50% (see Table 1). The model contrasts confirmed that this increase was significant b = 
.12, t(110) = 3.20, p = .002). Commission errors were unaffected for items participants 
told the truth about at interview (b = -.06, t(110) = -1.51, p = .13), indicating that this 
memory impairment was specific to lied-about items. 
For participants interviewed under high extraneous load, it was reasoned that memory 
could be impaired or enhanced for lied-about compared to control items. Indeed, there 
was no effect on memory for participants who lied under high extraneous load: 
Including Veracity did not improve the fit of the multilevel model, relative to an 
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intercept-only model (χ2(6) = 0.81, p = .67). Thus, lying under high extraneous load 
neither impaired or enhanced memory for lied-about items. 
Although commission errors were highest for participants who lied under low load, the 
overall model including Veracity and Cognitive Load indicated that the increase in 
commission errors relative to control items was not significantly greater for participants 
interviewed under low load (M = .19, SD = 0.27) compared to participants interviewed 
under high intrinsic load (M = .11, SD = .27; b = -.07, t(322) = -1.34, p = .18). Lying 
under low load did not therefore lead to a greater memory impairment than lying under 
high intrinsic load. 
HRs (omission errors). HRs can be analyzed to assess omission errors—incorrect “no” 
responses in truth trials represent omission errors and a lower HR therefore indicates 
increased omission errors.  
Including Veracity as a predictor significantly improved the model fit, compared to an 
intercept-only model (χ2(6) = 71.53, p < .001). Neither the main effect of Cognitive 
Load (χ2(8) = 4.89, p = .09) nor the interaction between Veracity and Cognitive Load 
further improved the model fit (χ2(12) = 5.56, p = .23). The model contrasts (containing 
Veracity as the single predictor), indicated that HRs were higher for items that 
participants truthfully reported during interview compared to control items (MControl = 
.69, SD = .22; MTruth = .86, SD = .22; b = .17, t(326) = 8.32, p < .001). Lying about an 
item during interview did not decrease HRs compared to control items (MLie = .72, SD = 
.15; b = .03, t(326) = 1.37, p = .17). Lying at interview did not therefore increase 
omission errors. 
A’ (discriminability). Analysis of the A’ values determines whether the increase in 
commission errors when participants lied under low load or high intrinsic load can be 
attributed to impaired recognition memory, rather than differences in response bias. A’ 
values were calculated in the same way as Experiment 4 (including the loglinear 
adjustment procedure for participants who achieved perfect performance (HR=1, 
FAR=0); see Section 4.4.3). 
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To recap, A’ typically ranges from 0.5 (indicating chance performance) to 1 (indicating 
perfect performance). Table 4.2 shows that discriminability was well above chance for 
all conditions. Including Veracity as a predictor in the multilevel model significantly 
improved the model fit (χ2(6) = 65.04, p < .001), but the main effect of Cognitive Load 
did not  (χ2(8) = 3.35, p = .19). However, adding the interaction term between Veracity 
and Cognitive Load significantly improved the model (χ2(12) = 18.63, p < .001), 
indicating that the effect of lying on discriminability was affected by the cognitive load 
imposed during interview. Once again, separate multilevel models were fitted to the data 
from each cognitive load condition to break down this interaction. 
For participants interviewed under low cognitive load, the model was significantly 
improved when including Veracity compared to an intercept-only model (χ2(6) = 29.38, 
p < .001). As predicted, participants interviewed under low load showed impaired 
discriminability (i.e., lower A’ values) for items they lied about compared to control 
items, as confirmed by the model contrasts (b = -.09, t(110) = -3.09, p = .003). 
Unsurprisingly, discriminability was improved for items participants reported truthfully 
during interview compared to control items (b = .07, t(110) = 2.65, p = .009). 
For participants interviewed under high intrinsic load, the model including Veracity was 
a significant improvement to an intercept-only model (χ2(6) = 41.18, p < .001). Contrary 
to the prediction, but consistent with the FAR analysis, the model contrasts indicated 
that discriminability was significantly poorer for items participants lied about under high 
intrinsic load compared to control items (b = -.08, t(110) = 3.05, p = .003). Again, 
discriminability was improved for items participants reported truthfully during interview 
compared to control items (b = .11, t(110) = 3.96, p < .001).  Thus, the increase in 
commission errors when participants lied under low load and high intrinsic load can be 
attributed to impaired recognition memory. 
For participants interviewed under high extraneous load, the model including Veracity 
was a significant improvement to an intercept-only model (χ2(6) = 9.49, p = .009). The 
model contrasts indicate that discriminability did not significantly differ for items 
participants lied about compared to control items (b = .04, t(102) = 1.35, p = .18), but 
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discriminability was improved for items participants told the truth about compared to 
control items (b = .08, t(102) = 3.11, p = .002). 
In sum, while all participants experienced better memory for items they reported 
truthfully during interview, only those interviewed under high extraneous load did not 
experience impaired memory for items they lied about during interview.  
B” (response bias). It is possible that the increased commission errors for participants 
interviewed under low load and high intrinsic load are not only due to impaired 
memory, but also to differences in response bias across groups; that is, participants’ 
tendency towards answering “yes” or “no” regardless of their memory for that item. To 
determine if response bias contributed to the increased number of commission errors, 
participants’ B” values were compared across conditions. 
Table 4.2 shows that B” was close to 0 in all conditions, indicating very little response 
bias. This suggests that the differences in commission errors between groups are indeed 
attributable to changes in discriminability, rather than response bias. Nonetheless, 
response bias did significantly differ across conditions. Including Veracity as a predictor 
significantly improved the fit of the multilevel model compared to an intercept-only 
model (χ2(6) = 16.87, p < .001) and including Cognitive Load further improved the 
model fit (χ2(8) = 6.01, p = .05). Including the interaction term between Veracity and 
Cognitive Load did not further improve the fit (χ2(12) = 1.71, p = .79). 
For the main effect of Veracity, participants showed a slightly liberal response bias in 
favor of stating that items they were interviewed about were shown in the mock crime 
(Mlie items = -0.08, SD = 0.25; Mtruth items = -0.05, SD = 0.31) and a slightly conservative 
bias in favor of stating that items they were not interviewed about (control items) were 
not shown in the mock crime (M = 0.04, SD = 0.25). The model contrasts confirmed that 
participants were significantly more liberal for both lied-about items compared to 
control items (b = -0.12, t(326) = -4.02, p < .001) and truth items compared to control 
items b = -0.09, t(326) = -2.83, p = .005). Put simply, questioning participants about an 
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item meant they were more likely to state that the item was shown in the crime, 
regardless of whether they remember so. 
For the main effect of Cognitive Load, participants interviewed under high extraneous 
load were significantly more liberal than participants interviewed under low load (Mhigh-
ext = -0.08, SD = 0.28; Mlow = -0.009, SD = 0.27; b = -0.07, t(162) = -2.15, p = .03). A 
liberal bias increases participants’ tendency to respond “yes” and a strong enough liberal 
bias would therefore increase commission errors. Interestingly, participants interviewed 
under high extraneous load were the only group that did not see an increase in 
commission errors after lying. Thus, despite showing the strongest liberal response bias, 
these participants still made the fewest errors after lying at interview. Response bias did 
not significantly differ for participants interviewed under high intrinsic load compared 
to participants interviewed under low load (Mhigh-int = -0.01, SD = 0.28; b = -0.001, 
t(162) = -0.02, p = .98). 
Table 4.2 
Mean hit rate (HR), false alarm rate (FAR), A prime (A’) and response bias (B”) for 
each type of item addressed during interview as a function of cognitive load. 
 HR FAR A’ B” 









































































Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations. LL = Low load, HLI = High 
Intrinsic Load, HLE = High Extraneous Load. ‘C’ represents items participants were not 
asked about during interview, ‘L’ represents items participants lied about during 
interview, and ‘T’ represents items participants reported truthfully during interview. 
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4.7.3 Confidence 
How confident were participants when they mistakenly reported a lie item as originating 
from the mock crime (i.e., committed a commission error)? Increased confidence in 
such memories may be interpreted as evidence that participants really did incorporate 
their lies into memory. 
Confidence ratings for the mock crime items that participants lied about, the lies 
reported, and mock crime items that participants reported truthfully were compared to 
confidence ratings for control items. Additionally, as in Experiment 4, a new factor 
(Accuracy) was created that split the confidence ratings into two levels: Ratings for 
recognition questions answered correctly and ratings for recognition questions answered 
incorrectly. Thus, the final multilevel model included three factors: Accuracy (correct, 
incorrect), Veracity (control items, lies reported, items lied about, items truthfully 
reported) and Cognitive Load (low load, high intrinsic load, high extraneous load). 
Analysis of confidence ratings was exploratory; there were no specific predictions about 
how lying under different levels of cognitive load would affect confidence in memory 
accuracy. 
Model fitting. Including the main effect of Accuracy significantly improved the model 
fit compared to an intercept-only model (χ2(6) = 16.87, p < .001) and including the main 
effect of Veracity further improved the model fit (χ2(9) = 25.04, p < .001). However, the 
main effect of Cognitive Load did not further improve the model fit (χ2(11) = 0.40, p = 
.82). The model was significantly improved including the interaction term between 
Accuracy and Veracity (χ2(14) = 91.12, p < .001), but not from the further addition of 
any other interaction terms. Cognitive Load was therefore removed from the model, 
since neither the main effect of Cognitive Load, nor any of its interactions, significantly 
improved the model fit. The final model therefore included the main effects of 
Accuracy, Veracity and the interaction term between Accuracy and Veracity.  
Model interpretation. Cognitive Load did not improve the model fit, indicating that, 
unlike recognition, confidence was unaffected by the cognitive load imposed during 
interview. Regardless of cognitive load, we can see from Figure 4.3 that participants 
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were generally more confident in their memories when they were correct compared to 
incorrect, except for when judging their confidence for the lies they reported during 
interview. This is represented by the significant interaction between Accuracy and 
Veracity. To follow up this interaction, the data were split according to Accuracy and 
separate multilevel models were fitted to the data for correct and incorrect answers 
respectively. 
The primary interest here is participants’ confidence when they made commission or 
omission errors, and therefore when they responded incorrectly. For incorrect responses, 
including Veracity as a predictor significantly improved the model fit compared to an 
intercept-only model (χ2(7) = 37.16, p < .001). Participants’ confidence when they made 
commission errors is indicated by responding incorrectly to questions containing a lie 
reported during interview (this indicates that they selected “yes”—the item was shown 
in the mock crime).  The model contrasts showed that when participants made 
commission errors, they were significantly more confident in their memories (M = 
68.97, SD = 19.37) than for their memories of control items (M = 55.08, SD = 21.23; b = 
13.71, t(329) = 5.67, p < .001). Thus, despite mistaking lies for the truth, participants 
were more confident in the accuracy of their memory, suggesting that they may have 
believed that some of their lies were in fact the truth. 
Participants’ confidence when they made omission errors is indicated by responding 
incorrectly to questions containing items they lied about during interview (this indicates 
that they selected “no”—the item was not shown in the mock crime).  The model 
contrasts showed that when participants made omission errors, they were significantly 
more confident in their memories (M = 61.69, SD = 23.39) than for their memories of 
control items (b = 6.09, t(329) = 2.46, p = .01). This suggests that lying weakened 
participants’ memory for the truth. 
For correct responses, including Veracity as a predictor significantly improved the 
model fit (χ2(7) = 116.49, p < .001). The model contrasts indicated that when 
participants correctly stated that the lies reported were not shown in the mock crime, 
their confidence was significantly lower (M = 67.41, SD = 19.13) than for control items 
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(M = 72.10, SD = 17.79; b = -4.71, t(486) = -3.87, p < .001). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that lying made participants more certain that their memories were 
correct when in fact they were not, and less certain of the truth even when they correctly 
remembered it. 
 
Figure 4.3. Mean confidence on a scale of 0-100 as a function of accuracy of 
recognition memory (responded correctly vs incorrectly) and Veracity. Error bars 
represent ±1 SE of the mean. 
4.7.4 Source memory 
By analyzing the types of source errors that participants made, we can assess how 
manipulating cognitive load during interview not only affects memory for the mock 
crime itself, but also memory for the interview. If manipulating cognitive load affects an 
individual’s ability to later remember the lies told during interview, they might be less 
consistent when undergoing repeated questioning. Since inconsistency is often used as a 
cue to deception (Vredeveldt et al., 2014), an individual who forgets that they lied or the 
lies they told may be easier to detect in the course of an investigation. Accordingly, only 
the source memory for the items that participants lied about during interview are 
reported here (the detailed analyses for all item types is detailed in Appendix 9). 
148 
To assess source memory, a Poisson loglinear generalized estimating equation (GEE) 
analysis was conducted to examine the distribution of source responses for the lies 
reported during interview. From this, the likelihood that participants selected the correct 
source option compared to the remaining four source options was calculated to identify 
the types of source errors participants made in each cognitive load condition.  
Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of source attributions. The correct source option for 
lies reported during interview is 4, which represents “this item was not shown in the 
mock crime, but I gave it as a lie during interview.” Source attributions of 1, 2 or 3 
represent the judgement that the item was shown in the mock crime, whereas 
attributions of 4 or 5 represent the judgement that the item was not shown in the mock 
crime. Since these items were not shown in the mock crime, a source attribution of 3 or 
below suggests that participants may falsely remember the item as originating from the 
crime. 
We can see clear differences in the number of times that participants selected each 
source option for each condition. The GEE analysis revealed a significant interaction 
between Cognitive Load and the source option selected (χ2(8) = 20.06, p = .01). To 
break down this interaction, separate GEE models for each cognitive load condition 
were evaluated. For participants interviewed under low load, we can see from Figure 4.4 
that the distribution of source responses is relatively evenly spread across the five 
options, with participants often selecting an option of 3 or below. This suggests that 
participants interviewed under low load experienced source confusion, as predicted. 
Indeed, all other source options were no less likely to be selected than the correct source 
option (all ps > .05; see Table 4.3 for odds ratios). Participants interviewed under low 
load therefore found it difficult to remember what items they had falsely reported during 
interview and often misremembered these items as coming from the mock crime. 
Conversely, participants interviewed under high load did not show source confusion to 
the same extent for the lies they reported during interview. Participants interviewed 
under high intrinsic load were the only group to select the correct option significantly 
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more often than all other options (see Table 4.3 for odds ratios). Thus, as predicted, 
these participants showed the best source memory performance. 
Interestingly, participants interviewed under high extraneous load selected option 5 
(“This item was not shown in the mock crime and I was not asked a question about it at 
interview”) for lie items most often, suggesting that they correctly remembered that the 
item was not shown in the crime, but did not remember reporting the lie at interview. 
Indeed, there was no significant difference in the odds that participants selected this 
option compared to the correct option (see Table 4.3). Thus, dividing attention led 
participants to often forget the lies they had told during interview. 
In sum, interviewing participants under low load led to source confusion, where 
participants often misattributed lie items to the mock crime and failed to remember how 
they spoke about these items during interview. Interviewing participants under high 
extraneous load did not increase misattributions of lie items to the crime, but did lead 
participants to forget the lies reported during interview. Source memory was most 
accurate for participants interviewed under high intrinsic load. 
Table 4.3 
Odds ratios obtained from GEE analyses indicating the change in count for each source 
option compared to the correct source option (4) for the lies reported during interview. 
Source Option LL HLI HLE 
1 0.73 [0.45, 1.20] 0.35** [0.21, 0.59] 0.54* [0.35, 0.83] 
2 1.24 [0.82, 1.89] 0.53** [0.37, 0.76] 0.73 [0.49, 1.09] 
3 0.79 [0.49, 1.27] 0.56* [0.37, 0.85] 0.50* [0.33, 0.76] 
4 - - - 
5 1.19 [0.80, 1.78] 0.61* [0.39, 0.94] 1.18 [0.79, 1.74] 
Note: * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .001. ORs of <1 indicate that the option was 
selected less often than the correct option; ORs of >1 indicate that the option was 
selected more often than the correct option; ORs of <1 indicate that the option was 
selected less often than the correct option. Values in parentheses are 95% confidence 
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intervals.  LL = low load, HLI = high intrinsic load, HLE = high extraneous load. The 
source option numbers correspond to the following statements: 1 = “This was shown in 
the mock crime and I gave it as a truthful answer to a question at interview”, 2 = “This 
was shown in the mock crime, but I lied when I was asked about it at interview”, 3 = 
“This was shown in the mock crime, but I was NOT asked a question about it at 
interview”, 4 = “This was NOT shown in the mock crime, but I gave it as a lie in 
response to a question at interview”, 5 = “This was NOT shown in the mock crime and I 
was NOT asked a question about it at interview.” 
 
Figure 4.4. The distribution of source attributions for the lies that participants reported 
during interview. The correct source option is highlighted in grey. Attributions of ≤3 
represent the judgement that the item was shown in the mock crime and attributions of 
>3 represent the judgement that the item was not shown in the mock crime: 1 = “This 
was shown in the mock crime and I gave it as a truthful answer to a question at 
interview”, 2 = “This was shown in the mock crime, but I lied when I was asked about it 
at interview”, 3 = “This was shown in the mock crime, but I was NOT asked a question 
about it at interview”, 4 = “This was NOT shown in the mock crime, but I gave it as a 
lie in response to a question at interview”, 5 = “This was NOT shown in the mock crime 
and I was NOT asked a question about it at interview.” Error bars represent ±1 SE of 
the mean. 
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4.8 Results summary 
Based on cognitive load theory and research into the factors affecting source monitoring 
ability, it was reasoned that imposing different types of cognitive load might affect 
memory differently. Experiment 5 therefore investigated how lying under low cognitive 
load, high intrinsic load, or high extraneous load affects recognition memory, 
confidence and source monitoring for the details of a mock crime. 
As predicted, the effect of increasing liars’ cognitive load on memory differed 
depending on how cognitive load was manipulated. Lying under low load increased 
commission errors, led to source confusion, and impaired participants’ ability to 
discriminate lies from truths in memory. Participants often mistook items they lied about 
for items that were shown in the mock crime, suggesting that lying under low load can 
promote false memories. 
The prediction that increasing liars’ intrinsic load would enhance source monitoring and 
decrease commission errors was partially supported. Interestingly, there was a 
dissociation between recognition and source memory when participants lied under high 
intrinsic load: These participants showed the best source performance, as expected, but 
commission errors increased, rather than decreased. This dissociation is discussed in the 
next section. 
It was reasoned that memory performance for participants who lied under high 
extraneous load could go either way. In fact, these participants showed no change in 
commission errors or discriminability for items they lied about compared to control 
items, suggesting that dividing attention during interview protected participants from 
incorporating their lies into memory. The source memory data may explain why. As 
predicted, participants interviewed under high extraneous load showed the poorest 
source memory performance. Specifically, these participants often failed to remember 
the lies reported during interview. Thus, dividing attention might have prevented 
participants from adequately encoding their lies to the extent that there were fewer lies 
in memory to later confuse with the truth. The implications of these findings for the 
MAD framework and CALD are discussed in the following section. 
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4.9 General discussion 
There were 3 main aims of Experiments 4 and 5: [1] To test the challenge to the MAD 
framework that the type of lie told is a distinct variable from the cognitive effort of 
lying, and therefore provide evidence that these variables should not be considered 
interchangeable predictors of the memory errors that might follow deception; [2] To test 
the hypothesis that increasing the cognitive effort of fabrication will decrease 
commission errors; and [3] To test the hypothesis that different methods of increasing 
the cognitive effort of fabrication will affect memory differently. Overall, the findings of 
Experiments 4 and 5 support aims [1] and [3], but not [2].  
Experiment 4 showed that participants who knowingly reported fabricated answers in 
response to interview questions concerning a mock crime subsequently made more 
commission and omission errors than participants who did not undergo questioning. 
However, increasing participants’ cognitive load during interview by increasing the 
difficulty of lie generation did not affect the error rate. Providing fabricated responses at 
interview therefore led participants to more often mistake those fabrications for the 
truth, as well as forget the truth, regardless of the cognitive effort required for lie 
generation. However, the manipulation check suggested that the cognitive load 
manipulation was not strong enough to elicit differences across groups. Accordingly, 
while the pattern of results was consistent with the prediction that commission errors 
would be highest for participants who lied under low load, the rate of commission errors 
did not significantly differ across cognitive load conditions.  
A stronger manipulation in Experiment 5 yielded a significant increase in commission 
errors when participants lied under low load. Furthermore, commission errors increased 
when participants interviewed under high intrinsic load, but not when they lied under 
high extraneous load. Thus, the cognitive effort of lying can be manipulated 
independently of the type of lie to produce different effects on memory, as proposed in 
Chapter 3. This supports the proposition that the cognitive effort of lying and the type of 
lie should not be considered interchangeable predictors of subsequent memory errors. 
153 
Neither Experiment 4 nor 5 supported the prediction that increasing the difficulty of lie 
generation would decrease commission errors. Based on the SMF, it was reasoned that 
increasing participants’ intrinsic cognitive load during interview would increase the 
number of cognitive operations associated with the memory for the lie, thereby 
enhancing later source monitoring and decreasing commission errors accordingly. 
Interestingly, while participants interviewed under high intrinsic load did indeed show 
the best source monitoring performance, this did not translate to decreased commission 
errors. Similar findings have been shown in eyewitness misinformation and forced 
fabrication studies, where participants show more memory errors when tested with a 
yes/no recognition test compared to when they are directed to consider the source of 
their memories (Ackil & Zaragoza, 2011; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989).  
The dissociation between item and source memory performance may reflect two 
different memory processes targeted by the recognition and source questions. Memory 
judgements can be based on two different processes: Familiarity—quick judgements 
determined by the extent to which an item in memory is activated—or recollection—
slower and more considered judgements determined by a more stringent retrieval search 
process (Yonelinas, 2002). Questions that measure item-context associations, like the 
source test in Experiment 5, likely tap into recollection processes, whereas questions 
that measure item recognition, like the recognition test used in both experiments, reflect 
both recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas, 2002). It may be that forced-choice yes/no 
recognition questions prompted familiarity judgements and that the increased familiarity 
with the item from lying at interview led participants to select the “yes” response more 
often, thus increasing commission errors. Conversely, the more detailed source 
questions may have prompted greater consideration and therefore recollective 
judgements that led participants to more accurately reflect on their memories. 
If the above interpretation is correct, this opens the possibility that different questioning 
methods during an investigative interview might affect the quality of the testimony 
obtained. For instance, directing interviewees to consider the source of their memories 
might encourage them to engage more accurate recollective processes, rather than make 
familiarity-based judgements, therefore mitigating deception-induced memory errors. 
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The findings of Experiment 5 help to develop our theoretical understanding of how 
lying can affect memory for the truth. To recap, the MAD framework categorizes 
different types of lie based on their cognitive effort and states that cognitive effort can 
help to predict the memory errors that might follow: The framework states that 
fabrication requires relatively more cognitive resources and is associated with increased 
commission errors, whereas false denials and feigned amnesia require relatively few 
cognitive resources and are not associated with increased commission errors (Otgaar & 
Baker, 2018). The MAD framework therefore treats the type of lie and cognitive 
demand of lying as interchangeable predictors of the types of subsequent memory 
errors, however the findings of Experiment 5 show that these are indeed independent 
variables that can interact to affect memory in different ways. Participants told the same 
type of lie (fabrications) but varying the cognitive load required to generate these 
fabrications led to different effects on memory: Fabricating under low load increased 
commission errors, while fabricating under high extraneous load did not. Furthermore, 
these findings show that the nature of the relationship between the cognitive effort of 
lying and commission errors depends on how cognitive load is manipulated. Thus, 
increasing the cognitive effort of lying does not necessarily increase commission errors, 
as proposed in Chapter 3. 
The findings of both experiments suggest that the main determinant of commission 
errors is not the cognitive demand of lying, but simply the presence of alternative 
information in memory that can be confused with the truth at test. When participants 
lied under high extraneous load, the source analysis indicated that they encoded lies 
from the interview less often. Thus, there were simply fewer opportunities for 
participants to confuse the lie with the truth and commission errors did not increase 
accordingly. Conversely, when participants lied under low load or high intrinsic load, 
they more effectively encoded the lies from the interview, increasing the chances that a 
lie can be confused with the truth, and commission errors increased. Thus, regardless of 
cognitive load, commission errors increased only when participants had to discriminate 
between a lie and a truth in memory. Increasing extraneous load appears to have 
155 
protected participants only by reducing encoding of the lies told at interview and 
therefore eliminating this discrimination task. 
Going forwards, the MAD framework may benefit from explicitly considering the 
cognitive effort of lying as a separate variable that can moderate the effects of different 
types of lie on memory. This allows the generation of novel hypotheses for future 
research, for instance by considering how manipulating the cognitive effort of false 
denials may affect the rate of omission errors. 
The finding that increasing different types of cognitive load affected memory differently 
may have implications for lie detection techniques that encourage the imposition of 
cognitive load to magnify cues to deception, such as CALD. The findings of Experiment 
5 give preliminary evidence that some methods of increasing cognitive load may be 
preferable to others. Specifically, methods that divide attention during interview may 
best preserve memory for the original event, so that an accurate account is retrievable if 
the individual later retracts their dishonest account. In addition, the findings suggest that 
dividing attention could facilitate lie detection by impairing encoding of the interview: 
Participants who lied under high extraneous load often forgot the lies they told at 
interview, which could promote inconsistencies in repeated interviews throughout an 
investigation, thus exposing deception (Vredeveldt et al., 2014).  Conversely, 
questioning procedures that interfere with the inherent task of lying and encourage the 
generation of false information might simply create more opportunities for source 
confusion, and in turn, reduce the likelihood that a revised statement is accurate.  
Future research should examine if the same pattern of results is found when using the 
specific procedures advocated by CALD, for instance increasing extraneous load by 
forcing participants to maintain eye contact with the interviewer (Vrij, Mann, Leal, & 
Fisher, 2010) and increasing intrinsic load by requesting that the interviewee provide 
their account in reverse chronological order (Vrij, Mann, et al., 2008). If the findings of 
Experiment 5 generalize to these techniques more broadly, some techniques of imposing 
cognitive load on interviewees may have detrimental effects on memory and therefore 
render an accurate account irretrievable. 
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The experiments reported here are a first step towards understanding the effects of 
increasing liars’ cognitive load on memory for a target event. Nonetheless, there is still 
much to learn. Most notably, there may be different effects on memory when 
participants construct their own lies. In the present experiments, some degree of external 
validity was deliberately sacrificed in favor of isolating the effects of varying cognitive 
load to test the challenges to the MAD framework outlined in Chapter 3. Nonetheless, 
since generating information typically enhances memory compared to merely reading it 
(Bertsch et al., 2007), it is likely that varying cognitive load while participants construct 
their own lies will moderate the effects on memory. Participants also did not prepare for 
the interview in advance, but encountered the lies for the first time during the interview 
itself. Liars typically anticipate and prepare for questions they will be asked (Lancaster 
et al., 2013) and such rehearsal may also moderate the effect of cognitive load 
manipulations on memory.  
Despite these limitations, the findings presented in this chapter are an important first 
step to clarifying the independent effects of lie type and cognitive load on memory. 
Refining our understanding of this relationship will contribute to the development of the 
MAD framework, as a first theory of lying and memory, and potentially to the 
refinement of the cognitive approach to lie detection.  
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Chapter 5: Can fabricating hamper subsequent lie detection in the 
Concealed Information Test? 
5.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 1 of the thesis, two reasons were given as to why deception-induced memory 
impairments could be problematic for the criminal justice system: (1) if an individual 
retracts a deceptive statement, they may find it harder to retrieve an accurate account of 
what happened, and 2) it may be harder to detect when somebody is lying if the truth is 
less accessible in their memory. The findings of Experiments 1-5 support (1) by 
showing that memory for an event can be less accurate after having lied about that 
event. Experiment 6 focuses on (2) by investigating whether lying about an event can 
reduce the accuracy of deception detection later on. 
As reviewed in Section 1.5.1, an increasing body of evidence shows that fabricating 
false information can make the truth less accessible in memory over time (Otgaar & 
Baker, 2018). Consistent with this research, Experiments 4 and 5 showed that simply 
reporting fabrications a single time in response to interview questions about a mock 
crime increased commission errors. Thus, lying in response to interview questions can 
impair memory for the truth, or make it less salient in memory. A potential consequence 
of this is that an individual might find lying progressively easier as a criminal 
investigation proceeds, making it harder for investigators to detect the interviewee’s lies 
in repeated interviews.   
Impaired memory for the truth may particularly compromise lie detection when 
detection strategies rely on a strong memory for the original event. One such strategy is 
the Concealed Information Test (CIT). By taking various physiological measures of 
recognition, the CIT determines whether an individual recognizes crime-relevant 
information that only a guilty person would know. Thus, if fabricating false details early 
on in an investigation can weaken memory for crime-relevant information, might this 
lower the accuracy of tests that rely on memory, such as the CIT? This is the question 
addressed in the final experiment of this thesis. 
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The CIT is often lauded for its accuracy at detecting when an individual is concealing 
information, while having a solid theoretical grounding (Meijer, Selle, Elber, & Ben-
Shakhar, 2014). In the CIT, examinees are presented with multiple-choice questions 
concerning the details of the crime. Examinees are shown several possible answers to 
the question, one of which is the correct crime-relevant detail (the probe) and the others 
are plausible incorrect alternative details (the irrelevants). For example, if the suspect 
stole a necklace, they may be asked “What was the stolen item?” and presented with the 
possible answers “Ring”, “Brooch”, “Necklace”, “Earrings” and “Bracelet”. The 
irrelevant details are chosen so that an innocent individual cannot discriminate between 
them and the probe, resulting in the same physiological response to all answers. A guilty 
individual, however, recognizes the probe and this elicits a distinct physiological 
signature termed the “CIT effect” (Lykken, 1974; Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, & Meijer, 
2011).  
There are various measures that can be used to assess recognition in the CIT, but the 
most widely studied are three ANS measures—skin conductance response (SCR), heart 
rate (HR) and respiration line length (RLL)—and the P300 event-related potential (ERP; 
(Meijer et al., 2014). The most recent meta-analysis on the CIT’s effectiveness found 
that all measures yield an impressively large effect size for the difference in 
physiological responses to probes compared to irrelevants for guilty participants (Meijer 
et al., 2014). 
Because the CIT measures recognition of crime-relevant information, the accuracy of 
the test is contingent on the quality of the examinee’s memory for that information. If 
the examinee never encoded or has a weak memory for the item in question, then the 
CIT effect may be eliminated or attenuated. The majority of the CIT research conducted 
to date has tested the effectiveness of the test under conditions that elicit strong memory 
for the crime-relevant information. Researchers often ensure that crime-relevant details 
are encoded and most conduct the CIT immediately after the event in question (Gronau 
et al., 2015). In reality, however, examinees might not have encoded all of the crime-
relevant details being tested and there can be long delays between the encoding of the 
event in question and administration of the CIT (Meijer et al., 2014; Osugi, 2011). The 
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examinee may also encounter post-event information in this time period, which could 
distort memory for important crime-relevant information. Indeed, there are a handful of 
studies showing that the CIT effect is indeed smaller when memory is compromised in 
these ways. 
Most of the research investigating the effect of compromised memory on the CIT’s 
accuracy have studied how an examinee might deliberately try to manipulate the 
strength of their memory for crime-relevant information as a way of cheating the test, 
that is, as a countermeasure. The first experiment to examine this possibility looked at 
whether voluntarily suppressing memory for crime-relevant details attenuates the P300 
ERP component that signals recognition in the CIT (Bergström, Anderson, Buda, 
Simons, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2013). Participants completed an interactive crime 
simulation task before undergoing a CIT. Specifically, participants imagined that they 
were a burglar and ‘searched’ through a house to steal valuables by pressing numbers on 
a keyboard that corresponded to different locations in the house. In the CIT participants 
were shown words describing items from the crime (probes) mixed with words 
describing items that were not shown in the crime (irrelevants). For some of the probes, 
participants were instructed to block any memories of the crime from coming to mind 
when the word appeared on screen. When participants suppressed their memory in this 
way, the classification accuracy of the CIT fell to an AUC of 0.70, compared to 0.87 
when participants were instead instructed to remember as many details as they could 
about the object when the word appeared. This finding has subsequently been replicated 
using a similar procedure, which led to indistinguishable P300 components between 
participants who suppressed their memory for crime-related information and innocents 
(Hu, Bergström, Bodenhausen, & Rosenfeld, 2015). Together, these studies show that 
intentional inhibition of the truth can significantly reduce the diagnosticity of the CIT by 
increasing false innocent classifications. 
While intentional suppression of the truth is distinct from memory distortion, additional 
evidence suggests that the accuracy of the CIT can be compromised regardless of how 
memory is targeted. One study modified the classic misinformation paradigm to 
demonstrate that distorting memory for the details of a witnessed crime can reduce the 
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CIT’s diagnosticity. Participants watched a mock crime scenario and—a week later—
read a narrative description of the mock crime scenario that contained a number of 
crime-relevant items. Half of these items were replaced with incorrect misleading 
information, for instance, a brown envelope was instead described as a red envelope. 
Participants then completed a CIT to compare their physiological responses for crime-
relevant details that were described incorrectly in the narrative text and crime-relevant 
details that were described correctly (control items). A typical CIT effect was found for 
control items, that is, a greater SCR response and more pronounced heart rate 
deceleration. Crucially, there was no CIT effect for crime-relevant details that 
participants were misinformed about in the narrative text. Thus, misinforming 
participants about the details of the crime just once meant that they no longer showed 
physiological signs that they recognized these items. Moreover, participants showed a 
CIT effect for the misleading information itself. So for the example above, participants 
showed no physiological response to the correct detail “brown envelope”, but instead a 
physiological response to the incorrect detail “red envelope” (Volz, Bahr, Heinrichs, 
Vaitl, & Ambach, 2018), which could lead them to be incorrectly classified as innocent. 
A crucial difference between lying and misinformation exposure is that people know 
they are providing false information when they lie, whereas participants in 
misinformation studies are unaware that they have been exposed to false information. It 
might be argued that this awareness will make liars more resistant to memory distortion, 
however existing evidence suggests that the CIT’s accuracy can be reduced even when 
examinees knowingly expose themselves to false information about the crime.  
One study examined the effect of deliberately learning false information about a crime 
as a potential countermeasure for reducing the CIT’s diagnosticity by creating memory 
interference (Gronau et al., 2015). Based on research into retroactive interference, the 
authors reasoned that learning new false information may interfere with the retrieval of 
true crime-relevant details that were previously encoded. Participants committed a mock 
theft and then read a narrative containing false information about some of the key details 
from the theft they had performed. They were told that learning these false details would 
help them to appear innocent when they subsequently undertook a CIT. The timing of 
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the exposure to the false narrative and the administration of the CIT were also 
manipulated to determine if the effect of learning false information on the CIT’s 
diagnosticity is moderated by delays between encoding and test. 
CIT detection scores based on SCRs were reduced for participants who learned the false 
crime details compared to control participants, regardless of when they learnt the false 
information or took the CIT. However, the overall detection accuracy of the test was 
significantly reduced only for participants who were exposed to the false crime details 
and undertook the CIT in a separate session one week after performing the mock theft. 
These participants also showed impaired recall and recognition of the true crime details, 
but better memory for the false crime details. The authors therefore propose that the 
reduced detection accuracy was caused by enhanced memory for the false crime details. 
Learning the false details immediately before undergoing the CIT meant that memory 
for these details was stronger than memory for the original details learnt a week before 
and therefore may have interfered with their retrieval. Recognition of the crime-relevant 
items was therefore poorer and the CIT less accurate as a result (Gronau et al., 2015). 
The handful of existing studies examining how exposure to false information can 
influence the CIT show that factors known to affect memory do indeed compromise the 
test’s accuracy. This is unsurprising, given that the CIT measures recognition of crime-
relevant information and is therefore essentially a physiological memory test. Given the 
existing evidence that lying can adversely affect memory, the next question is whether 
merely fabricating information can lead to similar impairments to the CIT. In the real 
world, people typically generate their own fabrications with the intent to create a false 
belief in another, but no research has studied whether such fabrication can affect 
memory and the CIT’s diagnosticity accordingly. The present experiment therefore 
investigated whether self-generating fabricated responses to interview questions about a 
mock crime can impair memory for those details and affect the diagnosticity of the CIT. 
In real life, suspects could undergo a CIT weeks or even months into an investigation 
(Elaad, 2011). It is also possible that they will have been questioned once or on several 
occasions before it is decided that they ought to undergo a CIT. Given past evidence that 
exposure to false information can impair the CIT’s accuracy, the aim of Experiment 6 
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was to determine if fabricating false information in interviews prior to a CIT can be a 
source of misinformation that lowers the test’s diagnosticity. 
5.2 Experiment 6 
The experiment was conducted across three sessions. Participants watched an interactive 
mock crime and were then questioned on half of the critical items from the crime one 
week later, where they were asked to lie in response to the questions. Participants were 
not questioned on the remaining half of the critical items and these therefore served as 
controls. Two weeks later, participants undertook a physiological CIT that measured 
SCR and heart rate to assess recognition of crime-related information. The CIT effect 
refers to a greater SCR response and more pronounced heart rate deceleration to probes 
compared to irrelevants. It was predicted that participants would show a smaller CIT 
effect for lied-about items compared to control items. 
5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Participants. 
Eighty participants completed the experiment (mean age = 22.15 years, SD =  8.22 
years, range = 18-76 years; 27 male, 52 female, 1 other/preferred not to say) in exchange 
for £10, plus a bonus £20 voucher awarded to the participant with a CIT score most 
closely approximating an innocent person. Participation was restricted to native English 
speakers and to individuals who had not participated in any previous studies or pilot 
experiments conducted for this thesis, due to the overlap in stimuli. To determine an 
appropriate sample size, a power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1.9.2 (Faul et 
al., 2007) based on the findings of Volz et al. (2018), in which the comparison of 
interest is participants’ responses to crime-relevant items from control categories and 
crime-relevant items from misled categories. Based on a small effect size of d = 0.37, 
the present experiment required a total of 44 participants to achieve a power of .8 with 
an alpha level of .05. However, data were collected from 80 participants to compensate 
for attrition over the three sessions and EDA non-responders (see Section 5.3.2 for 
definition of non-responders). 
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5.3.2 Stimuli and apparatus. 
Mock crime. This experiment used the mock crime video used in Experiment 4. To 
recap, the video depicted a gloved individual carrying out numerous actions culminating 
in the theft of a device and some important documentation. Ten target details were 
selected from the video for participants to memorize (8 critical, 2 practice). To ensure 
that participants encoded the details from the mock crime well, the video was edited to 
make it interactive. Before each of the key details was presented, the video stopped and 
participants selected the target item required to complete the upcoming action from an 
inventory that appeared on screen. Because participants watched the mock crime video 
online, 4 random attention checks were incorporated to ensure that participants were 
watching the video. Each attention check consisted of a multiple-choice question 
concerning a detail from the segment of the video that preceded it (details other than 
target items). Participants selected one of 4 possible answers. The mock crime video 
was hosted on Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). All video controls were disabled so that 
participants could not rewind, fast forward, pause or replay the video. 
Physiological recording. Two physiological measures were recorded for the CIT: Skin 
conductance response (SCR) to assess orienting and heart rate (HR) to assess arousal 
inhibition. Orienting and arousal inhibition are the primary mechanisms known to 
underlie the CIT effect. The orienting response is a reaction to significant or novel 
stimuli. Stimuli that are significant to the individual—such as crime-relevant 
information—elicit an orienting response; that is, enhanced SCRs (Klein Selle, 
Verschuere, Kindt, Meijer, & Ben-Shakhar, 2017). Arousal inhibition refers to 
inhibition of the experienced physiological arousal in response to crime-relevant 
information, which manifests as more pronounced HR deceleration (Klein Selle, 
Verschuere, Kindt, Meijer, & Ben-Shakhar, 2016). 
Physiological data were logged using a MP36R data acquisition unit (Biopac Systems 
Inc) with pre-gelled disposable Ag/AgCL electrodes (EL507 for SCR and EL501 for 
HR). Participants were also video recorded to identify any noise generated from 
excessive movements and to ensure that these movements did not overlap with stimulus 
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presentation. Data were excluded for any trial where there was an excessive movement 
up to 2s before stimulus onset (Klein Selle et al., 2016). 
To record SCR, electrodes were placed on the distal phalanges of the first and middle 
finger of the non-dominant hand. SCR peaks were identified by the AcqKnowledge v4.2 
proprietary algorithm (Kim, Bang, & Kim, 2004) and were sampled at 1000Hz at x2000 
gain with a 66.5Hz low pass filter. Parameters were set so that peak onsets were within 
0.5-5s following stimulus onset and maximum peaks within 10s (Gamer, 2011). Peaks 
identified by the algorithm that were not linked to stimulus presentation were removed. 
The skin conductance response analyzed was the difference in the absolute magnitude of 
tonic skin conductance peaks and their peak onsets. Approximately 25% of the general 
population do not elicit valid SCRs and are considered ‘non-responders’ (Venables & 
Mitchell, 1996). Participants were considered non-responders if the standard deviation 
of their raw SCRs was below 0.01µS and their SCR data were excluded from analyses 
(Klein Selle et al., 2016). SCRs for the first item in each CIT block were excluded from 
analysis, as this item was a buffer item to absorb the initial orienting response (Gershon 
Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2002). 
Heart rate was recorded from two electrocardiogram (ECG) electrodes placed on the 
ventral side of the non-dominant wrist and the non-dominant lateral aspect of the distal 
fibula, and from the SCR electrode located on the non-dominant distal phalange. ECG 
signals were sampled at 1000Hz at ×1000 gain, with a 66.5Hz low pass filter and a 
0.5Hz high pass filter. To assess the change in heart rate following stimulus 
presentation, the ECG signal was processed using AcqKnowledge’s propriety Heart Rate 
Variability algorithm to detect R peaks, measure the time interval between R peaks and 
filter artifacts. The algorithm identifies the change in heart rate by converting the R-R 
time interval to beats per minute (bpm) and performing baseline-correction by 
subtracting the mean heart rate in the 3s before stimulus onset. This is compared to the 
mean baseline-corrected heart rate in the 15s following stimulus onset to yield the 
change in heart rate following stimulus presentation (Gamer, 2011). 
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To reduce noise from the variability in the magnitude of physiological responses across 
participants, all physiological measures were normalized by converting them to z-scores 
and these z-scores were used as the units for analysis (Ben-Shakhar, 1985).  
5.3.3 Design and procedure. 
The experiment was a 2 (Veracity: Lie, Control) x 2 (Item Type: Crime-relevant, Crime-
irrelevant) within-subjects design. The experiment consisted of three sessions completed 
over 3 weeks. Participants watched the mock crime in Session 1 and were questioned 
about the crime in Session 2, which took place 1 week after Session 1. The mock crime 
and questioning phases of the experiment were separated in line with Gronau et al. 
(2015) and Volz et al. (2018), who both introduced misinformation in a separate session 
to the mock crime. Past research also shows that fabrication has the largest effects on 
memory when lies are constructed in a separate session to the original event (Polage, 
2012). Finally, participants completed the CIT in Session 3, which took place 2 weeks 
after Session 2. Sessions 1 and 2 were completed online, whereas Session 3 took place 
in the laboratory. Participants were given a cover story to conceal the memory aspect of 
the experiment. They were told that the experiment concerned the performance of the 
CIT at detecting plausible lies after a time delay. 
Session 1. After consenting to participate and providing demographic information, 
participants read a background story to immerse themselves in the experiment. They 
were asked to imagine that they had found themselves in financial difficulty and had 
resorted to a loan shark to cover their expenses. To repay their loan, they were to steal a 
valuable device and the blueprints detailing how the device is made. Participants then 
received instructions for how to carry out the crime, which consisted of 10 statements, 
each outlining an action together with the item needed to complete the action written in 
red (e.g. “lever open the workshop door using a crowbar”). Participants were instructed 
to memorize the items in red and had 90 seconds to do so. The first and last items were 
filler/practice items to control for primacy and recency effects, leaving 8 critical items 
for memorization. 
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Participants then ‘performed’ the mock crime by watching the interactive mock crime 
video, consisting of the 10 actions outlined in the instructions, and were asked to 
imagine that they were the person in the video performing the actions shown. 
Immediately before each action in the video was executed, an inventory appeared on the 
screen showing the 10 items and a description of the upcoming action (see Figure 5.1 for 
examples). Participants selected the item required to complete the action and the mock 
crime video then resumed.  
The inventory items were arranged in a random order, but the order was kept constant 
across all 10 actions. In addition, participants were interrupted with a multiple-choice 
attention check question at 4 pre-determined random intervals. On completion of the 
mock crime, participants were asked if they had seen the mock crime video before in 
any previous experiments they had participated in (none had). Participants were then 
thanked and reminded that they must complete Session 2 of the experiment in one 
week’s time. 
Session 2. Participants were emailed a link to Session 2 of the experiment 7 days after 
completion of Session 1 (mean delay between sessions = 7.12 days, SD = 0.43). 
Participants were questioned about 4 of the 8 critical details from the mock crime. The 
remaining 4 critical items served as control items that were not addressed during 
questioning. Each of the 8 items were randomly allocated to one of two sets and half of 
the participants were questioned about the items from Set 1 and the remaining half were 
questioned about the items from Set 2. The set that participants completed was randomly 
determined by Qualtrics. 
Before questioning began, participants were reminded of the mock crime scenario from 
Session 1 and were asked to imagine that they had been arrested. They were informed 
that the police had CCTV evidence showing them at the crime scene at the time the 
crime was committed and that the police knew that they were guilty, but were missing 4 
key pieces of information that they needed to locate the device. Participants were 
informed that they would be interviewed about this information, but that they should 
avoid incriminating themselves further by lying in response to all questions by creating 
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a plausible alternative answer. To encourage participants to take questioning seriously 
and to reinforce the cover story, participants were told that the plausibility of their lies 
would be assessed. 
Participants were instructed to give 1-2 sentence answers and had 1 minute per question 
to think of and type their response. They were first shown an example question and 
answer to demonstrate the type of response that was expected (see Figure 5.2). 
Participants then completed a practice question, typed their response, and were shown 
an example of how they could have responded to ensure that they understood the task. 
They then proceeded to answer 4 questions addressing each of the critical mock crime 
details (for example, “What did you use to cut the padlock off the device case? Please 
briefly describe what the item you used looked like”). The critical questions were 
presented in a random order across participants. Participants typed their response and 
moved onto the next question. On completion of all questions, participants were shown 
their answers to each question and were asked to confirm that the answers shown were 
the ones they provided. This was to reinforce their lies in memory. Finally, participants 
were reminded that they must come to the lab in 2 weeks time to complete a lie 
detection test. 
Session 3. Participants were invited to the laboratory to complete the CIT 14 days after 
completion of Session 2 (mean delay between sessions = 14.21 days, SD = 0.53). They 
were informed that they were to undergo a physiological lie detection test concerning 
the items from the crime and that the person with a CIT score most closely 
approximating an innocent person would win a £20 Amazon voucher.  
The CIT consisted of 9 blocks, 1 practice block and 8 critical blocks (one for each 
critical item from the mock crime). Each block contained a probe (a critical item from 
the mock crime) and 4 irrelevants (alternative items not shown in the mock crime). If a 
participant had provided one of the irrelevants as their lie during questioning in Session 
2, that irrelevant was substituted for an alternative irrelevant item in that CIT block. 
Participants’ responses to the questions in Session 2 were reviewed so that each 
participant’s CIT could be customized to swap irrelevants where necessary (participants 
168 
required the substitute irrelevant for a mean of 19.20% [SD = 39.44%] of items). 
Appendix 10 lists the CIT questions, probes and irrelevants for each critical item. To 
ensure that the irrelevants were unbiased alternatives to the probes, 20 additional 
‘innocent’ participants who had not seen the mock crime video performed the CIT. 
Paired sample t-tests were performed to compare physiological responses to the probe 
and irrelevants for each item. There were no significant differences in responses to 
probes and irrelevants for any item in neither EDA nor HR measures (all ps <.05). 
The CIT was conducted in the laboratory with the experimenter present in the room at 
all times (located behind a screen for the duration of the CIT). Participants were 
connected to the electrodes and sat at a desk approximately 1 meter from a 22-inch 
monitor with a resolution of 1920x1080. They were informed that a series of questions 
about the mock crime from Session 1 would appear on the screen followed by a series of 
possible answers, presented one-by-one.  
The task was to state “no”, aloud, in response to every answer that appeared onscreen. 
The first CIT block was a practice block addressing a filler item from the mock crime to 
familiarize participants with the task. On completing the practice block, participants 
were given the opportunity to ask any questions before starting the main CIT. For each 
of the 8 critical CIT blocks, a question appeared in the center of the screen for 10 
seconds followed by the 5 possible answers, sequentially presented as text on the screen 
for 5 seconds. The inter-stimulus interval between each answer was 10 seconds. The 
first answer presented was always an irrelevant to serve as a buffer item to absorb the 
initial orienting response. 
On completing the CIT, participants completed a recognition test to assess their explicit 
memory for the 8 critical items from the mock crime. Participants were informed that 
the lie detection phase of the experiment was over and that they should answer all 
questions truthfully according to their memory of what was shown in the mock crime in 
Session 1. The recognition test consisted of 8 multiple choice questions addressing each 
critical item from the crime with 5 possible answers: the true answer and the 4 
irrelevants for that item from the CIT. The order of the questions and the 5 answers for 
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each question was randomized across participants. After each recognition question, 
participants rated their confidence that their answer was correct on a scale of 0 = 





Figure 5.1. Screen shots extracted from the interactive mock crime video depicting two 
imminent actions (left panels). The video paused immediately before each action was 
performed and participants selected the correct item to execute the action from the 
inventory (right panels). 
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Figure 5.2. Example question and answer provided to participants to demonstrate how 
they were expected to respond to questions. 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Preliminary analyses 
Before addressing the primary research question of the experiment, three performance 
checks were performed. 
Engagement in mock crime. Participants’ performance in the interactive mock crime 
and the 4 attention checks were analyzed to assess whether participants were sufficiently 
engaged with the mock crime. Participants passed an average of 86.88% (SD = 33.82%) 
of attention checks, indicating that they paid attention to the mock crime video. 
Additionally, participants selected the correct item to perform each action described for 
98.75% (SD = 11.12%) of items, suggesting that they encoded the crime-relevant items 
well. 
Performance during questioning. Of the 80 participants who completed Session 1 of 
the experiment, 75 completed Session 2. The responses that participants provided during 
questioning were examined to ensure that they followed instructions by providing a false 
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alternative answer. Participants answered correctly in an average of 96.27% (SD = 
19.98%) of questions. When participants answered incorrectly (by providing the truthful 
answer) or did not provide an answer, the item in question was excluded from further 
analyses. 
Explicit memory performance. Of the 75 participants who completed Session 2, 71 
completed Session 3. Analysis of participants’ performance in the final recognition test 
indicated that lying during questioning did not impair explicit recognition of lied-about 
items: There was no significant reduction in the proportion of items that participants 
correctly recognized from the mock crime for lied-about (M = 0.80, SD = 0.20) 
compared to control items (M = 0.78, SD = 0.24, t(70) = -0.57, p = .57). In fact, lying 
during questioning may have slightly improved memory, as suggested by significantly 
higher confidence ratings for lied-about (M = 80.85, SD = 12.83) compared to control 
items (M = 77.48, SD = 13.31, t(70) = -2.05, p = .04, d = 0.26). Self-generating 
fabrications in response to questions about the mock crime therefore did not adversely 
affect explicit memory for the critical mock crime items. 
5.4.2 Physiology 
Skin conductance. Nine participants were flagged as non-responders (as described in 
Section 5.3.2) and were excluded from analysis, leaving SCR data from 62 participants 
for analysis. This still well exceeds the target sample size of 44 participants. 
It was predicted that participants would show smaller SCRs in response to items they 
lied about during questioning in Session 2 compared to control items that they did not 
lie about. To test this hypothesis, a 2(Item Type: probe, irrelevant) x 2(Veracity: control, 
lie) repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the normalized SCR scores. This 
revealed a significant main effect of Item Type (F(1,61) = 18.30, p < .001), which 
represents the CIT effect. As shown in Figure 5.3, SCRs were larger for probes (critical 
items shown in the mock crime; M = 0.21, SD = 0.55) compared to irrelevants 
(alternatives not shown in the mock crime; M = -0.07 , SD = 0.28). 
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There was no main effect of Veracity (F(1, 61) = 0.97, p = .33) and no significant 
interaction between Item Type and Veracity (F(1,61) = 0.04, p = .84), indicating that 
lying in response to the questions in Session 2 did not affect SCRs. In sum, participants 
showed larger SCRs in response to items from the mock crime, regardless of whether 
they lied about those items during questioning. Thus, contrary to the hypothesis, lying 
during questioning did not affect SCRs in the CIT. 
 
Figure 5.3. Mean normalized SCR scores for probe and irrelevant items for mock crime 
items that participants lied about during questioning and mock crime items that 
participants were not asked about during questioning (control). Error bars represent 土1 
SE of the mean. 
Heart rate. Heart rate deceleration values were analyzed from the 71 participants who 
completed all three study sessions. It was predicted that participants’ HR would be 
lower in response to items that they lied about during questioning in Session 2 compared 
to control items that they did not lie about. To test this hypothesis, 2(Item Type: probe, 
irrelevant) x 2(Veracity: control, lie) repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on the 
normalized HR deceleration values. 
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The HR data followed the same pattern of results as the SCR data. The analysis revealed 
a main effect of Item Type (F(1,70) = 13.39, p < .001), which represents the CIT effect. 
As shown in Figure 5.4, participants’ HRs were lower for probes (M = -0.12, SD = 0.48) 
compared to irrelevants (M = 0.05 , SD = 0.23). 
There was no main effect of Veracity (F(1,70) = 0.01, p = .92) and no significant 
interaction between Item Type and Veracity (F(1,70) = 0.02, p = .89), indicating that 
heart rate deceleration was unaffected by lying during questioning. Thus, contrary to the 
hypothesis, lying during questioning did not affect HR deceleration—participants 
showed a CIT effect regardless of whether they lied during questioning. 
 
Figure 5.4. Mean normalized heart rate deceleration for probe and irrelevant items for 
mock crime items that participants lied about during questioning and mock crime items 
that participants were not asked about during questioning (control). Error bars represent 
土1 SE of the mean. 
5.4.3 Signal detection analysis 
ROC curves were plotted to assess the detection efficiency of the CIT. Detection 
efficiency is calculated by comparing the overlap between the distributions of guilty and 
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innocent participants’ scores and can range from 0-1. A value of 1 indicates that there is 
no overlap between the distributions and therefore represents perfect detection, whereas 
a value of 0.5 indicates that the distributions of guilty and innocent participants cannot 
be distinguished and therefore represents chance detection. A ROC curve can be created 
from these distributions and the area under the curve (AUC) tells us the classification 
accuracy of the test (Gershon Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003). 
Because all participants watched the mock crime and were therefore “guilty” a group of 
innocent participants of equal sample size was simulated. Simulation of innocents 
involves computing values for the probe and irrelevant items that do not significantly 
differ from one another. This represents an innocent individual who has no knowledge 
of the crime items and therefore should not respond differently to probes compared to 
irrelevants. Simulation of innocents is commonly conducted in the CIT literature (e.g., 
(Klein Selle et al., 2016; Meijer et al., 2014) and the standard method is to randomly 
draw an SCR value for each item from a standard normal distribution with a mean of 0 
and SD of 1. This is calculated for each participant and the resulting values are used to 
create the ROC curves. 
The ROC curve plots the true positive rate (i.e., sensitivity: Participants classified as 
guilty who were in fact guilty) as a function of the false positive rate (i.e., 100-
specificity: Participants classified as guilty who were in fact innocent) for the range of 
SCR values. An ideal test would show a high true positive rate, while maintaining a low 
false positive rate, and therefore would show an ROC curve that lies as close to the co-
ordinate (0,1) as possible and an AUC close to 1 (DeLong, DeLong, & Clarke-Pearson, 
1988). Figure 5.5 shows that the ROC curves for both lied-about and control items lie 
close to the diagonal chance line, indicating that the CIT did not discriminate between 
guilty and innocent participants well in this experiment.  
Pairwise comparison of ROC curves for control and lied-about items was performed 
using MedCalc (MedCalc Software, Ostend, Belgium), which uses a non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney U-Statistic to compare within-subject ROC curves (as recommended by 
DeLong, DeLong, and Clarke-Pearson, 1988). This revealed no significant difference in 
176 
AUCs for control and lied-about items (AUCDiff = .05, 95%CI[-.08, .19], p = .44), 
indicating that lying during questioning did not reduce the diagnosticity of the CIT for 
discriminating between guilty and innocent participants. Nonetheless, while the 
detection efficiency of the CIT for control items was significantly greater than chance 
(AUC = .63, 95% CI[.54, .71], p = .01), the detection efficiency for lied-about items did 
not significantly differ from chance (AUC = .57, 95%CI[.48, .67], p = .44). This 
suggests that there might have been a slight reduction in the CIT’s performance for 
items that participants lied about during questioning. It should be noted, however, that 
detection efficiency was poor regardless of whether participants lied; AUCs for both 
control and lied-about items were below the acceptable rate of discrimination of .70-.80 
(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 5.5. ROC curves showing the signal detection rate of the CIT effect between 
guilty and simulated innocent participants for items that participants did not lie about 
during questioning (Control) and items that participants lied about during questioning 
(Lie). The dotted line represents chance detection. AUC = area under the curve, d = 
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Cohen’s d indicates the effect size of the difference between guilty and simulated 
innocent participants. 
5.5 Discussion 
While most research shows impressive accuracy for the CIT at detecting concealed 
knowledge, the studies reviewed in Section 5.1 uniformly demonstrate that the test’s 
accuracy depends on the quality of the examinee’s memory for the event in question. 
This is unsurprising, given that the CIT measures recognition of crime-relevant 
information. It is therefore important to establish what conditions impair memory for 
crime-relevant information, since this will inevitably compromise the CIT’s accuracy. 
The present experiment showed that self-generating fabrications in response to interview 
questions about a mock crime experienced 3 weeks before was insufficient to impair 
memory. Accordingly, the CIT effect was unaffected for items that participants lied 
about (compared to control items) for both SCR and HR measures. Nonetheless, the 
ROC analysis indicated that the detection efficiency of the CIT did not significantly 
differ from chance for lied-about items, but was significantly above chance for control 
items. This suggests that lying during interview may have slightly impaired the accuracy 
of the CIT at distinguishing guilty from simulated innocent participants. However, this 
finding should be interpreted with caution, given that the detection accuracy did not 
significantly differ between control and lied-about items.  
Previous research most closely resembling the present experiment are studies conducted 
by Volz et al. (2018) and Gronau et al., (2015), who both demonstrated that exposing 
participants to false information prior to a CIT significantly impaired memory and the 
test’s diagnosticity. One notable difference between those studies and the present is that 
participants in this experiment were explicitly instructed to lie by generating their own 
false information, whereas participants in previous research were exposed to or learnt 
experimenter-generated false information. It is therefore possible that self-generating 
fabrications protected participants from any memory distortion that might compromise 
the CIT. 
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Why might self-generating fabrications have protected participants? It is well 
established that people remember information better when it is self-generated rather than 
merely read—the generation effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978). In the present context, the 
generation effect may have improved participants’ memories for the lies that they 
generated in Session 2 compared to if they had been provided with ready-made 
fabrications. According to the lexical activation hypothesis, semantic features of an item 
are activated in memory when that item is self-generated as opposed to merely read. 
These semantic features are thought to provide retrieval cues when the individual later 
attempts to recall the item, thus facilitating recall (Payne, Neely, & Burns, 1986). Source 
memory may also benefit from self-generation, particularly when participants 
distinguish internally generated information from externally provided information, as in 
the present case (Riefer, Chien, & Reimer, 2007). Self-generating fabrications may 
therefore have improved participants item and source memory for their lies, making it 
easier for them to later distinguish fabricated details from those originally experienced 
in the mock crime and thereby protecting them from memory distortion. Future research 
should directly compare the effects of self-generated and experimenter-generated 
fabrications on subsequent memory to determine if generation effects are responsible for 
protecting participants against deception-induced memory distortion (although 
generation effects are difficult to isolate in a deception context, given the variability in 
the lies that participants generate). 
While it is possible that the generation effect prevented deception-induced memory 
distortion by improving memory for the lies told, the opposite may also be true; that is, 
that participants’ memories were unimpaired because they had poor memories for the 
lies told. Since participants reported their lies only once, they may not have encoded 
them sufficiently to create source monitoring difficulties at test. While participants in 
Volz et al. (2018) also encountered false information once, they were unaware that they 
were exposed to this information and such naivety can increase vulnerability to 
misinformation effects (Blank & Launay, 2014). When participants knowingly learnt 
false information as a countermeasure in Gronau et al. (2015), they rehearsed it until 
they achieved perfect performance. As outlined in Section 5.1, this likely created a 
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strong memory for the false information that blocked retrieval of the original event 
details via retroactive interference. Fabricating a false answer only once may not have 
created a strong enough memory to cause this interference at retrieval. Thus, if 
retroactive interference is indeed the mechanism underlying the memorial effects that 
hampered the CIT in Gronau et al., it may be that the conditions in the present 
experiment were insufficient to create interference and consequently no impairment to 
the CIT was found. It was a deliberate choice to request that participants lie only once, 
as past research shows that repeating self-generated fabrications can decrease the 
likelihood of deception-induced memory impairment (Rindal, 2017). Nonetheless, it is 
possible that repeating lies over time might affect memory differently and the CIT’s 
effectiveness accordingly. 
While the present experiment showed no deception-specific impairment to the CIT, it 
should be noted that the detection efficiency of the test was poor overall, with an AUC 
of 0.63 and an effect size of d = 0.57 for the difference in responses to the probes for 
guilty and innocent participants. This is markedly smaller than the average effect size of 
d = 1.55 found in CIT studies that typically implement optimal conditions for encoding 
crime-relevant information (Meijer et al., 2014). Indeed, the meta-analysis conducted by 
Meijer et al. excluded studies with a delay between encoding of the event in question 
and the administration of the CIT. However, the results of the present study suggest that 
a delay of just 3 weeks may be enough to considerably decrease the difference in 
physiological responses to crime-relevant items between guilty and innocent examinees. 
Participants’ explicit memory performance for control items was just 78%, suggesting 
that they forgot a significant proportion of critical items from the mock crime in interval 
between encoding and test. Thus, this experiment adds to a handful of previous studies 
suggesting that even relatively short time delays may be problematic for the 
diagnosticity of the test in the field (Gamer, Kosiol, & Vossel, 2010; Nahari & Ben-
Shakhar, 2011; Seymour & Fraynt, 2009). 
In summary, this experiment provides preliminary evidence that self-generating 
fabrications in a single interview is not sufficient to affect memory and the CIT’s 
accuracy after a 3-week delay. Nonetheless, given the increasing body of research 
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showing that lying about an event can impair memory for that event, further research is 
warranted to examine how lying under different circumstances might affect memory and 
consequently the accuracy of the test. 
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
This thesis began by noting the prevalence of deception at every level of the criminal 
justice system. Given its prevalence, there has been surprisingly little investigation into 
how lying can affect not only the beliefs of the deceived, but also those of the deceiver. 
The research presented throughout adds to the existing small body of evidence showing 
that by deceiving others, people can impair their ability to know the truth themselves. 
Although the effect of lying on memory has received increasing attention from applied 
memory researchers, there has been little theoretical development in this area of 
research and particularly little discussion of the mechanisms by which lying may distort 
memory. As such, this thesis was built around the two relevant theoretical frameworks 
of the relationship between lying and memory: Von Hippel and Trivers’ (2011) theory 
of self-deception and Otgaar and Baker’s (2018) MAD framework. The main aim of this 
thesis was to contribute to theory development to enable a better understanding of when 
deception-induced memory distortion could be problematic for the functioning of the 
criminal justice system. The experiments conducted therefore examined the mechanisms 
that allegedly underlie deception-induced memory distortion, as proposed by von Hippel 
and Trivers and the MAD framework, as well as the potential impact of such memory 
impairments on deception detection. Given that each of the previous chapters contain a 
general discussion, this chapter will bring together the theoretical and practical 
conclusions that can be drawn from the experiments presented within this thesis, as well 
as consider their limitations and avenues for future research. 
6.1. Theoretical implications 
The first three experiments of the thesis tested von Hippel and Trivers (2011) proposal 
that self-deception might be achieved via RIF of the truth. To recap, von Hippel and 
Trivers state that simply repeating a lie and omitting the truth may promote RIF of the 
omitted information, thereby helping people to lie convincingly and escape detection. 
As outlined in Section 1.4, we must be able to identify “below baseline” forgetting to 
differentiate RIF from mere decay over time. However, prior to the experiments 
conducted in Chapter 2, no existing research had implemented the appropriate design 
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and controls to determine that RIF is indeed the mechanism underlying forgetting 
effects.  
Section 2.1 outlined the parallels between the activation-competition-inhibition cycle 
known to underlie RIF in broader memory research and the processes known to be 
involved when people fabricate. It was therefore proposed that repeating fabrications 
might indeed trigger inhibition of the truth and reduce its accessibility. Experiments 1-3 
were therefore the first to test if repeating self-generated fabrications can promote RIF 
of the corresponding truthful information via an inhibitory mechanism. No evidence was 
found for this hypothesis: Participants’ memories for lied-about items did not differ 
from baseline memory. Repeating fabrications under the conditions tested was therefore 
equivalent to not rehearsing the items between encoding and recall, suggesting that any 
reduction in memory performance was due to decay over time and not caused by 
repeating fabrications per se. Thus, there is still no adequate evidence for von Hippel 
and Triver’s claim that self-deception can be achieved by RIF. 
Nonetheless, Experiments 1-3 implemented very constrained adaptations of the original 
RIF paradigm (Anderson et al., 1994) by matching its conditions as closely as possible. 
It may be that repeating lies and omitting the truth does promote RIF of the truth when 
lies are repeated over time, for instance. However, implementing a time delay may 
obscure RIF effects with source monitoring difficulties. Indeed, the experiments 
outlined in Chapter 4 add to the existing body of evidence that source monitoring plays 
a crucial role in deception-induced memory distortion. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, the primary focus was on the relationship between cognitive load 
and source monitoring errors when people fabricate. Cognitive load was considered 
important to investigate, as it is one of the key factors that distinguishes lying from other 
forms of misinformation and because it plays an important explanatory role in both the 
MAD framework and von Hippel and Trivers’ theory of self-deception. Accordingly, 
Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the MAD framework’s proposals concerning the 
relationship between the cognitive effort of lying and subsequent memory errors. 
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In Chapter 3, it was proposed that cognitive load might not be an appropriate primary 
predictor of the memory errors that follow deception and therefore that the framework 
may require a shift of focus from cognitive load to other causal mechanisms; namely, a 
lack of rehearsal in the case of false denial and feigned amnesia, and source monitoring 
errors in the case of fabrication. Specifically, it was proposed that the cognitive effort of 
lying and the type of lie should be considered independent variables and that failing to 
dissociate them could obscure the relationship between the cognitive effort of lying and 
subsequent memory errors. While the MAD framework proposes that increasing the 
cognitive effort of lying should increase commission errors, past research outlined in 
Chapter 3 suggested that if we isolate fabrication, commission errors may in fact be 
highest when participants fabricate under low cognitive load and lowest when 
fabricating under high cognitive load. 
The experiments reported in Chapter 4 proceeded to test the above hypothesis. While 
this hypothesis was not fully supported, the findings of Experiment 5 provided evidence 
that the cognitive effort of lying and lie type can dissociate and interact to affect 
memory differently. Varying the cognitive effort of a single type of lie—fabrication—
led to different memorial effects depending on how cognitive load was manipulated. 
The findings of Experiment 5 provide evidence that the MAD framework may benefit 
from explicitly separating the type of lie from other factors that might moderate the 
effects of lying on memory, including cognitive effort. The findings of Experiments 4 
and 5 suggest that the question of whether lying increases commission errors seems to 
depend on whether there are counterfactual details in memory that must be discerned 
from truthful details: Experiment 5 showed that commission errors increased only when 
participants encoded their lies. In other words, source monitoring is likely the most 
important factor for predicting commission errors. This is the most parsimonious 
explanation of when lying promotes commission errors; one cannot falsely recall a detail 
that was never encoded.  
The most appropriate next line of enquiry may therefore be to determine the moderators 
and mitigators of deception-induced commission errors. Factors known to affect source 
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monitoring ability, such as those discussed in Chapter 1, will likely moderate the rate of 
commission errors that lying produces. Thus, lying may not have unique effects on 
memory compared to a standard misinformation effect. Knowledge of the fact that the 
information communicated is false might not be sufficient to protect people from 
memory errors; wherever source needs to be monitored, errors inevitably creep in.  
Predicting commission errors based on what we know to affect source monitoring may 
lead to more accurate predictions than predicting commission errors from the cognitive 
effort of lying. For instance, plausible fabrications require less cognitive effort to 
construct than implausible fabrications (Walczyk et al., 2014), yet we know that 
plausible lies also promote commission errors (Pickel, 2004). The source monitoring 
framework is consistent with this finding—we know that the plausibility of a false event 
can affect the likelihood and extent of impaired source monitoring (Hart & Schooler, 
2006; Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, Lam, Hart, & Schooler, 2006; Sharman & Scoboria, 
2009) and we would therefore predict an increase in commission errors for plausible 
lies. However, if we instead based our prediction on the cognitive effort of lying, we 
would incorrectly predict fewer commission errors for plausible lies.  
In sum, the findings across this thesis do not support the idea that RIF can underlie self-
deception. However, they do support the proposition that we can experience “self-
inducing false memories” (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011, p. 6) via source monitoring 
errors. Moreover, we can alter the likelihood that commission errors will increase after 
fabrication by manipulating cognitive load. Nonetheless, the cognitive effort of lying 
should be considered a potential moderator of commission errors, rather than the 
primary predictor. 
6.2 Practical implications 
In real criminal cases, we might worry about the effect of lying on memory when an 
individual changes their testimony in an investigation; for instance, if they retract a 
deceptive testimony and revert to truth telling. This may be particularly important in 
cases of witness intimidation, where an eyewitness to a crime is intimidated or bribed 
into providing a false testimony or alibi. In 2016, an alleged instance of this brought 
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significant media attention. David Osadebay, a well-known rapper and gang member, 
was accused of plotting a drive-by shooting of Oliver Tetlow, a bystander mistaken for a 
rival gang member. The case looked like a certain conviction until a witness suddenly 
changed his story during the trial, providing Osadebay with the alibi that led to his 
acquittal. It is suspected that this alibi was in fact false and that the witness was 
intimidated into fabricating a false account to weaken the prosecution’s case (Haydock, 
2018; Wright, 2017).  
This case, like many others, highlights the importance of understanding how previous 
fabrications might affect an individual’s ability to later recall an event accurately. 
Experiments 1-5 add to the existing body of evidence showing that fabricating such 
false details could indeed impair the witness’ memory, potentially rendering a fully 
accurate account irretrievable if they later reverted to truth telling. Experiment 2 
demonstrated that fabricating information impaired memory for information that was 
related to the lied-about details by 10%. Thus, if such information became relevant later 
in an investigation, an individual may be less likely to recall those details accurately 
because of having initially lied about other related details. Although only a small 
impairment, seemingly insignificant single details can make or break a criminal case 
(Van Duisen, 2014). Thus, any factor that compromises memory, however little, should 
be taken seriously.  
The memory impairments seen in Experiments 4 and 5 were somewhat larger: 
Participants who lied in Experiment 4 showed a relative increase in commission errors 
of 50% and 38% when they lied under low and high cognitive load respectively, 
compared to participants who did not lie (though the absolute increase was 8% and 6% 
respectively). Similarly, commission errors doubled when participants lied under low 
cognitive load in Experiment 5 (with an absolute increase of 19%) and increased by 
55% when participants lied under high intrinsic load (with an absolute increase of 12%). 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that the effect of fabrication on memory for 
the truth is a legitimate concern for revised testimonies.  
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The next question, then, is how might we mitigate such errors? Given that we cannot 
stop people from lying, one approach might be to consider questioning approaches that 
reduce the chance that lying will contaminate memory. The findings of Experiment 5 
suggested that one potential way to protect interviewees from deception-induced 
memory distortion could be to ask questions that target source memory, rather than just 
item memory: When participants were questioned under high intrinsic load, commission 
errors increased when item memory was targeted, but source memory performance 
remained high. This finding is consistent with those of broader memory research 
showing that directing people to consider the source of their memories can reduce false 
memory rates by encouraging them to apply stricter source monitoring criteria (Dodson, 
Koutstaal, & Schacter, 2000; Lindsay & Johnson, 1989). Thus, it may be wise to obtain 
a revised witness testimony by encouraging witnesses to consider the source of their 
memory to yield the best chances that their testimony is accurate. Further research 
should investigate this possibility. 
Not only might deception-induced memory distortion create problems for revised 
testimonies, it might also compromise deception detection. Von Hippel and Trivers 
(2011) proposed that one of the ways to reduce the cognitive cost of lying—and 
therefore increase the chances of remaining undetected—is to make the truth less salient 
in memory. Reducing the accessibility of the truth means that less effort is expended on 
processes such as monitoring the behavior of the enquirer and the self, as well as 
suppression of the truth, thereby reducing potential cues to deception that might 
otherwise arouse suspicion. This is the reasoning behind the cognitive approach to lie 
detection: Deceivers implement strategies to reduce the cognitive cost of lying (von 
Hippel & Trivers, 2011; Walczyk et al., 2014), but imposing cognitive load counters this 
attempt, thereby magnifying cues that are typically faint and unreliable (Vrij, Fisher, et 
al., 2008).  
While there has been some disagreement over the effectiveness of the cognitive 
approach (Levine, Pete Blair, & Carpenter, 2018), the consensus is that imposing 
cognitive load on interviewees successfully improves deception detection with a 
medium effect size (Vrij, Blank, & Fisher, 2018). The findings of Experiment 5 may 
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explain one way in which this approach magnifies cues to deception like 
inconsistencies: Dividing participants’ attention reduced their encoding of the lies 
reported during questioning, which could promote inconsistencies over repeated 
interviews and therefore help to expose deception (Vredeveldt et al., 2014). Importantly, 
the findings of Experiment 5 suggest that dividing attention should selectively promote 
inconsistencies in liars, but not truth tellers: Participants’ memory was not adversely 
affected when they told the truth. A possible avenue for future research is to consider 
how dividing liars’ attention across multiple interviews might increase inconsistencies 
and facilitate detection. 
Finally, Experiment 6 directly tested the hypothesis that the mere act of fabricating in an 
initial interview might hamper an objective deception detection test, the CIT. Given that 
past research indicates that lying just once can adversely affect memory and that the CIT 
relies on a strong memory for the truth, it is possible that previously fabricating might 
lower the accuracy of the CIT. However, Experiment 6 did not find evidence for this: 
Fabricating details about a mock crime was insufficient to affect memory for the details 
originally witnessed or to affect the accuracy of the CIT. Thus, eluding detection via 
memory distortion of the lied-about information likely requires that deliberate strategies 
are implemented to achieve this, such as intentional suppression of the truth (as in 
(Bergström et al., 2013), or studying false information (as in Gronau et al., 2015). For 
deception-induced memory distortion to be a more passive process, it may instead 
require repetitions of the fabricated information over extended periods of time. An 
interesting question for future research regarding von Hippel and Trivers’ (2011) theory 
is whether manipulating the motivation to elude detection increases people’s 
susceptibility to memory distortion and ability to ‘pass’ the CIT. This would provide 
evidence that memory distortion is indeed a mechanism to better deceive others. 
It should be highlighted that the potential practical applications outlined above are 
currently speculative. Other than Experiment 6, all experiments were designed to 
address specific theoretical hypotheses and therefore sacrificed external validity in favor 
of greater experimental control. The form of deception studied here deviates from real-
life deception in several important ways that limit the generalizability of the conclusions 
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to a practical setting. Lying about a mock crime that one has merely watched or 
imagined performing might affect memory differently than when an individual has 
actually performed the event in question. It is a well-established finding that memory is 
superior for self-performed events compared to events that are only read or observed 
(Engelkamp, 1998; Mulligan & Hornstein, 2003). It is therefore possible that memory 
for self-performed actions will be more resistant to distortion following deception. 
Almost all existing research into the effects of lying on memory requests that 
participants merely observe a mock crime video. An important question for future 
research is therefore whether memory is affected by lying to the same extent when 
actions are performed, rather than merely witnessed or imagined. 
Perhaps even more important, future research should consider how social aspects of 
deception might moderate its effects on memory. The experiments within this thesis 
were conducted from a cognitive perspective and therefore focused on the memorial 
implications of the cognitive processes recruited in fabrication. However, deception is 
essentially a social phenomenon. The stakes of being exposed as a liar in criminal 
settings are very high and such circumstances therefore inspire great motivation to 
remain undetected. Of course, ethical restrictions prevent manipulation of the stakes of 
lying in any way that approximates a real life criminal situation and the inability to 
determine the ground truth in real criminal cases limit the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the field. We do, however, know that motivation to be believed can increase the 
likelihood of deception-induced memory distortion. This has been studied in the context 
of romantic attraction: People are typically more motivated to impress people that they 
deem attractive. In one study, participants more often misremembered agreement ratings 
they had previously given in response to certain statements to align more closely with 
the ratings of an attractive other, but not an unattractive other (Brady & Lord, 2013). 
Thus, the motivation to appear more similar to an attractive other led people to 
misremember that their prior opinions were actually discordant with that individual’s 
opinions. Social aspects of deception like the stakes and motivation will therefore likely 
moderate the effect of lying on memory. 
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6.3. Concluding remarks 
Memory is extraordinarily important; in many cases, it is the only record we have of the 
past. And because of that, we have the power to shape other people’s beliefs about the 
past through the information we share: We can omit, exaggerate, embellish or outright 
fabricate information to manipulate others’ beliefs. But perhaps we do not realize that in 
shaping others’ beliefs, we can unwittingly alter our own and lose an accurate 
representation of what we previously knew. A faithful representation of the past is more 
important in some contexts than others. The criminal justice system is perhaps the most 
extreme example of where the truth matters, where even tiny seemingly insignificant 
details can prove critical. It is also in this context where lying is perhaps most prevalent. 
Thus, not only are there more opportunities for lying to alter memory, but the 
consequences of this may also be the most severe. The experiments contained within 
this thesis show that, under some circumstances, lying can impair memory for the truth 
and suggest that this may indeed be problematic for the criminal justice system. The 
primary focus was developing theory for how deception-induced memory distortion 
might occur. Ultimately, a good theory can guide future empirical research to determine 
when lying might be problematic for memory and can inform the design of interventions 
to mitigate that. While there is still much to explore and understand in this area of 
research, this thesis advances our theoretical understanding of how we might 
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Appendix 1. Pilot questionnaire results for Experiment 1a. 
Experiment 1a required subjects to lie by fabricating an alternative category member 
beginning with the same letter as the item learned. We therefore conducted a pilot 
questionnaire to ensure that participants were able to generate appropriate alternatives 
for each item. The main experiment required 6 categories each composed of 6 items. We 
piloted 8 categories, each containing 8 items. 
Participants (n=18) were shown each category-item pair and asked to generate at least 
one alternative category member beginning with the same letter. Participants also rated 
the difficulty of generating an alternative for each pair on a scale of 0-100, where 0 
represented ‘very easy’ and 100 represented ‘very difficult’. 
Table A1 shows the percentage of participants who provided at least one alternative 
category member for each item. The 6 categories with the highest percentages were 
selected for use in the main experiment. For each category, the 6 items with the lowest 










Table A1.  
The mean percentage of participants who generated at least one alternative category 
member beginning with the same letter as the item provided, and difficulty ratings (scale 
0-100) for the top 6 items in each category. Starred categories were used in the main 
experiment. 
Category Mean percentage of participants who 
generated correct alternatives (SD) 
Mean difficulty rating 
(SD) 
Alcohol 80 (18.97) 37.65 (11.56) 
Body* 100 (0) 6.33 (3.56) 
Clothing* 95 (6.49) 20.72 (15.85) 
Country* 100 (0) 16.32 (5.51) 
Furniture 86 (16.37) 42.67 (24.69) 
Occupation* 99 (2.27) 17.4 (6.59) 
Sport* 94 (6.85) 35.64 (11.14) 





Appendix 2. Stimuli used in Experiment 1a. 
Category-item pairs used in Experiment 1a. (C) indicates critical categories and (F) 
indicates filler categories. 
Category 






Sport (C) Vegetable 
(C) 














































Appendix 3. Stimuli used in Experiment 2. 
Items that participants were instructed to remember in Experiment 2 together with their 
associated actions for the crime-relevant and crime-irrelevant image sequences. “(filler)” 
refers to non-critical items for which memory was not tested. 
Category Item Action 
Crime-relevant Keycard (filler) Opens door to the office using the keycard. 
 Wall Blueprints for the device are projected on the 
wall. 
 Phone camera Takes a photo of the blueprints with a phone. 
 Red mouse Identifies computer to hack as the one with 
the red mouse 
 USB drive Inserts the USB drive into the computer. 
 Password 
‘star2016’ 
The IT system is accessed with this 
password. 
 Security image of 
brain 
Circles back of the brain to access the IT 
system. 
 Key F8 The key pressed to copy the relevant files 
over to the USB stick. 
 Hard drive A hard drive is stolen from the desk. 
 Programming code 
(filler) 
Programming code is printed and taken. 
Crime-irrelevant Rubber gloves 
(filler) 
Puts on rubber gloves. 
 Toilet brush Scrubs toilet with a brush. 
 Dustpan and brush Sweeps floor with dustpan and brush. 
 Mop Cleans floor with mop. 
 Caution sign Puts out sign. 
 Black bin Empties the black bin. 
 Window cleaner 
(Mr. Muscle) 
Cleans the window using Mr. Muscle 
cleaner. 
 Water dispenser Wipes the water dispenser. 
 Feather duster Clears cobwebs with the feather duster. 
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 Vacuum cleaner 
(filler) 
Vacuums the carpet. 
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Appendix 4. Pilot experiment results for Experiment 2. 
When developing the mock crime stimuli, three video sequences were filmed: 2 crime-
relevant and one crime-irrelevant. This was to ensure that there was a choice in stimuli 
to match baseline memory for the crime-relevant and crime-irrelevant sequences as 
closely as possible. Ten still images were selected from each video as described in 
Section 2.11.2. Each image included an item to be remembered (example stimuli are 
shown in Figure 2.2). The crime-relevant image sequences depicted either a workshop 
break in to steal a device or an office break in to steal important documents. The crime-
irrelevant sequence depicted a cleaning scenario. A pilot experiment was conducted to 
test participants’ baseline memory for the image sequences and to determine which 
crime-relevant sequence was most appropriate for use in the main experiment. 
In the pilot experiment, participants (n=51) viewed the three image sequences and were 
instructed to memorize the items highlighted in red. The order in which the image 
sequences were shown was counterbalanced across participants. After a 10-minute 
distractor phase, participants completed a cued-recall test in which they were presented 
with a question addressing the 30 critical items from the 3 image sequences. The 
questions asked were the same as those to be used in the retrieval practice phase of the 
main experiment. Questions were presented in a random order. 
A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA indicated the proportion of items correctly 
recalled differed between the image sequences (F(2,96) = 6.26, p = .003). Bonferroni-
adjusted pairwise comparisons revealed that participants recalled significantly more 
items from the crime-irrelevant cleaning sequence  (M = .74, SD = .18) than the 
workshop break-in sequence (M = .64, SD = .20; p = .002, 95%CI [.03, .17]). There was 
no significant difference in recall performance for the cleaning sequence and the office 
break-in (M = .68, SD = .20; p = .10, 95% CI [-.09, .14]. The office break-in was 
therefore selected as the crime-relevant image sequence for use in the main experiment.  
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Appendix 5. Stimuli used in Experiment 3. 
Critical items used in Experiment 3 and their associated easy and hard questions. 
Category Item Easy question Hard question 
Body part Arm What body part might 
you cross in front of your 
chest? 
What body part contains 
the Axillary artery? 
Eye What body part do you 
see with? 
What body part does 
'Blephartis' affect? 
Foot What body part makes 
contact with the ground 
when you walk? 
What body part does 
'plantar fasciitis' affect? 
Head  What body part is cut off 
when someone is 
decapitated? 
What body part has the 
Latin name 'Caput'? 
Leg What body part is most 
likely to contain varicose 
veins? 
What body part does 
peripheral arterial disease 
mainly affect? 
Mouth What body part do you 
open for the dentist? 
What body part contains 
the uvula? 
Nose What body part do you 
smell with? 
What body part was the 
subject of an opera written 
by Shostakovich? 
Toe What body part might 
you stub? 
What body part enables 
you to balance? 
Country USA What country is Donald 
Trump president of? 
What country would you 
find the ’Garden of the 
Gods’ in? 
Canada What country is 
Vancouver in? 
What country has the 
longest coastline in the 
world? 
France What country was 
Napoleon from? 
What country is also 
known as ‘the hexagon’? 
Japan What country does sushi 
come from? 
What country consists of 
more than 6800 islands? 
England What country is 
Stonehenge in? 
What country was the 
inventor of the fire 
extinguisher from? 
Germany What country has Berlin 
as its capital? 
What country has changed 
its capital city more than 7 
times? 
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Spain What country is 
Barcelona in 
What country was the mop 
invented in? 
Italy What country is famous 
for its love of pizza and 
pasta? 
What country has the lily 
as its national flower? 
Fruit Apple What fruit is cider made 
from? 
What fruit contains the 
poison cyanide in its 
seeds? 
Orange What fruit makes the 
juice that is commonly 
abbreviated to ‘OJ’? 
What fruit originated in 
4000BC in Southeast Asia? 
Banana What fruit is long and 
curved with a yellow 
skin? 
What fruit is also known as 
the ‘fruit of the wise men’? 
Grape What fruit is wine made 
from? 
What fruit has over 8000 
varieties? 
Strawberry What fruit is typically 
eaten with cream in the 
Summer? 
What fruit did Othello 
decorate Desdemona’s 
handkerchief with in the 
Shakespearean play? 
Pear What fruit completes the 
phrase ‘a partridge in a 
___ tree’? 
What fruit did Ancient 
Greeks use to treat nausea? 
Kiwi What fruit with green 
flesh is also the name of 
a flightless bird? 
What fruit is also known as 
the ‘Chinese gooseberry’? 
Watermelon What fruit is large with 
pink flesh, black seeds 
and a thick green skin? 




Flute What musical instrument 
is held to the side of the 
face and played by 
blowing across a hole? 
What musical instrument, 
still played today, dates to 
Paleolithic times? 
Trumpet What musical 
instrument’s name comes 
from the word ‘trompe’? 
What musical instrument 
was originally used for 
military and religious 
purposes? 
Violin What musical instrument 
is also known as a 
‘fiddle’? 
What musical instrument 
does an Archetier help to 
make? 
Drum What musical instrument 
do you hit with sticks? 
What musical instrument 
would you play a 
ratamacue on? 
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Saxophone What musical instrument 
was created by Adolphe 
Sax? 
What musical instrument 
was Cannonball Adderley 
famous for playing? 
Guitar What musical instrument 
typically has 6 strings 
and can be acoustic or 
electric? 
What musical instrument 
was preceded by the gittern 
and vihuela? 
Clarinet What musical instrument 
is a woodwind 
instrument that is 
typically black in color? 
What musical instrument is 
made by the company 
’Chadesh’? 
Piano What musical instrument 
has 88 black and white 
keys? 
What musical instrument 
are the Steinway family 
famous for making? 
Sport Football What sport involves 
kicking a ball into a 
goal? 
What sport is also referred 
to as ‘the beautiful game’? 
Basketball What sport attracts tall 
players and involves 
throwing a ball into a 
hoop? 
What sport do the 
Memphis Grizzlies belong 
to? 
Tennis What sport involves two 
players hitting a ball over 
a net with a racket? 
What sport originally had 
an hourglass-shaped court? 
Hockey What sport involves 
moving a ball or puck 
into a goal using a long 
stick? 
What sport originates from 
the term ‘shepherd’s 
crook’? 
Golf What sport uses the term 
‘a hole in one’? 
What sport holds a 
tournament called’ The 
Solheim Cup’? 
Lacrosse What sport, played on a 
pitch, requires its players 
to use nets at the end of a 
long stick? 
What sport originated as a 




Appendix 6. Stimuli used in Experiment 4. 
 Interview questions, the truthful answers, and the corresponding lies provided to 
subjects in Experiment 4 during interview for subjects under in the low and high 
cognitive load conditions. (C) indicates critical items and (P) indicates practice items. 
Interview Question Truth Item Lie Item (low load) Lie item (high load) 
What did you use to 




A SCREWDRIVER A SCWRIVRDEER 
  
What was the pattern 
to disable the alarm? 







What did you use to 




A CLOTH A CTOHL 
  





IN A DRAWER IN A DARWRE 
  
Where was the code 





ON SOME PAPER ON SOME PRPEA 
  




A BAG A GBA 
  
What did you use to 
cut the padlock? 
Bolt cutters 
(C) 
A HACKSAW A HSAKCAW 
  










What kind of bag did 
you put the device 
in? 
A sports bag 
(C) 
A BACKPACK A BCKACAPK 
  




A NUMBER CODE A NBUEMR CEDO 
  
Where were the 
device blueprints 
shown? 
On the wall 
(C) 
ON A SCREEN ON A SERCNE 
  
How did you know 
what computer to 
hack? 
It had a red 
mouse (C) 
IT HAD A BLUE 
MOUSE 
IT HAD A BEUL 
MUSOE 
What did you take 








What did you copy 
the computer files 
onto? 






What was the 






What was the 
security hologram? 
A brain (C) A HEART A HRETA 
  
The folder on the 
computer you 





What document did 
you print? 
Programmin







Appendix 7. Stimuli used in Experiment 5. 
Interview questions, their truthful answers and corresponding lie answers for 
participants in the low load and high load conditions in Experiment 5. (C) indicates 









Lie item (hard) 






What did Eric eat? 
(C) 
  
APLPE LPAEP PECAH 
  
CAPHE 
What magazine did 
Eric read? (C) 
  
TMIE ITEM NEWWSEEK WENSEKEW 
Where did Eric read 
the note from the 
homeowner? (C) 
  
HALWLAY AWLHYAL KITHCEN NCEHKTI 
What tool did Eric 
use in the kitchen? 
(C) 
  
SCREDWRIVER RSDWCVEIRRE PLEIRS RPILSE 
What did the picture 







EFIFEL TWOER FLIEFE ROEWT 
What was the state 
of the bed in the 
first bedroom? (P) 
  
AMDE DMEA n/a n/a 
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What did Eric test 










What did Eric play? 
(P) 
  
n/a n/a A VIEDO A OEDVI 
What color cap did 




BLCAK AKLCB MAORON OAROMN 
What was the name 











On what did Eric 
check the time? (C) 
  
WLAL CLCOK LALW KCOCL WTACH THAWC 
What did Eric steal 
from the first 
bedroom? (C) 
  
ERARINGS GERARINS NECLKACE KELCENAC 
What did Eric look 







A JORUNAL A NUJORLA 
What color was 
Eric’s van? (C) 
  
BULE LEBU SIVLER VIESRL 












What color was the 
mug that was next 




WHTIE ETWIH BEGIE EEGIB 
What did Eric take 
from the fridge? (C) 
  
CKOE OEKC PESPI IESPP 
What did Eric steal 
from the bathroom? 
(C) 
  
PLILS LISLP PERUFME RUEFEPM 
What did Eric steal 
from the second 
bedroom? (C) 
  
A RNIG A IGRN MNOEY OYEMN 
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Appendix 8. Pilot study results for Experiment 4. 
To create the fabrications for each interview question in Experiment 4, alternative false 
answers were generated for each question and a pilot survey was conducted online to 
ensure that the alternatives were plausible lies. Participants (n=21) were told about the 
mock crime and given a summary of what happens in the video. They were then shown 
the interview questions to be used in the main experiment, together with the correct 
answer (i.e., the item from the mock crime video). For example, participants saw ‘Q: 
What was used to cover the CCTV camera? A: Shaving foam’. Participants were then 
given two alternative false answers to the question and indicated the plausibility of each 
false answer on a 7-point likert scale ranging from 1 (“I would definitely disbelieve this 
answer”) to 7 (“I would definitely believe this answer”). The false answer that 
participants rated as most plausible was selected as the fabrication for the main 
experiment. 
The mean plausibility rating for the selected false answers was 5.49 (out of 7; SD = 
0.30). A rating of 3 or less indicated that participants would not believe the answer and 
therefore that the lie was implausible (3 corresponded to “I might disbelieve this 
answer”). All false answers were rated above 3, indicating that all selected answers were 
plausible fabrications. 
A second pilot study was conducted to ensure that the anagrams used in the high load 
condition were considered more cognitively demanding to solve than merely reading the 
answer. Participants (n=18) were asked to solve anagrams that required them to switch 
two underlined letters (as used by Foley & Foley, 2007). However, participants did not 
rate this task as more cognitively demanding than the low cognitive load condition, 
which merely required them to read the deceptive answer. In fact, participants in the 
high cognitive load condition provided lower difficulty ratings (M = 2.67, SD = 0.87) 
than participants in the low cognitive load condition (M = 3.33, SD = 2.0), though these 
ratings did not significantly differ (t(16) = 0.92, p = .37, 95%CI[-0.87, 2.21]). 
A further pilot study (n=20) was therefore conducted that tested two different ways of 
increasing cognitive load. Either 3 scrambled letters were underlined with a 10 second 
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deadline for solving the anagram, or 4+ letters were scrambled. Participants solved each 
anagram and then rated how much cognitive effort they required to solve the anagrams 
on a scale of 1-9. Participant in the 4+ letter condition rated the task as significantly 
harder than Participants in the 3 letter deadline condition (M4+ = 5.0, SD = 1.56; M3 = 
3.30, SD = 1.49; t(18) = -2.49, p = .02, 95%CI[-3.14, -0.26]). Anagrams in the main 
experiment therefore had 4+ letters underlined.  
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Appendix 9. Source memory analysis for Experiment 5. 
Section 4.7.4 outlines the findings of the source analysis for the lies that participants 
reported during interview. The results of the analyses for the remaining item types are 
reported below (items lied about, items reported truthfully, and items not asked about). 
A series of Poisson loglinear generalized estimating equations (GEE) were performed to 
examine the distribution of source responses for each type of item and determine the 
types of source errors participants made (depicted in Figure A9.1). Separate GEE 
models were performed on each type of item—control items, lies that participants 
reported during interview, items from the crime that participants lied about during 
interview, and items from the crime that participants reported truthfully during 
interview—with Cognitive Load and the source option selected as predictors. From this, 
the likelihood that participants selected the correct source option compared to the 
remaining 4 source options could be calculated. Table A9.1 shows the odds ratios (ORs) 
for the change in the count for each source option compared to the correct option. The 
findings for each type of item are summarized below (excluding the items reported 
during interview, as these results are reported in Section 4.7.4). 
Control items. The top left panel of Figure A9.1 shows the distribution of source 
responses for items shown in the mock crime that participants were not asked about 
during interview (control items). Given that these items were not discussed during 
interview, the cognitive load manipulation was not expected to affect source memory for 
these items. As expected, the distributions for the source responses were similar across 
all cognitive load conditions and participants selected the correct source option 
significantly more often than all other options, regardless of cognitive load (χ2(4) = 
169.59, p < .001; see Table A9.1 for ORs). The GEE confirmed that there was no 
interaction between Cognitive Load and the source option selected (χ2(8) = 4.20, p = 
.84). This provides evidence that the differences in source memory performance 
between cognitive load conditions seen for other item types are indeed attributable to the 
cognitive load manipulation during interview. 
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Items lied about. The bottom left panel of Figure A9.1 shows the distribution of source 
responses for items that participants lied about during interview. We can see that 
participants selected the correct source option more often than all other options, 
regardless of cognitive load (χ2(4) = 154.71, p < .001; see Table A9.1 for ORs). The 
type of cognitive load imposed during interview did not affect source memory for items 
lied about. The GEE confirmed that there was no interaction between Cognitive Load 
and the source option selected (χ2(8) = 6.13, p = .63). Thus, participants typically did not 
forget that these items originated from the crime after lying about them and remembered 
that they lied about them during interview, regardless of cognitive load. 
Items reported truthfully. We can see from the bottom right panel of Figure A9.1 that 
the distribution of source responses for items reported truthfully during interview differs 
depending on the cognitive load imposed during interview: the GEE revealed a 
significant interaction between Cognitive Load and the source option selected (χ2(8) = 
35.18, p < .001). To break down this interaction, separate GEE models were performed 
for each cognitive load condition. The differences in the option selected are most 
pronounced for participants interviewed under high intrinsic load. These participants 
selected the correct option significantly more often than all other responses and showed 
the best source performance (see Table A9.1 for ORs). 
Participants interviewed under low load also selected the correct option significantly 
more often than all other responses, but the effect size for the difference in the counts 
was smaller than participants interviewed under high intrinsic load, as indicated by 
smaller ORs. Participants interviewed under high extraneous load also rarely forgot that 
these items came from the crime, but were no less likely to select option 2 (“This item 
was shown in the mock crime, but I lied when I was asked about it at interview”) 
compared to the correct answer, indicating that participants interviewed under high 
extraneous load sometimes misremembered how they spoke about the items during 
interview. Overall, regardless of the cognitive load imposed during interview, 
participants rarely forgot that items originated from the crime when they reported them 
truthfully during interview. 
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Figure A9.1. The distribution of source attributions for items that participants were not 
interviewed about (top left panel), lies reported during interview (top right panel), items 
lied about during interview (bottom left panel) and items reported truthfully during 
interview (bottom right panel). The correct source option for each type of item is 
highlighted in grey. Attributions of ≤3 represent the judgement that the item was shown 
in the mock crime and attributions of >3 represent the judgement that the item was not 
shown in the mock crime: 1 = “This was shown in the mock crime and I gave it as a 
truthful answer to a question at interview”, 2 = “This was shown in the mock crime, but 
I lied when I was asked about it at interview”, 3 = “This was shown in the mock crime, 
but I was NOT asked a question about it at interview”, 4 = “This was NOT shown in the 
mock crime, but I gave it as a lie in response to a question at interview”, 5 = “This was 
NOT shown in the mock crime and I was NOT asked a question about it at interview.” 
Error bars represent ±1 SE of the mean. 
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Table A9.1 
Odds ratios (ORs) indicating the change in the count for each source option compared 
to the correct source option for all item types. 
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Note: * indicates p < .05; ** indicates p < .001. LL = low load, HLI = high intrinsic 
load, HLE = high extraneous load. The source option numbers correspond to the 
following statements: 1 = “This was shown in the mock crime and I gave it as a truthful 
answer to a question at interview”, 2 = “This was shown in the mock crime, but I lied 
when I was asked about it at interview”, 3 = “This was shown in the mock crime, but I 
was NOT asked a question about it at interview”, 4 = “This was NOT shown in the 
mock crime, but I gave it as a lie in response to a question at interview”, 5 = “This was 
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NOT shown in the mock crime and I was NOT asked a question about it at interview.” 
ORs of <1 indicate that the option was selected less often than the correct option; ORs 
of >1 indicate that the option was selected more often than the correct option. Values in 
parentheses indicate 95% confidence intervals. For control items and items lied about, 
the interaction between Source Option and Cognitive Load was not significant and 
therefore only ORs for the main effect of Source Option are reported.  
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Appendix 10. CIT questions asked in Session 3 of Experiment 6. 
(S) indicates substitute irrelevants to replace irrelevants that participants gave as their lie 
in Session 2 of the experiment. 
Question Probe Irrelevants 
Was this the item used to conceal the CCTV 
camera?  










Was this the item used to cut the padlock off 
the device case?   





Was this the item that the computer files were 
copied onto?   








Was this the phone that was used to 


















Was this the object that you took the device 
away in?  




Tote bag (S) 
 
 
 
 
